نشریه مطالعات تاریخی جنگ
سال هفتم شماره 3 (پاییز 1402)

Disputes between China and India are a complex historical issue. The 70th anniversary of China-Indian relations in 2020 became one of the most crucial years in the history of bilateral relations. Following the formation of a dispute between the two countries over shared borders and the creation of military posts, Chinese and Indian forces were heavily involved in battles in the Galvan Valley near Ladakh on June 15, which killed Indian and Chinese forces. The question that arises here concerns the causes of the Sino-Indian border disputes as well as their continuation. The hypothesis of the present descriptive-analytical study is that the colonial heritage and the unwillingness of the great powers to accurately determine the common boundaries in the past have led to the formation and persistence of critical conditions between the two countries. The findings of the study show that although the colonial contexts have led to border disputes between China and India, none of the parties took advantage of the opportunities to solve the problem at various historical stages and did not succeed in bilateral negotiations.

Andalusia has always been important for the governments that came to power in the Islamic Maghreb. They employed measures for the establishment and continuation of their political power there. Among the governments that gained power in the Islamic Maghreb and established a powerful rule was the Almohads that emerged in the 6th century AH (12th century AD) and succeeded in establishing its political power in Andalusia. This descriptive-analytical research sought to identify the approach adopted regarding Andalusia in the power structure of the Almohads, considering the conditions of the sixth century. It also addressed how the Almohads managed to maintain their sovereignty in Andalusia. Research findings show that the Almohads were successful in establishing their rule in Andalusia by making appropriate military decisions and plans and were able to encounter political contenders and Christians.  A problem that was implemented using military programs and played a role in establishing the political power of Almohads. This can be well analyzed in the way they faced political claimants and Christians in that region.

The role of the governors of Baghdad is one of the important issues in the relations between Iran and the Ottoman Empire during the Qajar period. The administration of Iraq was difficult due to the distance from the center, the presence of different ethnic groups and Shiite pilgrimage sites, and the proximity to Iran, and the appointed governors tried to strengthen their political and financial power by fueling the differences between Iran and the Ottoman Empire. From the middle of the 19th century and the reforms carried out in the Ottoman territory, an attempt was made to coordinate their administration with Istanbul by appointing governors such as Najib Pasha. However, Pasha's contractionary policy in Baghdad caused a political crisis. Against this backdrop, the research question of the present study concerns the policy adopted by Najib Pasha during the governorship of Baghdad to divide Iran and the Ottoman Empire. Based on the descriptive-analytical approach and the view of centralism, the governors of Baghdad and consequently Najib Pasha saw the security threat from Iran and the Iranians living in Iraq very forceful for their position. Therefore, in their political orientation, they tried to use this intellectual atmosphere of the Istanbul court in line with their interests. Also, relying on the idea of centralism and the unbreakable link of the empire and removing its destructive elements, they tried to consider the suppression and massacre of the people of Karbala as legitimate and necessary.

The Battle of Harran was the first military encounter between the Parthians and the Romans in the first century BC. Despite the advantages that the Romans had in terms of military experience, equipment, techniques and personnel, they suffered a heavy defeat because this failure in the future political and military relations between the Romans and The Parthians were very influential, the sociological study of this war becomes important. As sociologists of war in their researches about wars examine the underlying factors of war, the phenomenon of war and the consequences of war, this research aims to analyze the phenomenon of Harran war by relying on the opinions of some sociologists in the field of war and with descriptive and analytical method. examine. The findings of this research show that according to the theories of sociologists of war, the weak morale of the Roman forces caused by factors such as the influence of Roman soldiers from influence groups outside the army, some otherworldly beliefs and beliefs of the Romans and individual mistakes of the commander led to their defeat. The strength of the command of the Parthian army in using the strategy of psychological warfare with tactics or strategies such as destroying the will and ability of the Romans to fight, depriving the Romans of the support of their allies and obtaining military information through the use of infiltrators, became the basis for the victory of the Parthians.

Although the first Pahlavi is known for trying to create a new army and national bureaucratic institutions, as historical evidence shows, the structure and protection-security programs of Reza Shah to deal with the intelligence activities of foreign countries and especially England and Russia have not had favorable results. Based on this, the main question of the present article concerns the failure of the first Pahlavi intelligence organization to deal with England and Russia. The results of this study show that while dominating communication infrastructures, extensive and organized use of obvious sources and finally human espionage have been considered as the general strategy of England, the use of diplomatic institutions and people was the main strategy of Russia. Additionally, this document-oriented research shows that the prevalence of customary-cultural compulsions of the Qajar period in the center of modern institutions, the priority of Reza Shah's interests over national goals, and the lack of nationwide rules and laws in new structures, had destroyed the possibility of properly dealing with the intelligence activities of foreign countries.

In his political relations, the holy prophet (SAW) used strategies of various types, one of which was the military one. In this regard, some questions to answer concern the nature of military strategies used by the prophet and the extent to which he employed them to fulfill his aims and to adjust political relations. The outcome of this stance is evident in his political relations. The findings of the present descriptive-analytical study that surveys historical sources show that the prophet (SAW) made the least use of military attacks, and mainly benefited from defensive positions as a deterrence strategy aimed at stabilizing the Islamic government. To prove this, the present article provides evidence. The results also show that although the prophet’s military actions were merely defensive, he has used his war tactics so accurately that he could alter the political relations in the Arabian Peninsula and encourage people to accept Islam.