The Negative and Positive Role of the Bipolar Structure in the Syrian Crisis (2011–2021) (2021-2011)

The distribution of power in the international system and the relationship between the two are important indicators for the analysis of international crises. There is a direct relationship between the structure of the international system and stability, conflict, and crisis; therefore, the nature, consequences, and management of international crises as well as behavioral patterns of international actors all vary according to the structure of the international system. The present research seeks to explain the relationship between the two by focusing on the negative and positive impact of the bipolar structure on the escalation of the Syrian crisis. It is assumed that the behavior of states is influenced by the structure of the international system, be it unipolar, bipolar, multipolar, or transitional.
The study tries to answer the key question as to how the positive and negative role of the bipolar structure contributed to the escalation of the Syrian crisis. The research is based on the main hypothesis that the lack of systemic limitations particular to the bipolar structure of the Cold War restricted identity, ideological, and geopolitical conflicts in the Middle East region during the Syrian crisis, and that the crisis escalated—from both negative and positive perspectives—due to the emergence of the putative bipolar structure at the regional level through the zero-sum game between the two regional poles, namely Iran and Saudi Arabia, along with their regional allies and proxy arms. Despite the extensive literature both about the Syrian crisis and about the impact of the structure of the international system on international crises, no independent research seems to have been conducted on the negative and positive impact of the bipolar structure on the Syrian crisis, so the present research has novelty in this respect.

The structure of the international system and the Syrian crisis:

This research argues that the distribution of power in the international system, also known as structure, undeniably affects the political and security dynamism at the level of the regional (sub)systems. During the Cold War, the two superpowers could not be indifferent to the instability in the strategic regions of the world because any instability and crisis therein would lead to an ideological vacuum and the possibility that the vacuum would be filled with rival ideologies—hence changes in the status of the satellite countries. However, the collapse of the bipolar system and the end of the Cold War resulted in a period of instability in the international system. According to Waltz and Mearsheimer, the systems that are not bipolar are unstable, and the instability undeniably affects the escalation of international crises and conflicts, such as the Syrian crisis.
The Syrian crisis was characterized by the lack of bipolarity, a transitional period in the international system, and the absence of a new system and establishment of new rules. As a result, the US, uncertain about its strategy for stepping in the crisis, transferred its responsibility for maintaining the stability of the system to its regional allies; consequently, the intervention of regional actors, as one of the main factors, contributed to the escalation of the Syrian crisis. Meanwhile, the lack of the stabilizing structure prepared the ground for the formation of a regional bipolar structure centered on Iran and Saudi Arabia and their proxy arms, which would escalate the instability. By defining their interests in the Syrian crisis within the zero-sum game (i.e., maintaining Assad/overthrowing Assad), the regional bipolarity played a big role in escalating the Syrian crisis, and Syria became the main field for the new regional cold war between Iran and Saudi Arabia.

Syria was considered as one of the Soviet satellites during the Cold War, so if the Syrian crisis had occurred during the Cold War, Russia would have stepped in the crisis, the US would  have withdrawn from it, and regional actors (e.g., Iran, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey) would not have been allowed to use their proxy forces (e.g., Hezbollah, the Free Army, and Salafi groups) in order to play an independent role in the crisis in line with their interests. The reason is that the bipolar system would not essentially allow the regional actor to play an independent role in the system. However, the Syrian crisis escalated as a result of the end of the bipolar system, the transitional situation in which the rules of the new system had not been established yet, the US strategic uncertainty about how to step in the crisis, its fear of military intervention and experience of Iraq and Afghanistan, its transfer of responsibility to its weak regional allies, the regional bipolarity centered on Iran and Saudi Arabia and their ensuing strong presence with their proxy forces—in line with their predetermined interests—and finally the historical opportunism of Russia to restore its dignity and historical status in the Middle East and support its historic ally.