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سال شانزدهم شماره 2 (پیاپی 89، پاییز و زمستان 1402)

One of the more complex versions of coherentism is the version designed by the contemporary philosopher Nicholas Rescher in a series of his works with special detail. This version claims to be resistant to the usual criticisms of coherentism and more productive in research methodologies. This article, written with a descriptive and analytical method, aims to criticize the main claims of Rescher's version after briefly explaining the generality of this view and expressing its advantages compared to the usual versions of coherentism. The generality of Rescher's point of view can be explained through a brief description of some of the main concepts of his epistemological system, such as "data," "network model," "maximalism," and also with a brief reference to his meta-epistemological perspective, which is a version of pragmatism called "methodological pragmatism." Despite the precision used in this version and its advantages, it seems that some of the main problems of coherentism still persist. The new mechanisms proposed in this version to address these issues are insufficient, and some even introduce additional problems. Furthermore, despite Rescher's insistence on being a coherentist, it appears that his view somehow deviates from the main criterion of coherentism. The amendments used in this version have actually blurred its distinction from some foundationalist versions.

There is a contemporary interpretation of ontological pluralism which formulatesthis thesis under the title of “recognition of ways of being”: that there are differentmodes of being, and things exist in different ways. On the other hand, it is commonin analytic philosophy to take quantifiers as pointers to our ontologicalcommitments. So, this contemporary interpretation brings ontological pluralismalong with quantification theory and accept  the plurality of existential quantifiers,which is better to be labeled as quantificational pluralism. In the following article,after explaining this interpretation, it will be discussed which quantifiers we should consider as the representation of our ontological commitments, and whether multiple quantifiers have overlapping domains. It also asks that, assuming theacceptance of multiple quantifiers, should we also accept the generic quantifier (used in the predicate logic and inspires a monistic interpretation of ontology)? To this end, four arguments for generic quantifier will be presented and, then refuted.However, in the end, generic quantifier prefers over pluralism.

In natural language, we sometimes come across arguments contain non-functional connectives. Classical logic is not able to analyze and formalize these arguments. Moreover, logical implication in a valid argument has four properties: Truth-preservation, Necessity, Formality, and Universality. In classical logic, which evaluates EQT and EFQ as valid and correct, the second property, necessity, is not guaranteed. Hajihosseini in book “A New Outlook on Elements of Logic” has paved the way for solving these two problems by establishing two logical systems, one functional and one non-functional, and extending these systems. In this context, however, Asadollah Fallahi, in his article On Historical Aspects of Hajhosseini’s Logical Systems, published in Knowledge, No. 88/1 (Spring/Summer 2023), has attributed three claims to the author of the book: 1) The separation of functional and non-functional fragments is one of the author's innovations. 2) Classical logic confused material implication and deduction and considered them one. 3) The metatheorem of deduction is incorrect because the relation between the premises is an extensional conjunction. In this article, we demonstrate that none of the above claims were made in the book and that any confusion results from a selective reading of a detailed passage and a lack of understanding Fallahi, also, argues that any contradiction can be derived from a contradiction in the functional system. Moreover, transitive relations in arguments are valid in both functional and non-functional systems, contrary to Tennant's classical relational logic.

The examination of the concept of mind in Aristotle’s psychology poses aconsiderable challenge within his work, De anima. This paper unravels thecomplexities by scrutinizing Aristotle’s expressions as both a response to and anadvancement of Anaxagoras’ Mind theory. Anaxagoras’ theory, whether explicitly orimplicitly, presents mind as both indeterminate and everlasting. However, thesecharacteristics contradict the primary function of the mind, namely, its capacity forknowledge and thought. Anything that is entirely indeterminate lacks resemblanceto anything else, thereby rendering it incapable of comprehending anything, in accordance with the widely accepted axiom that “like is known by like”. Besides, knowledge and thought involve a transformation from potentiality to actuality, implying the involvement of matter, while a material entity cannot possess eternity. In this paper, it is contended that the fourth and fifth chapters of the third book of De anima address these two dilemmas. Aristotle reconciles these attributes by endorsing and reinterpreting Anaxagoras’ theory.

