Investigation of phenomenological problems for the theory of mental existence in the light of the sense datum theory

There are different tests for an adequate philosophical theory of perception. One of them is phenomenological testing, which focuses on the conscious aspects of sense experiences. Sense-datum theories that appeal to sense data cannot deliver a satisfactory phenomenology. One of the problems is related to awareness of objects that bear the properties that characterize what it is like for us the austere nature of sense data—as objects that only possess sensible qualities— makes it difficult for the theory to adequately capture the phenomenology of “real” experiences. Other problem is related to the primary qualities. A more specific phenomenological problem area for sense datum theory has concerned the experience of depth. The sense datum theorist rebuts some objection by adopting an ontological and epistemological position.One of the leading theories of perception in the ontology of the Islamic philosophy is the theory of mental existence. The sense-datum theory seems to have many similarities with the theory of mental existence. Using some principles of Transcendent philosophy such as the discussion of the nature union between external objects and their mental forms, the resurrection of sensory and imaginary forms to the soul, the distinction between the first carriers and common carriers and the characteristics of present knowledge, the theory of mental existence can be defended against phenomenological problems.