Critics to the distinction between primary and secondary ‎rules in the law of international responsibility of states

On the one hand, this article aims at analyzing Herbert Hart's approach to the legal system and his attitude to international law, and on the other hand, it seeks to find the roots of the separation of primary and secondary rules in international responsibility law and presents criticisms towards this separation. The theory of international law is mixed with the criticism of the rule of law in this system. This separation was caused by an incomplete understanding of analytical law philosophy. The issue of rules in international law is not enough for this separation, and it is not clear exactly where the position of other rules is in this system. The context of rule-making in the international community is so complicated that it is not possible to simply differentiate between rules in this order. This distinction can be drawn in the best case in a positivist tradition. This article, based on the mainstream critical approach in international law, aims to investigate the relationship between the demarcation of primary and secondary rules in international responsibility law with theories of rules demarcation in the theories of Herbert Hart and Hans Kelsen.