نشریه خردنامه صدرا
پیاپی 92 (تابستان 1397)

One of the accurate and profound discussions in logic pertains to the problem of modality in propositions. In the common books of logic, the definition of modality begins with the concepts of necessity, possibility, and impossibility and is later extended to perpetuity, eternity, activity, and temporality. Some logicians have referred to a maximum of 28 modes. Nevertheless, Kant maintains that the modes of propositions are only limited to possibility and impossibility, existence (actuality or in actuality) and non-existence, and necessity and contingency. In this paper, given the author’s epistemological stance, he argues that the modes of propositions are merely limited to necessity and possibility. This is because a proposition is either affirmative, with a necessity mode, or negative, again with a necessity mode. The former is called a “necessary proposition” and the latter an “impossible proposition”. In fact, it is the structures of affirmation and negation which are different from each other; otherwise, both share the same necessity mode. The mode of possibility is also related to the mind’s hesitation regarding the quality of the relationship between the predicate and the subject. If enough care is not exercised in extracting the predicate from the subject, or if the product of this process is manipulated, possibility will arise.

Ibn Sina’s kinematics, particularly based on his book of al-Shifa, has greatly influenced the thinkers of the Islamic period. Al-Shifa (The Book of Healing) is a philosophical encyclopedia, which, in Ibn Sina’s words, consists of four sections on logic, physics, mathematics, and metaphysics. The comprehensive and detailed nature of this work persuaded later scholars to write glosses, rather than comments and interpretations, on it. However, there are some short treatises whose writers have tried to explain some of the complexities regarding Ibn Sina’s kinematics in al-Shifa without making a direct reference to the title of this book in their own works. Hakim Mulla Solayman Gilani, a philosopher of the 11th century (AH), has explored some of the difficulties regarding the definitions of motion, types of motion, continuous motion, and cutting motion in a short treatise entitled Motion, Rest, and Time. In this treatise, in addition to paying particular attention to the views of Ibn Sina and Mulla Sadra, Hakim Gilani has also considered the views of some other thinkers such as Fakhr al-Din Razi, Athir al-Din Abhari, Khwajah Nasir al-Din Tusi, and Mir Seyyed Jurjani concerning the problem of motion. Hakim Gilani’s treatise consists of three parts: 1) An introduction to the definitions of motion, rest, and time; 2) Types of motion; 3) Responses to raised criticisms and objections. This treatise is published for the first time as an appendix to this paper.  

Believing or not believing in the world of suspended Ideas is one of the philosophical problems which affects philosophers’ approaches and methods in conducting their studies. Hence, it is necessary to examine this problem more profoundly following a new approach and benefitting from original and authentic sources. In the same vein, the present paper is intended to, firstly, present a clear picture of the “world of suspended Ideas” and its difference from “Platonic Ideas” in Suhrawardi’s view. Next, the author explains Hakim Abdulrazzaq Lahiji’s view of Suhrawardi’s world of suspended Ideas and presents his critique in this regard. Finally, he tries to respond to Lahiji’s criticisms. The author does not believe that he has covered all the details with respect to the theme of this paper; however, he can claim that no reliable research or critical study has ever been conducted on Hakim Lahiji’s view of the theory of suspended Ideas. Mulla Hadi Sabziwari, the theologian philosopher, provided some responses to Lahiji’s criticisms in his book of Asrar al-hikam; nevertheless, his responses are not conclusive, and they are very difficult to understand. It is hoped that this study opens the way for a new series of research activities in this regard. The author also hopes that future studies on the world of suspended Ideas will not suffer from the potential deficits of this study.

There are three views regarding the relationship between “essential attributes” and the “Essence of the Truth”. The Ash‘arites believed in the addition of the existence of attributes to the existence of the Essence of the Truth and the differences of their meanings from each other and from the Essence of the Truth. However, most philosophers acknowledge the identity of the real co-existence of attributes with the existence of the Essence of the Truth and, at the same time, believe in the differences mentioned above. Moreover, gnostics believe that the Essence of the Truth is free from attributes and maintain that attributes are of the same meaning with the Essence of the Truth. They also emphasize that contrasting attributes exist by accident in relation to the very existence of the Truth and are posterior to it. It seems that, unlike the Ash‘arites and other philosophers, who both suffer from some rational and traditional problems, the truth of gnostics’ view can be demonstrated based on several rational and traditional proofs.

Aristotle believes that the soul is necessarily a substance and views substance as the main ontological concept of his philosophy. Accordingly, it is important to learn about his idea of substance in order to perceive his view of the materiality or immateriality of the soul. Aristotle received great attention in the tradition of Islamic philosophy, particularly, the Peripatetic philosophy, and the stance of Islamic thinkers with regard to the soul bears some direct or close relationship with his theories. Farabi and Ibn Sina agree with Aristotle’s different definitions of substance and its general division into sensible and insensible types. However, the fundamental differences between their ideas and those of this Greek philosopher have yielded certain consequences which are quite noteworthy. The main purpose of this study is to explore such differences and discover their ultimate views on the immateriality and immortality of the soul. Accordingly, the writers initially examine the words that Aristotle used in order to define the meaning of substance and, secondly, refer to the various works in which he discussed the concept of substance. Finally, they compare his ideas in this regard with those of Farabi and Ibn Sina.

The problem of happiness and salvation is one of most important concerns of the human mind. Different religious and philosophical systems have tried to offer an appropriate solution to this problem on the basis of their particular worldviews. Ibn Sina is one of the thinkers that holds an innovative view in this regard. In the present paper, the authors have tried to explain Ibn Sina’s view of salvation and its compatibility with the theories of salvation in theology. He believed that Man’s salvation relies on attaining virtues and avoiding vices, developing rational knowledge and perfection of rational faculty, uniting with immaterial things, and obeying the prophets and religious laws. He advocated maximum salvation and maintained that the majority of human beings are qualified to enter the heaven and be rescued from torture. Given Ibn Sina’s view, Islam is the supreme religion; however, the followers of other religions can also reach some levels of salvation based on their rational knowledge and purity of the soul. In this view, his view of salvation comes close to the theory of inclusivism. Nevertheless, unlike inclusivists, who limit the domain of Man’s salvation to religion, Ibn Sina has an extra-religious view and portrays three sides for salvation: intellect, ethics, and religion.  

Ibn Sina’s argument of the righteous is one of the most important arguments on demonstrating the existence of God in Islamic tradition. After Ibn Sina, a number of prominent Muslim philosophers and mutakallimun welcomed this argument and carried out some profound studies in this regard in order to reveal its strengths and weaknesses following a critical approach. In spite of such efforts, there are still some ambiguities about this argument which demand more scientific research. In the present paper, the author has analyzed the form, content, and limits of the argument of the righteous based on logical principles and has demonstrated that it is an existent-oriented (not the concept of existent) and apriory argument on the basis of the impossibility of infinite regression and distinct from the argument of possibility. He also acknowledges that the argument of the righteous is no different from creature-oriented arguments in terms of epistemological value.