Investigating the Impact of Corruption on Foreign Direct Investment in Iran: Application of Games Theory

In the last decade, attention has been paid to the issue of foreign direct investment. Foreign direct investment is the most common form of capital flow towards developing countries, which affects the economic growth and macroeconomic stability of the country (Metaxas & Kechagia, 2016).The government of Iran has spent a lot of resources in order to attract foreign investment, but despite the implementation of supportive policies and the approval of numerous laws in order to remove obstacles in the business environment, less than expected success has been achieved in the field of foreign investment. According to the UNCTAD report (2021), Iran's share of the total amount of foreign direct investment in the world was equal to 0.09 percent. By examining the existing literature, it is clear that the interaction of the actors involved in the issue of foreign investment (foreign investor, government and people) and its effect on policy outcomes has been neglected, which can lead to less success. Iran should play an important role in attracting foreign direct investment.David Cruz et al. (2023) in a study investigated the relationship between corruption and foreign direct investment in natural resources with emphasis on the role of recession and economic crisis in Latin American and Caribbean countries during the period of 1995-2020 using the panel approach. The results shown that high levels of corruption lead to a decrease in foreign direct investment in natural resources, which is a confirmation of the hypothesis of greasing wheels in investment literature.In this aspect, the present study is innovative, which aims to highlight the government's lack of attention to two basic issues in Iran. The first issue is the government's lack of attention to the interests of actors involved in foreign investment. The second issue is the presence of complex bureaucratic obstacles in the country.This study aims to analyze the decision-making process of foreign investors by using game theory when choosing Iran as an investment destination. In this study, the production function is considered with three capital inputs, the amount of bribery and provision of benefits. The reason for applying the third input (provision of benefits) in the production function is due to the fact that many activities are implemented. In the sense that their success requires the interaction of many players and adaptation to local conditions (Andrews et al, 2017). Then the problem of foreign investor optimization is examined.According to the findings of this research, with the increase in the level of institutional quality, the amount of bribe paid decreases, which applies to countries with a low level of institutional quality. The results of this study show that the Nash equilibrium is where the investor enters Iran and pays a bribe. In the next step, people choose the threat option. The government should also provide sufficient benefits and keep its promises in the future.