Developing a Model of Providing Medical and Health Facilities Based on for-Profit Contracts in Iranian Banks

Health care financing in Iran uses a multiple model in which the government, insurance companies and patients simultaneously bear the costs of health care. Despite the government's extensive expenditures and the share of some expenses by insurance companies, patients’ out-of-pocket payment is significant which necessitates their being supported. One is banking facilities provided through Qard al-Hasan (benevolent loan). This, however, being somehow against Banks’ interests, is practically unsuccessful, and in many cases patients need to apply for loans to meet their needs, which is a form of formalization. The purpose of this paper is to provide a model to address this shortcoming in the health financing system. This model is presented using analytical-descriptive method and comparative comparison so that in addition to securing the interests of banks, it also meets the medical needs of facility applicants. The results show that the diversity of medical needs in the forms of diagnostic, medical, nursing and home nursing services has necessitated a diverse range of banking contracts. Compliance of medical needs with banking contracts shows that facilities like Ju’alah, Murabaha (installment sale), Istisna’ and Ijarah can be used in such cases. The three main players in this model are banks, patients and hospitals, and the communication mechanism is designed in such a way as to prevent moral hazards and adverse selections.