Criticism of correspondence theory from the viewpoints of Suhrawardi and Heidegger

Although the background of the correspondence theory as a criterion of truth goes back to the Plato's doctrine of ideas, the proposing and development of this theory takes place in Aristotle's philosophy. According to Aristotle, truth means the correspondence of a judgment or statement with reality, and untruth and falsehood mean non-correspondence. Since the time of Aristotle, the correspondence theory, despite its ups and downs, has always been one of the dominant theories in the field of epistemology. Of course, some philosophers, while paying attention to the correspondence theory, have pointed to something prior to this theory, which basically made it possible to be proposed. Heidegger and Suhrawardi, while criticizing the philosophical traditions before themselves, have emphasized that the basic understanding of man and his relationship with objects and phenomena is not a matter of proposition and judgment. Now important question arises: what is prior to the propositional truth that provides the possibility of truth in the meaning of correspondence? With a descriptive-analytical method, this article tries to investigate this question from the point of view of Suhrawardi and Heidegger. Heidegger believes that the truth in the sense of unhiddenness (Aletheia) is the primary meaning of truth, and the forgetting of this meaning has caused truth to be proposed in the meaning of correspondence. Suhrawardi also believes that truth in the sense of the intuition of objects precedes the correspondence theory. Heidegger and suhrawardi believe that the correspondence theory does not have the necessary efficiency for the disclosure of truth.