مجله فلسفه و کلام اسلامی
سال پنجاه و ششم شماره 2 (پاییز و زمستان 1402)

In a previous scholarly contribution (A1), a critical examination was conducted wherein the foremost arguments substantiating and challenging the theory of the "amalgamation of the intelligent and the intelligible" were scrutinized. Through a meticulous critique, I advanced the proposition that a stance of reticence should be adopted concerning this theory. The approach characterized by reticence has encountered critique in another scholarly investigation (A2), wherein the author endeavored to salvage the "mutual correlation" argument from the perceived challenges presented in my article. In the present article, upon scrutinizing A2, I have demonstrated: 1-A2 effectively abandons the "mutual correlation" argument and advances alternative contentions not articulated by Sadra himself; 2-these contentions prove inadequate in substantiating the postulated unity of matter and form integral to the theory of the "amalgamation of the intelligent and the intelligible"; 3-none of the objections posited by A2 find incorporation within A1. It has been clarified that being non-material is not a condition of being intellectualized, and this matter does not contradict being non-material of perceptual forms. It is also known that the condition of being actually intellectualized is being non-material substance.

In the works of Ibn Sina, expressions related to the discussion of will are phrased in a way that allows for two interpretations. Some researchers believe that Ibn Sina considers the attribute of will to be verbally common between the Necessary Being (God) and humanity. In contrast, others argue that he views this attribute as semantically common. Examination of Ibn Sina's works indicates that his expressions, in cases such as the following, have laid the groundwork for the interpretation of verbal commonality: (1) the absence of conceptual conflict in divine attributes, especially knowledge and will; (2) the distinction of will in the Necessary Being and humanity. On the other hand, his expressions regarding the division of will and the comparison of will in humans and the Necessary Being provide the basis for interpreting semantic commonality. It seems plausible to consider Ibn Sina's theory as semantic commonality and, relying on his expressions about will and divine attributes, present an interpretation of evidence supporting verbal commonality. Examining Ibn Sina's works allows us to define will as "a quality in the agent of the world that causes the issuance of an action from him." In this case, the will between God and humans will be semantically common. Within such a definition, the distinction between the will of God and the will of humans will be merely an extensional difference.

One of the most important principles in theology, laying the foundation for many rules and issues in this field, is the principle of "rational goodness and badness." Acceptance of this principle significantly influences our perspective on the world, theology, and other crucial theological matters. Muslim theologians have two perspectives on this principle. The Adlīyah (including Mu'tazilites and Imamis) accept it, believing that the goodness and badness of actions are intrinsic, and human reason and nature comprehend them without considering anything else. On the other hand, the Ash'aris deny its rational nature, asserting that the divine law specifies the goodness and badness. In this paper, we aim to analyze and explore this principle from the perspective of the narratives of the Imāms (peace be upon them) using an analytical-descriptive and library-based approach. We seek to clarify whether the principle itself or its substance is mentioned in the narratives. According to the findings of this research, the Imāms have addressed this issue, and the narratives sometimes explicitly and sometimes implicitly indicate the rational goodness and badness. This article will elaborate on the explanation of these narratives.

In the fourth chapter of Pointers and Remarks (Al-Ishārāt wa al-Tanbīhāt), Avicenna draws conclusions from the univocality of extension within a certain category, positing the existence of an immaterial entity alongside materialistic extensions. Avicenna’s treatment of the relationship between universals and their extensions often resembles the familial bond between fathers and sons (plurality within plurality). However, in the fourth chapter of Pointers and Remarks, he introduces a novel model akin to the relationship between a single father and his sons (unity within plurality). By examining interpretations and comments on Pointers and Remarks, we delve into this conceptual tension. While Avicenna’s argument establishes the existence of universals in the external world, it falls short of proving their immaterial nature. His perspective aligns with realism, yet it also echoes Hamedani Man (al-Rajul al-Hamidānī)’s stance on universals—a viewpoint that necessitates reform and reconstruction. Employing a historical approach, we critically assess these ideas to arrive at a more coherent perspective.

