Applying Popper's Theory of the Three Worlds on the Ontology of Memes

There are different opinions regarding the origin of Memes’ ontology. Some researchers, including Blackmore and Dennett, believe that Memes are cultural creatures, while others, including Lynch and Bridie, recognize them as intellectual entities. Moreover, some researchers, including Gatherer and Benzon, consider the Memes as physical existence. Some critics such as Boyd and Riechrson, and their supporters, deny the existence of the Memes. All these negotiations make it necessary to focus on the ontological scrutiny of the Memes theory. The present paper contributes to analyzing the discrepancies in the opinions for the ontology of the Memes using Popper's three worlds theory. In this study, the opinions regarding the ontology of the Memes are investigated with an introduction to Popper's three world’s theory. Then, we present reasons in favor of Mems pluralism. First, some Memes are in one, two, or three worlds simultaneously. Thus, The Memes should not be considered the same in terms of ontological cognition. Secondly, some Memes might be existing in two or three worlds at a time, while they might be in another world at another time. Popper's three worlds’ theory (especially world three) could have enough capacity for describing and discerning the ontology of the Memes due to robust linkage with the evolutionary epistemology and linking procedure of the three worlds.