Optimal Allocation of Security Resources by Using Game Theorie

Security is one of the most important concerns around the world. In most fields of security, accessibility to security resources for protection is limited. Some important issues, including universal threats of terrorism, drug-smuggling, has increased our requirement of settling limited security resources in order to maximize the efficiency of resources. Game theory provides a logical method in order for allocating security resources to prevent enemies’ targets. In addition, it helps us to analyze a competitive situation using a mathematical approach. The aim of this paper is to study Stackleberg games model and its applications in allocating limited security resources. In this model, first, the defender chooses its strategy and then the attacker, with information of what the defender chose, chooses its strategy. Now, the defender has to make its decision. In most security problems, the defender maybe confronts two or more different attackers which they have their own targets. These games are called multi-objective Stackelberg Games which is formulated as multi-objective optimization problem. For determining the payoffs of each player, the experts’ opinions are employed and also for modelling the uncertainty due to the experts’ opinions, the theory of uncertainty is used. Then the method of weighted summation for this type of games has been used. Finally, an application of this model for providing security in borders is expressed.