Perspectivism of Scientific Instruments

This paper addresses the scientific realism debate by giving thought to the epistemic status of scientific instruments. The paper claims that a perspectivist yet realist view is capable of explaining the role of instruments in science. Thus, instrumental perspectivism is defined and supported against the following three criticisms. 1- Perspectivism leads to relativism. 2- Perspectivists’ view that instruments represent reality partially is trivial. 3- The perspectivist claim that instruments are not transparent is either trivial or unacceptable. In response, I defend a realist version of perspectivism on the basis of the concept of “robustness”. I also argue that perspectivism has interesting implications for the plurality of scientific representations and for teaching science to the public. Furthermore, I explain that the (post)phenomenological account of “mediation” sheds light on the assertion that instruments are not transparent.