Critique of the Principle of the One (Al-Wāḥid) with Reliance on Avicenna's Opinions

The principle of al-wāḥid is one of the principles that has long been of interest to philosophers so that some references to the contents of this principle can be found in the works of Plotinus, but Ibn Sina seems to be the first person to have tried to logically prove the principle of al-wāḥid. Although his theories seem to differ in his various works to justify the issuance of plurality from unity, he can generally be considered as one of the defenders of this principle with the contents intended by philosophers. The authors of the present article intend to refer to Avicenna’s works, and while extracting the differences in his statement about the issuance of plural from one, to critique the arguments he has presented in support of the principle of al-wāḥid. Although some criticisms have been written about Avicenna’s opinions (on this subject) and some people have sought to answer, we have, in this article, by analyzing Avicenna’s own words, reached some instances, most of which are not brought up by the critics and are therefore considered as a new analysis. For example, it can be said that, firstly, proving the principle of al-wāḥid logically causes a vicious circle, and secondly, other principles accepted by Avicenna show that the issuance of plural from the simple one is possible and will not lead to insertion (tarakkub) in essence.