The Subject Predicate Sentence in Aristotelian, Stoic and Sinaitic Logic

Aristotle considered the subject predicate structure and the simple proposition, based on his categorical and ontological view, predicating the sentence on the subject and its existence, and the Stoics, by denying the objective existence, introduced the contents of this atomic proposition as the coexistence of the subject and the predicate. The result of these two different views on this structure is the formation of a predicative argument in Aristotelian logic and the inefficiency of the Stoic atomic proposition. Avicenna and his followers, on the other hand, by abandoning the categorical and philosophical view on the meanings of singular, introduced another structure. This approach to the content of the predicate structure leads to the formation of the predicative conditional argument in Avicenna's logic, which does not contradict the conditional arguments in this logic. Therefore, in this logic, in addition to predicative argument, conditional arguments are also presented. The combination of the predicative and conditional reasoning in Avicenna's logic has led scholars of logic to question whether the Avicenna's logic is a combination of Aristotelian logic and Stoic conditional logic or it has an independent nature? Because Aristotelian and Stoic logic are incompatible with each other. In the face of this question, some logicians have adopted the view of combination. Using a descriptive-analytical method this paper studies the difference between the Avicenna predicative proposition, Aristotelian simple proposition and Stoic atomic proposition to distinguish Avicenna's logic from the other two logics.