Analysis of the Legal Relationship and Behavior of Actors in the Legal System of Initial Land Registration Based on Game Theory and Posner Criteria in Economic Efficiency

In the initial Land Registration System, where the Land is registered for the first time, there is a ground for making strategic decisions in the social contract between the “Government” and the “Owners” in entering the initial registration system and choosing its type, Therefore, analyzing their relationships without considering the economic theories of games and Posner, does not achieve the economic efficiency of the registration system. The question is with which strategy the game theory justifies the necessity of the existence of an initial land registration system and what kind of initial registration system, is it economically efficient. The present study, with interdisciplinary analysis, explains the legal behavior of the actors of the registration system according to the game theory with the bargaining strategy and evaluates the benefits and costs of the initial registration system according to the Posner criteria. According to the result, the initial registration system with a “Dynamic Approach” and also “Implementation of the full effect of Land Registration”, while creating a cooperative game with a positive result, “Natural Monopoly” leads to Posner and economic efficiency.