Boghossian on Constructivism about Rational Explanation
Paul Boghossian regards constructivism about the explanation of belief as one of the theses espoused by the constructivist picture of knowledge. The strong version of this thesis assumes the cause of belief exclusively social and gives no place to epistemic reasons and its weak version while making room for epistemic reasons, never considers them sufficient without the intervention of social influences. Boghossian explicitly considers the strong version of this thesis to be rooted in the Strong Program, but implicitly attributes its weak version to it. He tries hard to refute both versions; however, as I will indicate in this paper, his criticisms are based either on unsuccessful arguments or on a misconception of the Strong Program. Since, this program does not consider epistemic reasons ineffective or insufficient in creating belief; rather, it considers the reasons themselves socially constructed or constituted. Therefore, the Strong Program’s position does not undermine rational discourse and contrary to Boghossian’s claim, its proponents can argue in defense of themselves without committing any contradictions or falling into the trap of self-refutation.
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