The main issue of this research is to examine Christopher Franklin's solution to Ensurance and Rollback formulation of Luck, and its purpose is to criticize this solution and show the ineffectiveness of his answer in a descriptive-analytical way. According to the problem of luck, the negation of determinism in the creation of an action leads to luck, and its requirement is the negation of free will. Franklin, who is one of the supporters of event-based causation, offers four formulations of this problem. Negation of determinism in Ensurance formulation leads to unguaranteed action and in the Rollback formulation, leads to the failure to predict the occurrence of an action at the moment of its occurrence. Franklin's answer is based on recognizing the proper location of indeterminism in the process leading to free action. According to him, by placing indeterminism at the moment of the basic action, the two formulations of luck can be solved. According to this interpretation, the agent's reasons, including his desires, goals and emotions, are the cause of free action. In this research, it is revealed that the indeterministic causality of the agent's reasons for free action, which is considered the central core of Franklin's view, is exactly where it leads to the randomness of free action, and as a result, the problem of luck remains valid.

This paper has two objectives first, to provide an explanation and analysis of Anselm and Plantinga's ontological argument based on the interpretation of William Rowe, a contemporary atheist, and second, to determine the place of the fallacy of " begging the question" in this argument. After presenting the criticisms of Anselm's interpretation of the argument, Rowe considers Plantinga's modal version to be the most convincing version of the argument and believes that previous interpretations, based on the principle that "existence in reality" is a superior property, are caught in a logical fallacy. Plantinga's interpretation is also based on the premise that God is "a possible being with maximum perfection," and this proposition is true only if God exists in the real world. In this research, using an analytical-critical method, I show that Anselm's interpretation and Plantinga's reconstruction of it are fallacious, and although Plantinga's modal interpretation has logical necessity, it does not prove the necessity of God's existence in the external world. This is because perfection in this argument is defined in a way that falls into the fallacy of "begging the question”.

Sufism has evolved around the principles of etiquettes and has become well-established. Behavioral etiquettes derived from Quran, traditions, and the biography of spiritual leaders are considered part of the spiritual journey and are classified in relation to the self (nafs), rights (adab with Allāh), and interactions with others. Abu al-Qasim Qushayri Nishaburi (376-465 AH) briefly outlined some of these etiquettes in his work “Sufi Etiquettes” (Ādāb al-Sufiyya). The significance of “Sufi Etiquettes”, in addition to understanding Qushayrī's philosophical system as one of the influential Sufi leaders, lies in recognizing the favorable practices of the monastic communities of that time and how the development of mystical concepts occurred. Despite its great importance and recognition by both earlier and later bibliographers, this concise educational treatise had not been introduced and edited until the discovery of two complete and ancient manuscripts from the first half of the eighth century. This research aims to provide an overview of the tradition of writing Sufi etiquettes, introduce this treatise, and present an edited and revised version of the text.

Master Mesbah considers the existence of God as "unlimited intensity." Emphasizing the gradation and longitudinal plurality of existence, he holds a hierarchical gradation to the extent that each level possesses perfections superior to and without deficiencies of the lower ranks. Therefore, the divine existence, being at the highest level of this hierarchical system, has infinite perfections and intensity of existence. He perceives, for the contingent beings, an existence beyond the cause. Consequently, the expansive essence of God's existence, as the cause of all causes, is limited by its contingent effects. He attributes his perspective to Mulla Sadra. However, this perspective has shortcomings: 1. Contingent beings do not have an existence beyond the cause, and nothing other than the will of the causal existence defines them. They cannot limit the expansive existence of the first cause, and God is the "unlimited intensity." 2. This perspective does not align with the explicit statements of Sadra al-Muta'allihin and the mystics. Mulla Sadra emphasizes that discussing the gradation and longitudinal plurality of existence is a preliminary framework that prepares the mind for the ultimate perspective. This research employs an analytical-critical method to elucidate Master Mesbah's perspective and evaluates it based on the ultimate viewpoint of Mulla Sadra.

