Explanation and Review of Nicolas Rescher's Version of Coherentism

One of the more complex versions of coherentism is the version designed by the contemporary philosopher Nicholas Rescher in a series of his works with special detail. This version claims to be resistant to the usual criticisms of coherentism and more productive in research methodologies. This article, written with a descriptive and analytical method, aims to criticize the main claims of Rescher's version after briefly explaining the generality of this view and expressing its advantages compared to the usual versions of coherentism. The generality of Rescher's point of view can be explained through a brief description of some of the main concepts of his epistemological system, such as "data," "network model," "maximalism," and also with a brief reference to his meta-epistemological perspective, which is a version of pragmatism called "methodological pragmatism." Despite the precision used in this version and its advantages, it seems that some of the main problems of coherentism still persist. The new mechanisms proposed in this version to address these issues are insufficient, and some even introduce additional problems. Furthermore, despite Rescher's insistence on being a coherentist, it appears that his view somehow deviates from the main criterion of coherentism. The amendments used in this version have actually blurred its distinction from some foundationalist versions.