Absent Leviathan and the Fall of the Republic: An Examination of Democratization Failures in Afghanistan (2001-2021)

The Rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan during the 1990s and their seizure of power was an important event in the fate of this country. Their fall and the establishment of the republican system in 2001 seemed to herald Afghanistan's entry into the corridor of democracy. However, the unexpected resurgence of the Taliban in the summer of 2021 was surprising to the world. This article attempts to examine the shaky process of democratization in Afghanistan between 2001 and 2021, from theoretical perspective of Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson. This analysis seeks to answer this question: : what causes to the failure of democratization in Afghanistan and the rapid return of the Taliban?The integration of these factors facilitated the restoration of authoritarianism by the Taliban. The data in this article has been collected through library and documentary studies and analyzed in the framework of Acemoglu and Robinson's theories. The findings show that democratization of Afghanistan grows with the emergence of the Leviathan and empowers the society by eliminating anti-development norms.Despite international efforts for democratization that began at the Bonn Conference, Afghanistan's recent history witnessed the sudden fall of the Islamic Republic and the rapid return of the Taliban. The goal of the conference was to establish a new government and end the Taliban rule, but Afghanistan's deviation from the democratic path and the rapid resurgence of the Taliban reveals deeper complexities beyond common themes such as a collapsing state or systemic corruption. The vital role of participatory governance and social empowerment for sustainable democracy in Afghanistan was neglected. This failure highlights the complex relationship between govenment and society that is crucial to the maintainance of democracy. Therefore, we will further analyze the failure of democratization in Afghanistan and ultimately, the rapid revival of the Taliban. Emphasizing the nature of the state and society in Afghanistan and its consequences on democratization will be our focus.

Research question: 

what causes to the failure of democratization process in Afghanistan and the rapid return of the Taliban?

Research hypothesis: 

The hypothesis is that the nature of govenment in Afghanistan aligns with an absent Leviathan due to the weak structure and anti-democratic power of society. In such a setting, the cage of norms dictates policies and prevents the simultaneous strengthening of both the state and society, thus preventing the emergence of a Shackled Leviathan as a counterbalance to democracy.

Methodology and theoretical framework: 

This research examines the prerequisites for the transition to democracy in Afghanistan with a historical sociology approach. It rejects a simplistic and linear view and instead emphasizes the interplay of political and social factors. Drawing on more recent perspectives like Acemoglu and Robinson's, it highlights the necessity of a balanced relationship between state power and social consciousness. This balance, called the "Red Queen Effect," emphasizes the need for both the goverment and society to evolve and compete to preserve individual rights and independence and ultimately stenghten democratic transition. Acemoglu and Robinson analyze the normative barriers of democracy as the "cage of norms." Under the constraints of norms and the weakening of the state's capacity as another basis for the transition to democracy, the simultaneous empowerment of society and the state and the emergence of the Shackled Leviathan as an optimal transition point to democracy will not happen.

Afghanistan's weak state structure and social dominance hinder democratic transition. Norms constrain policy, halts govenmental and social progress and thwart a Shackled Leviathan. The lack of unified power hinders the use of resources and provision of public services and fuels poverty. Tribal values exacerbate the exploitation and violence that has become normal since the war. State-Social competition fails and hinders progress. Even intermediary institutions such as Jamiat-e-Islami, Hizb-e-Islami and Dawat-e-Islami did not prioritize increasing their modern capacity to collaborate with the govenment. The Afghan national government ignored the influence of the “Red Queen” concept and instead promoted specific tribal groups, a policy that was at odds with social awareness. During the democratization years, it was not the state but rather the actions of foreign forces that prevented major events such as the re-emergence of the Taliban. The stability of the state was not inherently linked to its authority. In a realm where there is no single authority (akin to an absent Leviathan), social support may falter or cease at any moment, affecting the stability of the state. This moment in Afghanistan coincided with the fall of the republic and the rapid rise of the Taliban.

During Afghanistan's Republican era, the absent Leviathan struggled to enforce laws, curb violence, resolve conflicts and provide public services. In fact, Afghanistan had wrapped itself in a facade of democracy, yet it had not even set foot in its corridor. The weak structure of this supposedly democratic system led to internal conflicts even during elections, deepened the state's weaknesses and limited the nation's development potentials amid foreign interventions. The divisions of Afghan society challenge the American narrative that simply hands the country over to the Taliban. The re-emergence of anti-modern authoritarianism was a gradual process, not a sudden event. Afghanistan lacks strong state authority which dims the prospects for democracy or stability. The lack of state authority and the resistance of rival factions perpetuate the cycle of violence. Escaping this, requires more than temporary changes—it requires leadership and dismantling the norms that fuel this cycle.