نشریه جاویدان خرد
سال بیستم شماره 1 (پیاپی 43، بهار و تابستان 1402)

the view of souls eternity has been sometimes explained on the basis of the opposite mode of principle “all things coming to being are preceded by potentiality and matter”. this principle has been challenged in islamic philosophy and it is the ground for introducing the body as the matter of the multiple souls and the base of preferring the soul’s spiritual coming to being by Ibn-Sina. Ibn-Sina referring to personal mental properties shows that these properties cannot be explained without multiplicity of human souls. transcendental wisdom says that Ibn-Sina’s view is subjected trying to reconstruct it. The present study stating the reasons for the unity or plurality of human souls based on the mentioned rational rule, an attempt has been made to express the subjections on the rule and the proposed answers, finding a new way sole the challenges on the soul’s occurrence and its coming to being.

We can introduce two classes of scenarios. The first, standard model of cosmology proposes a scenario in which the BigBang is beginning, and the second, scenarios where the BigBang is merely a gate to our universe and the universe have more dimensions than ours. The basic question is why and how did the universe come to be out of nothing? To answer such a question, two methods have been taken in the physics: firstly, finite but no boundary model and secondly, the scenario of eternal inflation. Having explained the two classes, I will show that the main experimental and theoretical evidence support the past incomplete directions of the universe; whether we consider it as Big Bang or more developed. Also, the existing models and scenarios are not against the supernatural approach, but also consolidate it.

The review of the works of Mir Sayyid Sharif Jurjani (1816 AH) indicates that the theory of the unity of existence (waḥdat al-wujūd) was one of his main questions. Jurjani has tried to bring reasoning and intuition closer together in this matter as much as possible. According to his point of view, the correct understanding and recognition of the unity of the existence of mystics can only be achieved through the way beyond the way of reason, i.e. intuition. Reason can prove the "unity of existence", but not as the mystics believe, because the denial of plurality in "existence" is in conflict with the verdict of reason that the existence of multitudes is self-evident. Influenced by his predecessors, based on Ibn Sina's argument on divine monotheism, he has tried to argue on a kind of existential monotheism, which of course is accompanied by many fallacies that make it impossible to accept it. In this article, based on documentary method, Jurjani's statements about existential monotheism have been collected and then described and analyzed philosophically.

Speaking of the history of Muslim moral thought, the age of the Companions is still unknown and unexplored. Common ideas in this period have survived in the form of Narrations. Attitudes are different in assessing their validity. One way in the histori-cal analysis of these narrations can be that by accepting the attribution of the narrations of each narrator and analyzing the content of their collection, we will try to reconstruct the symbolized character which these naarations present. In the present study, we should try to use such a method to analyze the moral narrations of Anas b. Malik (d. 93 AH), a companion living in Basra. This study is devoted to reviewing and analyzing the content of some of his moral narrations that reflect the general framework of his vision of the supreme good for human beings.

Kant argued that in order to bring about validity for knowledge we have to make a paradigm shift. The paradigm shift which was well known as copernican revolution was based on this assumption that the one who observing could be able to determinate objects. For Kant subject as observer has the ability to determine the world transcendentally. For Hegel the Kantian paradigm shift count as subjetivising the objectivity. He blames Kant for not seeing this basic fact that, subject himself become in the objectivity and the relation could not be as Kant was assuming. Hegel by replacing the transcendental I with Giest attempts to instead of making objectivity, subjective, do the reverse. In this article we argue that by objectivizing the subjectivity, Hegel not inly became able to overcome the problems posed by Kantian philosophy but also assumes subjectivity as intrinsically intersubjective

Descartes found the main basis of modern thought. As a critic of modern thought, Gadamer has a critical approach to Descartes' philosophy. If we don't pay attention to this point, we can't understand many themes of Gadamer's philosophy. Descartes' epistemology is the origin of the idea of absolute human reason in the history of modern philosophy, from its perspective, one can achieve universal and certain knowledge and truth. Gadamer's thoughts on understanding and truth criticize this idea, i.e. this Cartesian approach in modern epistemology. Gadamer's criticism of the Cartesian approach of modern epistemology targets the foundations of Descartes' philosophy; e.g. the concept of absolute reason, foundationalism, certainty, and denying the validity of tradition. Here we will examine Gadamer's critical approach to these Cartesian themes and then we will try to ask the Cartesian problem of validity and epistemological justification from Gadamer and examine the possible answer derived from his works.

While Descartes tried in his philosophy after using the procedure of doubt by introspection and rational intuition to achieve the essence of “the self” as thinking substance and then by clear and distinct ideas that he already had of “the other” (including God and other creatures) to make judgement about the existence and the essence of “the other” and in the end by using the truths which were known with the mediation of natural light of reason to acquire the regulator moral principles with “the other”, Pascal in addition of asserting the impossibility of discovering “the self” by introspection, reversed all the creative process of Descartes and considered discovering of “the self” in its relation with “the other” and succedent to it and as a result, the free thinking and autonomous Cartesian subject that faced “the other” only as its object of knowledge and supposed the existence and the essence of “the other” as something dependent on the ideas that he had from them, manifested in complete contrast with the heteronymous and subordinate Pascalian human that his only alteration before and after grasping the God’s grace lies in experiencing the different kinds of heteronomy and the impossibility of autonomy and finally, regulation of relation with “the other” just establishes by referring to a “super other” i.eh. God.

Most scholars take Aristotle's Theology as Tanzihi, according to which the philosopher tries to refine and rationalize the principle ideas which are given in a certain religion. Some other scholars, on the other hand, deny such a theology in Aristotle and believe that there is an analogical model between Aristotle's Theology and First Philosophy. In this paper both views have been criticized and a third view has been proposed according to which the philosopher encounters the divinity in the course of his philosophizing and bears a rational experience of divinity. So religion is not the basis of First Philosophy for Aristotle, but is its outcome

The argument from illusion and the argument from hallucination refute the directness of visual perceptual experience. Although the first argument includes at least two disputable premises (the phenomenal principle and the common kind assumption), the second one just includes the common kind assumption. I will illustrate that the arguments, not only have different premises, but concern different subjects. The argument from illusion concerns the object of visual perceptual experience, but the argument from hallucination concerns the nature of the experience. On the basis of this consideration, I will propose the two different senses of directness. According to the first sense, an experience is direct, if it is directed to the world itself. But according to the second sense, an experience is direct, if the world itself, notably not its representation, constitutes the experience.

The history of wisdom is proof that the knowledge of life after death and the discussion about it have always been among the popular mysteries of thinkers. Among them, Sadrul Matalhin is one of the most successful Muslim thinkers who was able to provide a rational analysis and explanation of many situations after death. Among the stances that Mulla Sadra analyzed with evidence is Sarat's position. According to him, the truth of Sarat is nothing but the representation of the soul in the money board on hell, while it seems that this reading of Sarat, by itself, has some kind of incompatibility with the path that is said in religion; The present study, which is written in an analytical-descriptive method, paying attention to the foundations of Muni Sadra'i and religious texts, proves that Sarat is evident, without any doubt, a facet of the inner part of the perfect Muhammadan human being, and what Sadr al-Maltahin says about Sarat in The truth is the quality of crossing the path; In this way, in the present study, while presenting a new interpretation of Sarat seen in Qayamat, Mulla Sadra's interpretation of Sarat (with a little possession and in a way compatible with the aforementioned reading) has been preserved.