In Classical Logic, an argument is deemed valid if and only if it lacks a counterexample. However, arguments like  and  are considered valid based on this definition, despite natural intuition challenging their validity. A New Outlook on the Elements of Logic introduces a novel definition for argument validity, rendering the aforementioned arguments unprovable. This new definition necessitates revisions in argument evaluation, the substitution rule, the definition of logical truth, methods for determining argument validity and invalidity, as well as the definition and procedure of soundness and completeness proofs in Classical Logic. The establishment of the Truth-Functional System of Propositional Logic stems from this revised definition.Asadollah Fallahi critiques this system in "Hajhosseini’s Truth-Functional Semantics," published in Philosophy and Kalam, 2023, Vol. 56, issue 1. While proposing scattered criticisms, this article reveals that, aside from one critique requiring rectification due to an inadvertent mistake, the other criticisms stem from fallacies, unfounded accusations, non-compliance with certain critique conditions, incorrect formulation of the definition of a valid argument, and oversight of consequences arising from new conditions for argument validity and its definition.

In Uthulujiyya, "thought" (fikr) is discussed in various ontological, theological, cosmological, and psychological contexts, while "contemplation," (nazar) often contrasted with "action" in contemporary discourse, is explored in theological discussions on cosmology and existential meaning. This paper aims to examine the ontological usage of the terms "thought" and "contemplation" in Uthulujiyya theological discourse. The central question is: How are "thought" and "contemplation" employed in relation to God and the world? Are these two concepts interchangeable? The answer posits that in Uthulujiyya theology, "thought" cannot be attributed to God (a negative approach), while "contemplation" can be ascribed to God, intellect and soul (a positive approach). "Contemplation" is discussed in the context of the theory of emanation (feiz wa soudour), intertwined with cosmology and theology. Based on this foundation, in this essay, we aim to elucidate the theological meanings of "thought" and " contemplation " in Uthulujiyya and examine their applications in the its theology and cosmology.

In this exploration, we delve into the profound concept of beauty and its antithesis—ugliness—through the lens of the philosopher Suhrawardī. Renowned for his emphasis on Illuminationism and the boundless realm of imagination, Suhrawardī’s discourse extends beyond the luminous to encompass the very essence of ugliness. Our purpose is to unravel the enigma of what Shaikh-i-Ishraq truly meant by ugliness and how he articulated it within the framework of his philosophical tenets. Through meticulous analysis, we discern various facets of ugliness: the palpable, the perceptible, and the ethereal, all interwoven within Suhrawardī’s literary tapestry. Ultimately, we witness how ugliness, akin to darkness, stands in stark contrast to the radiant light—a symbol of beauty and virtue—pervading Suhrawardī’s profound philosophy.

The process of sense perception has been a subject of discussion in Islamic philosophy, and four theories have been proposed to explain the sense perception process. Before Sheikh Ishraq, mystics focused on impressions in sense perceptions, and mathematicians considered the emergence of rays in visual perception. Suhrawardī, through criticizing the theories before him regarding visual perception, emphasizes the relation of illuminational relation (al-iḍāfa al-ishrāqiyya) and the direct connection of the human soul with external agents. Although he extensively discusses the quality of visual perception, he has not explicitly addressed the quality of perception in other sense faculties. This has led some to doubt the generalization of his theory to other sense perceptions. In this paper, we attempt to provide evidence for the generalization of Suhrawardī's theory to other sense faculties. To demonstrate the effectiveness of this theory in his philosophical system, we study some of its functions within his philosophical system. In this article, we present three pieces of evidence for the generalization of his theory to other sense faculties, and among these three pieces of evidence, two are considered innovations in this paper. Finally, we will examine the functions of this theory in Suhrawardī's theological-philosophical system.