An Inquiry into the Relationship between Character Traits and Situations: Critical Analysis of Miller’s Response to Situationists’ objections

Unlike virtue ethicistswho emphasize the existence of robust character traits in individuals, philosophical situationists argue that character traits do not exist. Based on the findings of social psychologists, situationists claim that the virtue ethicist's view of character traits is false. Arguments presented by situationists such as Harman, Doris, and Flanagan are grounded in empirical evidence provided by social psychologists; the empirical findings that lead to serious concerns and tensions for virtue ethics. In response to situationists, virtue ethicists, including Christian Miller, strived to defend the existence of character traits. The present paper is an attempt to introduce a novel and multidimensional viewpoint about the role of character traits and situations. First, the paper reviews Miller’s responses to situationists while elaborating on the situationists’ questions and arguments. Second, both stands are critically analyzed and evaluated and a novel viewpoint is suggested as a better alternative for understanding the basis of individual’s moral thoughts and actions. The paper proposes that the reality of individuals' moral thoughts and actions are neither solely based on situations, nor exclusively determined by robust character traits. Rather, it is a dual-aspect unit of character and situation that determines an individual’s moral thoughts and actions.