نشریه مطالعات تاریخی جنگ
سال دوم شماره 1 (بهار 1397)

The Palestinian issue is the oldest and the most complex crisis in the world and can be considered one of the most important Middle East conflicts in the twentieth century, especially after World War II. Many years have passed since the crisis started, and many plans have been put forward to deal with it, none of which have had any positive effect and the consequences of the crisis have affected the inhabitants of this land. Not paying attention to the realities on the Palestinian side has caused a lack of success of the plans. In order to provide a proper solution, recognizing the complexities of the crisis is necessary. So the main question is why, despite more than half a decade of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, this issue has remained unresolved, and none of the proposals have been able to end this issue? Our answer to this question is multidimensional and includes several agents and structural factors that are discussed here using Anthony Giddens's structuration theory. According to this theory, both agents and structures together form phenomena and no one can be given priority over the other. Accordingly, the findings of this study indicate that the structure of the region and the world should be prepared for resolving this problem. Without the agreement and the partnership of the world powers and regional countries no solution will be effective. Furthermore, the agents on both sides of the crisis should reach an internal consensus. That they only be representatives of a part of the ruling body and authority in their own land will not be enough.

Analyzing the military strategies of Iranian governments in the early Islamic centuries is a topic that has not much received researcher's attention. Due to the role played by the recognition of these strategies in explaining the military function of the governments of this era, the Samanids and the Saffarid's war strategies as well as the impact of these strategies on the victory of each side of the war, were found questions worthy of investigation. The military confrontation between the Samanids and the Saffarids in the sensitive medieval period of Iran is another factor explaining the necessity of a case study of these two governments, carried out in this paper. Evidence suggests that the use of propaganda, psychological and military strategies based on operational tactics were simultaneously the most important strategy developed by the Samanids and the Saffarids, which had a significant impact on their victory. Strategies that imply the ingenuity and creativity of the emirs of these two dynasties in confronting their enemies and trying to maintain and expand their realm.

The migration of the Qara Khitais from northern China to Transoxiana in the first half of the sixth century was met with resistance of the Seljuq state. The confrontation of these invaders with the Seljuqid Sultan Sanjar in the Battle of Qatwan, which is one of major and effective events in the history of Iran and the Islamic world, gave rise to considerable social and economic consequences. Using a descriptive-analytic method, this article seeks to besides explaining this war and the interaction of the Qara Khitais with the region's inhabitants, answer this question that what were the social consequences of the Qara Khitai's conquest for Transoxiana and how they occurred. The results show that the social and economic conditions of the region were deeply influenced by the Qara Khitai's conquering the region, their cultural and religious differences with the natives living there, in addition to the ungovernability of the Qarluqs. Some of these consequences were social insecurity, economic downturn, disturbance in trade, agriculture, animal husbandry and demographic changes in the region.

In the era of the Prophet (PBUH), in three fronts battling the pagans, the Jews and the Romans, the Muslims were engaged with Ghazavat and Sariyyehs. Overall, 29 Ghazveh and 66 Sariyyehs happened and completed with victory except in the case of the Ghazveh of Uhud. One of the success factors in these Ghazavat was the effective military organization of forces in the battlefield. The Prophet organized the wars in two kinds of regular warfare (Gazveh) and irregular warfare (Sariyyeh). The Prophet never fought without arranging the four types of organization that comprised of organization before moving the army, organization during the move to the war zone, organization in the war camp, and finally organization in the battlefield. The hypothesis of the present research is based on the fact that this type of organization had unique features contributing to Muslim's victory in Ghazavat. The results of the research show that, firstly, these four stages of arrangement were the innovations of the Prophet and had no precedent in the age of Ignorance, and secondly this organization had a significant impact on Muslim's victory in wars.

