The Epistemic Value of Religious Beliefs and the Application of Affirmative and Negative Pattern of Pragmatism in the Qur'an

Trying to show the epistemological value of religious beliefs has always been one of the preoccupations of philosophers and theologians. While a group of philosophers of religion denies the epistemic value of religious beliefs, others emphasize their epistemic validity. Although each of these two groups differ in their criteria for the epistemological evaluation of beliefs, they all consider the nature of such criteria to be a priori. In the meantime, by denying this common point, the school of pragmatism tries to evaluate the epistemic value of religious beliefs based on their practical aspects. The aim of the present study is to try to examine the validity of pragmatic views in evaluating religious beliefs based on the Quranic teachings. In this regard, based on some verses of the Holy Quran, the authors will show that pragmatism as a criterion in determining and evaluating the epistemic value of religious beliefs is not incompatible with the Quranic teachings, but several verses have pragmatic aspects. The approach of this research is critical analysis and its result is to show that pragmatism as a criterion for evaluating the epistemological value of Islamic beliefs should not be considered as a threat. In this regard, it will be demonstrated that, in evaluating beliefs both affirmatively and negatively, the Holy Qur'an judges them based on their practical results, rather than presenting logical arguments.