The Semantic and Epistemological Position of Mystery From the Viewpoints of Gabriel Marcel and Muṣṭafā Malikiyān

Mystery, as a word that has a slippery and vague meaning, is defined by Muṣṭafā Malikiyān and Gabriel Marcel in two different but explicit and definitive ways. These two thinkers take different approaches to mystery by presenting different definitions of it and adopting different philosophical affiliations. In this paper, which has been written in a descriptive-analytical way with references to library sources, the role and effect of belief in mystery in the epistemological system and, consequently, in the human’s existential and practical ways of life is clarified. The approach that Marcel takes in the face of mystery makes him the philosopher of mystery and keeps him constantly engaged with mysterious matter, while the approach adopted by Malikiyān keeps him away from what he considers to be mystery such that he deems wisdom as avoiding mysteries. These two philosopher’s viewpoints differ in semantic, epistemological, and ontological aspects as well as in the human’s access to mystery.