Reductionism in Avicenna's Moral Thought

The aim of the present study is to organize Avicenna’s meta-ethical thought, providing a foundation for understanding the ethical system derived from his opinions. The primary focus is on determining Avicenna's overarching approach to the existence of moral attributes and propositions. In response to this inquiry, the author seeks to articulate three models of reductionism rooted in Avicenna's perspectives. These reductionist models could be crafted at the levels of conventional attitude, philosophical attitude, as well as Avicenna's mystical and monotheistic stance towards moral truths, so that it could be possible to establish coherence among them. This article begins by examining Avicenna’s viewpoint in accordance with his logical principles, introducing his constructivist approach – aimed at fame and intellectual agreement – as a model of reductionism at a conventional level. Subsequently, Avicenna's attitude is explored through the philosophical science of the soul and the truth of the happiness of the human soul, leading to the introduction of a form of moral reductionism based on Avicenna's philosophical opinions. Finally, attention is given to his mystical and monotheistic perspective, presenting yet another model of reductionism. The research concludes that, based on Avicenna's discussions in the field of ontology, it is not feasible to adopt a true realist position, as there is no independent truth for moral attributes.