An Analysis of Future possibility from Avicenna's Perspective

Avicenna defines “future possibility” as the negation of any necessity in the future. He considers the absence of the object as the wrong condition for this type of possibility. In this research, the concepts of general possibility, special possibility, contingency, and future possibility are formulated. The author then proceeds to demonstrate that the definition of the contingency, as presented in the Book of Healing (Kitāb al-Shifā), suffers from ambiguity. Finally, the author explores the question of whether the addition of some condition, which was added after Avicenna, to the definition of future possibility, namely, “the negation of necessity conditioned by predication”, is warranted or not. Two analyses of future possibility will then be presented and the author attempts to show that Qutb al-Din Razi had proposed the aforementioned condition before Sabzivari. As will be shown, this condition is not compatible with Avicenna's modal system.