The Truth of the Human Soul according to Fārābī

The truth of the human soul is one of the fundamental issues of psychology and the basis of various ontological, anthropological, and epistemological theories. In expressing the truth of the soul, Plato believes in natural intellectual dualism, which is based on his view on the theory of remembrance and the allegory of the cave. By presenting two definitions of the soul, Aristotle tries to present the true limit of the soul, which seems to be a problematic definition. Fārābī agrees with Plato in dualism and the inability of man to reach the true limit of things, and unlike Aristotle, he denies that the man attached to the matter can understand and offer the true limit of essences; Instead, he considers definition possible only through the things’ properties and implications, which leads him to offer different definitions for the soul. Fārābī’s definitions show his special attention to the issue of happiness, its principles such as natural and voluntary characteristics in attaining the state of the actual intellect, and its implications such as the effects of the practical intellect of the rational faculty. The selection of the word “perfecting” shows the comprehensiveness of the philosophical discussions regarding happiness in the definition of soul. Fārābī dealt critically with the discussions in al-Jam‘, and considered the functional definitions in al-Jadal and Kitāb al-’Akhlāq as the duties of the rational soul.