The Objectivity and Externality of Motion in Ibn Sina’s View

Parmenides and Xenon’s argument for denying motion turned this issue from its obvious form into a theoretical one for the first time. Aristotle showed the possibility of motion with the theory of force and action, but did not offer an argument for the existence of motion. Many philosophers after him, without mentioning the issue of acknowledging the external existence of motion, seem to have taken its externality for granted. Ibn Sina considered the argument for the external objectivity of motion to be metaphysical, yet he made no attempt to prove the external existence of motion. However, we can derive arguments from all of his works and ideas to prove the objectivity of motion. In this article, the theory of grace has been used as an argument for the objectivity of motion. Since grace is the permanence of the divine act, and hindering the series of causes is impossible, the occurrence of time is the same as motion. In other words, the continuity of divine grace is nothing but movement. This movement has manifested itself in material objects. His view of time and its relation to objects is also presented as another argument for proving the externality of motion. Ibn Sina considers the existence of time as a proof of the existence of objects.