The possibility of knowing the truth of objects in Avicenna’s philosophy

e objects through the essential definition. Definition in Avicenna is based on the acceptance of the essences and the adaptation of the known in- itself to the known by accident, and this problem is also from ranches of the acquired knowledge. Ibn-e Sina, in some of his works, considers the truths of objects to be beyond human power, and say essential definition is not only difficult, but also impossible. The problem here is that the refusal of true knowledge of objects by insisting on mentioning the essence in the definition is incompatible. Because mentioning the essence in the definition is based on knowing them. Why this inconsistency in Ibn Sina’s view and finding the answer is the task of this article. The analytical conclusion of this article is that Ibn Sina is basically talking about two encounters with the truth of things in order to acquire knowledge, and therefore there is no contradiction between Ibn Sina’s two views. The first encounter is for a human being who is accustomed to the perception of the senses and is therefore deprived of receiving the truth of things and will not attain anything but some of the prerequisites of the truth of the objects. Ibn Sina considers this knowledge to be in accordance with acpects of objects. In contrast, he is a human being who, by passing through worldly and corporeal attachments, acquires the ability to receive the truth of objects. Ibn Sina considers this knowledge to be a complete correspondence.