The Relation of the Inference to the Best Explanation with Induction and Speculation

One of the most significant issues about the inference to the best explanation (IBE) is whether it is an independent argument, or can be reduced to one of the common arguments in logics. Thus we should examine the relation between abduction and other types of proofs. Since abduction cannot be reduced to syllogism, our discussion will concentrate on induction and speculation (speculative propositions). As to the relation of abduction with induction, two views have been proposed (a) the view that reduces one to the other, which is of two types: (1) some like Harman, Josephson, and Psillos reduce induction to IBE, and (2) some like Fumerton, reduce IBE to induction. (B) the view that rejects the reduction and takes them to be independent. Pierce and more recently Schurtz are advocates of this view. The three views above can be categorized under two views: reductionist and non-reductionism; this paper defends the latter. I also deal with the relation between speculation and abduction. Despite similaries, they are not reducible to one another. Thus the paper holds the independence of abduction from other types of arguments.