Application of the evolutionary game model of genetic transfer to analyze strategic trade relations in target markets in line with regional agreements

Still influenced by Cold War thinking, many countries may interact in the international scenario through competition rather than cooperation. However, in most cases it is not possible to choose permanent trade policies, because by changing the structure of production and the level of development, the interests of countries change. As a result, several forms of strategic interaction emerge during the trade policy process. Accordingly, in this paper, using an asymmetric evolutionary game model and adding a win-win game hypothesis, the effects of applying a cooperation strategy instead of competing in international affairs are analyzed. Examining evolution in the context of game theory helps to better explain phenomena such as cooperative behaviors; therefore, in this study, the dynamic mechanism of change in the period 2005 to 2018 has been considered. Based on the results of the evolutionary game under mixed strategy, Iran will act as a leader due to its higher bargaining power and will choose a competitive strategy instead of cooperating with Turkey, and instead, Turkey will play the role of follower and Instead of competing with Iran, it chooses to cooperate, especially if the projected cost of losing the competition is high. However, in the dynamic evolutionary game under the new win-win hypothesis, it is realized that a strategy of cooperating in trade with Iraq and helping to develop it, is likely to be a logical option for Iran and Turkey. Also, with the presence of Russia, the possibility of gaining more benefits by choosing a cooperation strategy instead of competition will be higher.