Voluntariness of Intellection in the Light of Active Intellect According to Farabi and Ibn Sina

Action and reaction of human soul in perception and intellection that is without doubt one of the most fundamental and oldest problems of philosophy goes by the name of active intellect in the philosophy of Aristotle. This designation in the history of Philosophy after Aristotle is interpreted from two points of view: natural and illuminative. The first view considers both active and passive intellect inherent in human soul, and like all creatures in natural world, it regards the evolutionary process of human spirit as coming out from the stage of passivity and receiving to the dimension of activity. By contrast, the second view allocates the passive aspect of intellect to human being and ascribes the active aspect to the order of Godhead this view regards the actuality of intellect as an emanation and divine illumination. In spite of a gap between the two view about the reference of intellect's activity, both view inevitably agree on this point that is beyond the will and power of human being and consequently speculative evolution of man's soul is an involuntary and deterministic matter. Contrary to these two customary exegesis, Islamic Prepatetic Philosophy of Farabi and Ibn Sina by ascribing the aspect of intellect's activity to two faculties that have come into being by a separative substance by the name of active intellect as well as intention and volition they succeed to propose a third view in the theory of active intellect that in spite of the assertion with the implication of the influence of a separative agent of the process of intellection, to explain the voluntariness and intentionality of speculative evolution of human soul.