Global Information Ethics: Analysis and Critique of Charles Ess View

Information technology makes possible the relationship between people around the ‎world. Hence, the information ethics theorists, such as Charles Ess, are trying to ‎propose a global ethical theory. Ess believes that this global theory in the field of ‎meta-ethics requires some kind of pluralism, in the name of interpretive pluralism, ‎and in the normative field of care ethics, virtue ethics and confucian ethics. This ‎paper, by using library research method and conceptual analysis, while introducing the view of Charles Ess, illustrates some of the most ‎important theoretical gaps in his project. His interpretive pluralism does not solve ‎the problem of relativism in relation to ethical judgment about “the other”. Also, his ‎defense of interpretive pluralism based on two incorrect assumptions. First, he has ‎supposed that cultural differences necessarily entail ethical differences; secondly, ‎he argues that pluralism is an accepted theory in all ethical approaches of the world. ‎In the normative field, the defense of the ethics of care, virtue and Confucius, in ‎contrast to consequentialism and deontologism, is not justified. The critiques do not ‎falsify the whole project, proposing a global information ethics; these clarify the ‎future paths of research to strengthen it.‎