Freedom in Hegel is defined in terms of the determining power of subjectivity, i.e. by the rule “to be with oneself in the other”. Free is the one who moves in his thoughts and actions completely in accordance with the absolute thinking that has been freed from its finitude, meaning that it has become identical with being. Freedom presupposes the elevation to the “absolute” standpoint and conforming to it. Thus, it is tied to the concept of identity. Free is someone who lives (thinks and acts) in accordance with the “absolute” subjectivity. Therefore, the individual is not free as far as he/she is an individual, but only to the extent that he/she is a universal individual (absolute subjectivity). Schelling calls this position on the “absolute” simply “negative”, for it defines the “absolute” as identity-in-difference of thinking and being in accordance with absolute subjectivity or thinking. Being, what Schelling calls the positive, is supposed to be explained away according to thinking, the negative, which means that contingency should be included under necessity.Schelling, on the other hand, emphasizes that contingency takes precedence over necessity, just as Kant’s freedom takes precedence over cognitive thinking. Therefore, in Schelling, thinking sould be based on freedom. Furthermore, heunderstands freedom in relation to the divine. In this article, we will first explain the development of the Hegelian “absolute” in connection with its history in German idealism; Then we will unpack its implications for freedom. After that, we will point out Schelling’s criticism of the Hegelian “absolute”, and finally give a perspective of a non-Hegelian model for freedom.

This paper is a critique of Romanticism as aesthetics of Loss. As a case study, thispaper addresses Life is Elsewhere by Milan Kundera. Nietzsche says that an abundantlife is a major cause of the tragic pain (strong pessimism), but a sense of Loss resultsin Romantic aesthetics (week pessimism). A Romantic poet has been chosen as aprophet who has access to a transcendent truth: a truth going far beyond ordinarylimits; he is a person who is immature because he used to live in ideal place (womb).The Lyrical age, according to Kundera, is youth, and this novel is an epic ofimmaturity. The lyric poetry is an ideal form for self-expression, a poetry that praysemotions per se. Actions have been replaced by enthusiasm. In practice this meansthat poetry retreated into the soul. The current study has already described the crisis of Romanticism as an excess of subjective interiority. A poet goes so far as to say Reality is reduced to the aesthetic object. An action is the conditioned domain, but passion aims at the unconditioned. Poetry is always separate from the reality. These inward explorations do not coincide with the external world. This article focuses on a young poet, Jaromil, who aimed at the unconditioned, yet his last attempt ended in failure, falling under the spell of metaphors.

Philosophers have always looked for the relationship between motivation and moralobligation. For this purpose, Kant proposes a special feeling of respect and offersan interpretation of it that respect is defined as synonymous with morality; At thesame time, this feeling is not of the other feelings and therefore not experimental.Rather, it is similar to the concept of anxiety in Lacan's dissimilarity with empiricalfeeling. The feeling of respect appears when the subject finds himself near the object(the moral law). Besides, in explaining this concept and the object of the moral law,Kant uses expressions such as Voice and Eye, which have a pathological strain(depending on feeling). On the one hand, the voice and Eye direct the moral agent to the moral law, and on the other hand it prevents the unreasonableness and dominance of the superego over the moral law by separating the fat voice from the pure statement. The subject's Eye at the moral law and the Gaze of the moral law at the subject is the closest interpretation to the feeling of respect that shakes the body of every wrongdoer. This is a completely pathological interpretation of morality and a special sense of respect.

Eduard Hanslick, the first formalist thinker in music criticism, believed that music is the moving forms of tones. He argues that music is nothing but a form without any content or theme outside of its form. Therefore, music cannot express the feeling that comes from the outside, but if there is a feeling, it is the result of the forms and the structure of the music itself. The difference between music and other arts is that it cannot represent reality. Therefore, aesthetic judgment on music should be thoughtful and based on reflection rather than feeling. The content of music cannot be conceptual and the beauty of music is not objective. We can find these concepts by Hanslick in Immanuel Kant's The Critique of Judgment. Kant believes that beauty appears in the form of phenomena, on which  any aesthetic judgment should be based. Also, Kant believes that aesthetic judgment should not be based on personal interest or a specific goal, but should be general and universal so that it can be presented as a universal (subjectively necessary) judgment, that is, individual and personal feelings should not be involved in the judgment. Hanslik's approach to music criticism is also based on this concept.