During World War I, Southern Iran was in a chaotic situation, affected by the rivalry and animosity of the trans-regional warring parties. In this regard, being influenced by the presence and the interactions of two trans-regional superpowers, the measures of the patriotic forces in general political and security atmosphere of Fars are worthy to be analyzed and evaluated. How the Qashqai Il-Khani interacted with the trans-regional forces and his procrastination in collaboration with the national and popular forces and on the other hand the reason for his appeasement with the British forces at the beginning of the war and combatting them after the Event of Khaneh Zenyan, is this study's main question. The hypothesis that the danger of being removed from power, motivated the Qashqai Il-Khani to finally enter into direct confrontation and a war with the British forces was evaluated in this study. Based on new and recent documents and data, contrasting them with new research and existing documents, the findings indicated that the Qashqai Il-Khani not only refrained from taking a clear stance towards cooperating with the southern patriots but also got involved with a complicated political game against his old enemies and rivals.

Undoubtedly, one of the main challenges facing the Safavids since the beginning of their rule in Iran was how to deal with Uzbeks as one of their stubborn enemies in the northeast regions. Those who had territorial and religious claims against the Safavids, during the expansion and consolidation of the power of Shah Ismail I in Iran, created for him a great deal of concern in the Khorasan region. Eventually, the first Safavid king, who also had common claims against the destructive power of Uzbeks, had to solidly and seriously prevent them from moving forward into Khorasan. The battle of Marv served the intentions of Shah Ismail, but another battle called Gijduvon, which took place along the Amu Darya not long after the battle of Marv, ended in the defeat of Shah Ismail's troops. The present study, with a descriptive-analytical approach, seeks to answer this question that how this failure affected the political geography of Transoxiana and the internal relations of power in Iran. The results of this study indicate that the Gijduvon battle ended the continuation of the Timurid rule in the Transoxiana region in addition to putting an end to the wishes of Shah Ismail I for propagating the power of the Safavids on the other side of Amu Darya. Moreover, this battle revealed the disturbances in the credo centered system in the power structure of the Safavids.

With the occupation of Iran during World War I, Iranian cities became rivalry arenas for the existing powers. Zanjan was one of those cities. The main question of the present study is: ‘How did the powers in Zanjan act during World War I and with what outcomes? 'This study sought to answer the above question through gathering documents as well as field study, using an analytic-descriptive method. During the war, Zanjan became the scene of conflict between three powers: alien invaders (Russia and England), local khan (Jahanshah Khan Amir Afshar) and the local governor (Asad al-Dawla Zolfaghari). The alien invaders and the local khan exploited material and human resources of Zanjan for supplying their own needs and interests. The third power, the Governor of Zanjan, adopting a realistic policy, used all the possible capacity to organize the affairs of the city and its surrounding areas. Because of its weakness, the central government's policy in Zanjan in communicating with the first power was passive and in relation to the second and third powers was invitation to peace and obtaining the consent of both parties. The power struggle in Zanjan caused disorder, population decline, emigration, unemployment, the closing down of local industries and disruption in trade.

The rise of Islam in the mid-7th century led to the collapse of the power equations in the world of that day. The new Muslim Arabs defeated the most important world powers in a marvelous military movement. They drew the great Sassanian Empire to a collapse and reached the political capital and religious center of the Roman Empire. The main problem the present article addresses is what made it possible for the Muslim Arabs to achieve such quick and stunning victories? Undoubtedly, in these miraculous victories, irrespective of the spiritual power of Islam materialized in the form of jihad and martyrdom-seeking, Muslims must also have been materially and militarily attained to a degree of strength in order to fulfill their religious or material aims. In this paper, the military power of the Arab Muslims was examined from two aspects of the Arab's military differences with Iranians and Romans and the new military tactics of the Arabs, adopted proportionate to the military genius of their commanders. It was found that agility, diligence, personal ingenuity, and the difference in the method of Arab's fighting on the one hand and the design of combat techniques, combining the Iranian and Roman methods of warfare with those of Arabs led to Arab's overthrowing Iran and Rome.