The Problem of soul-body, Sadrean Monism and Emergentism

The traditional problem of soul-body emerges when we consider the two as being different by essence. The questions of the nature of soul and its relation to body are two questions for which replies should be provided. Dualism (a series of dualist doctrines) puts emphasis on the distinction between the two. In the present article, the author will say that Mulla Sadra is not a dualist. Monist (but non-reductionist) view is based on three ontological presumptions: (1) principiality of existence, (2) gradation of existence, and (3) substantial motion. The impact of this ontology on Sadra's psychology may be found in the following doctrines: (4) immateriality of the faculty of imagination (the middle point between reasonable and sensible); in its simplicity, the soul contains all faculties; and (6) in its origination, the soul is corporal, and in its permanence it is spiritual. The conclusion of these premises is manifest in the essential (and not accidental) relation between the soul and body. In conclusion, the author has made a comparison between Sadrean view and emergentism. The author is of the opinion that some readings of emergentism may be useful to provide a new formulation of Sadrean view.