Explaining the Unity of Objects, Including Human Beings, Based on Aquins’s Hylomorphism; the First Interpretation: Properties as Powers

Relying on the teachings of Aquinas, Oderberg as one of the analytic hylomorphists ascribes the unity of an object to form. His view is that if form is responcible for unity, it should be a simple entity not a composite one. In this article, we have shown that although one can find this view tenable, but his own specific metaphysics cannot support it. In doing so, we first focus on his explanation of form and analyze his argument for form. We argue that his view suffers from many weaknesses. In the sequel, we explained our own argument for unity of form, which is taken from Aristotle. At the end, we showed that even if we ignore the weaknesses of Oderberg’s argument and accept his claim to the unity of form, his metaphysics cannot support this theory.