In the last century, some physicists challenged the principle of general causality in science, and claimed that in the subatomic world, some events happen that contradict determinism and causality. The positive interpretations of the thinkers of the Copenhagen school of the law of causality, especially in the interpretation of the path of particles, have formed a wrong argument and a pragmatic issue has been referred to an ontological issue, which brings physics into an abyss other than its specialized field. David Bohm, one of the greatest physicists of the 20th century, was able to present a causal formulation of quantum theory with his ontological interpretation and the use of hidden variables in quantum mechanics. From Mulla Sadra's point of view, the principle of causality is dominant in the world and no action will occur without a cause. Mulla Sadra's reliance on the primacy of being leads to the conclusion that if there is causality in the world of being, it is only in the context of being, and the criterion of the being's need for another lies only in thetruth of being as well as the poverty of being hidden in the essence of being. In his interpretation of quantum mechanics, Bohm has taken a general and philosophical view and by proposing hidden variables, he has taken an effective step closer to reality. What is necessary is to not return the hidden variables to a physical and material matter so that a comprehensive framework can be considered to solve the problems.

In the contemporary view, metaphor is the transfer of the inferential pattern of the source area to the destination area, based on which many philosophical concepts can be reconstructed. The way of perception and its different stages in Avicenna’s philosophy can be understood and explained in a metaphorical way and based on the metaphor of the event structure of Lakoff and Johnson and the definition of movement given by Avicenna. The movement schema is the basis of the event structure metaphor, which is composed of the macro metaphor “perception is movement” from the combination of the primary metaphors “knowledge is movement” and “science is movement”; and it is capable of reconstructing all types of perception, including partial and general perception, and in that general movement includes micro-movements that form sub-metaphors of the macrometaphor of movement. Each of these sub-metaphors focuses on an aspect of the perception process and highlights it. This article aims to present a new reading of Avicenna’s epistemology with the approach of conceptual metaphor through the expression of the domain of  erception by movement.

According to the theory of divine order, there is no goodness or moral obligation without God’s command, and God’s commands are the main source of moral truths and explain them. In this case, God and, of course, revelation and scriptures play a fundamental role in realizing the essence of goodness and obligation, as well as understanding propositions focused on good and bad, should and shouldn’t. Based on his theory of divine order, Adams also states that God plays a fundamental and necessary role in creating certain moral phenomena. In this research, we will seek toreject Adams’ theory of the divine order based on the epistemological challenge of that theory. It becomes clear that all the theories of divine affairs, even the Ash‛arite approach in Islamic thought, are vulnerable to this challenge, since in all those theories, there is this epistemic condition that the existence of moral obligation depends on the fact that the divine command is known to the moral agent. In this article, Adams’ theory is first analyzed from an epistemological point of view, and then the epistemological challenges of this theory are explained and verified.

In the 17th century, the concept of natural education was proposed by Rousseau in Emil's book, and despite the public and private acceptance of this book since its publication, Researchers have different opinions about whether Rousseau's words were oriented towards individuality or the collectivism of natural education.Although the scope of this controversy affects the whole of Rousseau's thought, an attempt has been made in this article After this issue is clearly stated in the book of Emil the opinion of, one of the most important contemporary commentators of Rousseau's educational views, Jürgen Oelkers, is given an example in favor of the individuality of Emil's natural education And with the help of her clarifications of Rousseau's educational views, a deeper understanding of Emile can be obtained, which can preserve the unity and coherence of Rousseau's thought in a lower layer; In this way, although individuality and population are natural characteristics of two distinct periods of the desire's development, But the principle of submission to necessity resonates throughout Emile, and it is this principle that keeps the unity of Rousseau's educational thought intact.