Measuring Collective Judgment: Public Choice Theory and Judicial Ethics in the Structure and Functioning of the Administrative Justice Court

The theory of public choice is the study of politics based on economic principles. Today, the application of this theory has expanded into issues such as judicial behavior that has been widely accepted in the field of order. Studies have shown that the concept of general selection theory in judging has practically proved a kind of interdependence between the personal interest of the judiciary and its effects on the outcome of the lawsuit. The nature of the proceedings, the difficulty of an agreement between judges, the inequality of judges, the uncertainty in judgments and the influence of superior justices on the other judges, is one of the disadvantages of this type of judgment that is judged in the light of the structure and functioning of the full bench and specialized chambers of the Administrative Justice Court. The purpose of this study is to examine the possibility of the existence of a personal judicial interest in administrative justice. The present study, with a descriptive-analytic approach, explains this relationship and proves that these chambers are not exempt from the constent pressures and material temptations of interest groups, the non-judicial ethics and the culture of expediency stemming from the practices of the Administrative Justice Court.