Liza’s Subjective Relativism and its Guide in Comparison to Absolutism in Transcendent Theosophy

“Philosophy for children” is a new subject in modern syllabus of education in the course of improvement of practicing philosophy and reason for children. Despite its good capacity to make a room for thinking and creativity, this plan has principles irreconcilable with those of Iranian local philosophy. It is thus necessary to scrutinize its philosophical principles. Due to the importance of ethics and moral training as one aim of such a plan learnt by the kids by means of story, this article studies the principles of ethical relativism of Liza’s story and its guide (the content of Lipman’s plan for moral training) and compares it to Transcendent Theosophy. A descriptive-analytic study of the content proves that, despite Lipman’s rejection of relativism, his denial of the absolute good and his voice that values and thinking are personal and prepared by a ground are documents denoting that the content is morally relativistic. Since it fails to free from the strains of conventionalism and its lack of fixed criteria, this content suffers from relativism and its consequences. In contrast, Transcendent Theosophy is safe from the harm of relativism because it considers the ethical propositions absolute and adapts an ontological and virtue-ethic attitude. It has thus more appropriate axiological principles in the creation of a coherent plan for moral training.