Kant on Illumination and Illuminative Knowledge

The Kantian term “rational illumination” which has become popular mostly in post-Kantian philosophy, barely corresponds to Kant’s intention. Based on active or passive role played by the subject, Kant puts rational Illumination oppose to sense Illumination (Anschaung). Thus, when beings are subject to a sense (passive) illumination, they will be created by a rational (active) illumination. For Kant, this means that Only God enjoys rational illumination. Kant, of course, was not interested in mysticism, and for the same reason he went to betray the Swedish cleric, Emanuel Swedenborg, in a striking way. But it should be noted that in Kantian philosophy, one may find mysticism. It seems that there is no illuminative knowledge which is, like knowledge, selfsubsistence. An illuminative knowledge, of the kind which is not knowledge, is a universal and essential experience of Illumination which is called customarily (and not technically) “Illumination”. Such Illumination does not lead to anything; in other words, it does not prove something; and it is only justifiable when it is analyzed and reduced to demonstrative knowledge, and as a result it is taken as the basis of perception and as the basic perception. For Kant, if ordinary Illuminations lead to something, in other words, if they are pieces of knowledge, Illuminationism, i.e. a theory suggesting that knowledge is founded through such illuminations will appear. Though mysticism is a form of Illuminationism, not all kinds of Illuminationism are mysticism. Mysticism is illuminative knowledge of immaterial things i.e. things which are not covered by ordinary sense or material perception. Mystics see things which are not a part of ordinary perceptual experience. If mystical knowledge is allowed in a Kantian theory, that knowledge cannot be analyzed; in other words, it cannot be interpret through a system of demonstrative knowledge of immaterial things.