The Role of Certainty in The Argument from Design

One of the rational ways of knowing God that is understandable to the general public is thinking about the phenomena of the natural world, which in various aspects (coming into being or huduth, movement, etc.) can be a way for man to know the creator of the world. One of the most prominent and apparent of them is the order and precision that governs the world. From the argument from design, various accounts have been presented, one of which is based on the law of probability. The martyred professor Morteza Motahari has given this account of the argument from design in his works, just as he has also explained it according to the law of congruity of cause and effect. Certainty arising from the argument from design according to the law of probability is epistemological and logical certainty, not psychological certainty which has no logical or epistemological value. Of course, this certainty is not certainty in the specific sense that exists in Awwalliyyat (primary propositions) and Fitriyyat (natural propositions), rather it is a certainty at the level of Mutawatirat (widely reported propositions), Tajribiyyat (empirical propositions), and Hadsiyyat (inspired propositions). But the certainty resulting from the argument from design according to the law of congruity of cause and effect is certainty in the special sense and is equivalent to the certainty of logical Awwalliyyat (primary propositions) and Fitriyat (natural propositions). In this article, the two accounts of the argument are explained and examined, and the objections to the account of the argument from design according to the law of probability are answered.