نشریه هستی و شناخت (نامه مفید)
سال دوم شماره 2 (پیاپی 4، پاییز و زمستان 1394)

This article seeks to demonstrate that some of Plato's epistemological and ontological principles and foundations underwent some changes during the interval between the early and middle period dialogues. Although this conclusion may lead to the strengthening of the developmentalist's position as regards the relation between the early and middle period dialogues, this change in Plato's ontology and epistemology and expanding it, implies a more profound development that the one adhered to by developmentalists. The fact that bipolar and incoherent ontology and epistemology in the early period dialogues are replaced with tripartite and interdependent ontology and epistemology in middle period dialogues suggests that Plato's view regarding the concepts of being and knowledge has changed.

The first part of the first sermon of Nahjul Balagha is a discursive proposition of description and explanation of different levels of faith, knowledge, purity and unity of the Almighty God. In the statement "Kamalo Marefatehi Al-Tasdiqo bih" (Knowing Him perfectly means confirming Him) in this sermon, Imam Ali (PBUH) talks about the relationship between knowing the Almighty and confirming him.
Adopting a logico-analytical approach and its various tools, this study aims to describe and explain how "Knowledge of the Almighty God" and "His confirmation" in the above mentioned statement are related and integrated. The result of the analysis of this proposition suggests the disputability of knowledge, and identification – not just entailment – of "conceptual knowledge" with” assertive knowledge" of the Almighty God. The possibility of the identicality the two types of knowledge – conceptual and assertive – could only be presented in the context of epistemological principles of transcendental philosophy, which is a true account. The above-mentioned statement in Nahjul Balagha could also be turned into a kind of existential proof for proving the Almighty God. The criticisms of "the confusion of concept and instance" and "the impossibility of obtaining assertive knowledge through conceptual knowledge" leveled against this proposition and other existential proofs are refuted and appropriates explanations are provided in this regard.

The realization of knowledge in the form of naïve realism and critical realism has been one of main concerns of philosophers. Correspondence theory, which is considered as theory of truth in transcendental philosophy (Al Hekmah al-motaaliya), can be interpreted as either naïve realism or critical realism. Problems of transcendental philosophy are presented in a way that evidence can be provided for both interpretations. Given the incompatibility of the two interpretations, only one should be chosen as Mulla Sadra's final theory. Given that within the framework of transcendental philosophy Naïve realism faces many serious criticism and problems, and that Mulla Sadra's final theories and strong evidence provided by transcendental philosophy are more consistent with critical realism, it seems that it is more appropriate to consider critical realism as Mulla Sadra's final theory.

This article seeks to address the question whether Avecinna and Kant believe that the nature and existence of soul (self) can be known. It seems that Avecinna believes that knowledge of the existence of our self (soul) is immediate and that of the nature of the soul (self) is mediated and inferential. But Kant's view differs from that of Avecinna. He believes we have unity of consciousness and not just one particular subject. He believes that predication of categories on self and beyond the scope of possible experience leads to fallacy. For Kant, pure reason is not capable of knowing self, but in criticizing practical reason he believes otherwise. In this article, we first explain how we acquire knowledge, then we examine how we know about the existence of self and finally justifications of self from their point of view are dealt with.

This article seeks to explore the factors involved in the development of propositions referred to in logic as conventional propositions. It will examine conventional propositions from Farabi and Ibn Sina's points of view. In Farabi's works, we dont see any direct and clear reference to conventional propositions. However, by reflecting upon his works we can understand how conventional propositions are formed. Unlike Farabi, Ibn Sina has coherently dealt with the factors involved in formation of conventional propositions and in some of the most important ones, he shares Farabi's views implied in his works in this regard. On the whole, it can be said that the main objective for Farabi's discussion about the formation of such propositions is to reach true happiness. In Ibn Sina's works, conventional propositions are taken to bring about positive changes in communities. Finally, Farabi and Ibn Sina have suggested that the inheritors of their knowledge take care of inquiries about the practical wisdom and political philosophy.

Hegel’s philosophy often gives way to handful of ambiguities. And particularly interpretation of Hegel’s political philosophy always is a problematic one. Assuming one of the fundamental differences between ancient tradition of natural law and modern tradition of natural rights is due to their philosophical anthropology, it is possible to ask this question again as regards Hegel’s political philosophy: “Does Philosophy of Right entails some kind of philosophical anthropology?” Although it is a general question, but examining the relation of Hegel’s political philosophy to two considerable earlier traditions is a necessary step. This paper deals with the analysis of this relationship from the point of view of systematicity of philosophy of rights; and as we will see this systematic aspect is seen from its methodical perspective. The result of this analysis is an exact formulation of the foregoing question: Does the systematic – or methodical – aspect of Hegel’s political philosophy entail some kind of philosophical anthropology?

According to Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE), the hypothesis that provides the best explanation for a group of observed phenomena is probably true. One of the key objections against this line of thought is “the bad lot objection”. According to this objection, the idea that the best of available explanatory hypotheses will be more likely to be true presupposes that the truth is already more likely to be found among them. But we have no reason to believe it. The most prominent criticisms against this objection are argument from Bayesianism (Niiniluoto, 2004), argument from a pair of contradictories (Lipton, 1993), argument from self-destruction (Lipton, 1993) and argument from distinction between material content and form of IBE (Schupbach, 2013). In this paper, we evaluate these arguments and show that all the arguments but the last one misses the mark.

Different fields of science (including physics, biology, psychology and philosophy (have had various scientific endeavors to describe the nature of consciousness. They all agree on the point that: “consciousness is a complex issue”.
Neurological and cognitive science is the dominant paradigm in consciousness studies. This article, after presenting a review of the status of consciousness in the realm of related sciences, is going to open a new window to this topic -“complexity and chaos theory”. For this purpose, with the help of the concepts such as “Control of chaos” and “The Emergence” an attempt has been made to give a primary explanation about the problem of consciousness.
According to this approach, an infinitesimal force may be able to take control of complex and chaotic system in the brain through the influence of very small energies. This may be the main origin of consciousness problem. As a result, consciousness can be extremely complex form of manifestation of the “Emergence” through neural interaction networks in the brain.