Modeling of short-term financial transmission rights in a secondary auction market using game theory

Finding the best situation for the expected profit by each of the participants (players) in the secondary auction market of financial congestion transmission rights.

From the point of view of game theory, finding at least one Nash equilibrium point for this competition takes into account the various constraints of the secondary auction market.

This paper study the issue of financial transmission congestion contracts then uses the game theory to analyze the short-term (weekly) secondary FTR markets, in which the players manage the transmission risk through optimal biddings.

Originality/Value: 

Congestion risk management is one of the most important topics of transmission network management in restructured power systems and electricity markets in the world, especially markets based on regional or local pricing, whose main tool is transmission financial contracts. In the other scientific articles published so far, mainly the modeling and analysis of the primary auction markets of transission congestion financial rights have been discussed, and the secondary auction markets of these contracts, which have a different pattern, have not been scientifically analyzed. The main innovation of this article is to pay attention to this issue using application of game theory.