A Study of Ḥakīm Khājūī’s Objections to the Gnostic Theory of Oneness of Being

As the basis of theoretical gnosis, oneness of being has provoked several debates among thinkers in the history of Islamic philosophy. Mullā Ismā‘īl Khājūī, one of the thinkers and Mutikallimun of the Safavid period and post-Sadrian era, has criticized this theory and challenged it from different aspects. Khājūī rejects this theory based on the ontological differences between the Necessary Being and possible beings, absence of absoluteness in the Necessary Being, the lack of a rational argument for demonstrating the oneness of being, and the inefficiency of the arguments of some gnostics and mystics on proving this oneness. However, the present study postulates that Khājūī’s criticisms originate in confusing the different meanings of certain key terms in philosophical sciences and kalām with those in theoretical gnosis. Nevertheless, it seems that in certain cases, such as gnostics’ failure in adducing a rational argument for demonstrating the oneness of being, his criticism is justified.