Rereading Anaxagoras’ Mind in Aristotle’s Psychology

The examination of the concept of mind in Aristotle’s psychology poses aconsiderable challenge within his work, De anima. This paper unravels thecomplexities by scrutinizing Aristotle’s expressions as both a response to and anadvancement of Anaxagoras’ Mind theory. Anaxagoras’ theory, whether explicitly orimplicitly, presents mind as both indeterminate and everlasting. However, thesecharacteristics contradict the primary function of the mind, namely, its capacity forknowledge and thought. Anything that is entirely indeterminate lacks resemblanceto anything else, thereby rendering it incapable of comprehending anything, in accordance with the widely accepted axiom that “like is known by like”. Besides, knowledge and thought involve a transformation from potentiality to actuality, implying the involvement of matter, while a material entity cannot possess eternity. In this paper, it is contended that the fourth and fifth chapters of the third book of De anima address these two dilemmas. Aristotle reconciles these attributes by endorsing and reinterpreting Anaxagoras’ theory.