فصلنامه حکمت اسلامی
پیاپی 17 (تابستان 1397)

The first part of this paper takes a cursory glance at the various arguments for the existence of God that can be found in the works of the scholars of the East and the West from times immemorial. In the Islamic world, three approaches [to prove God] were generally accepted. These were the approach of the philosophers, the approach of the theologians and that of the physicists. The philosophers tried their utmost to keep the premises of their arguments for the existence of God to a minimum. Also, from the time of Ibn Sina, they called the manner of their argument, ‘the Argument of the Veracious. ’ The late Ashtiyani mentions nineteen versions of this type of argument If we add to these the version of Allamah Tabatabai, then the number of versions of the argument of the Veracious’ would extend to twenty. One of the scholars who actively pursued this problem was Allamah Khafri. After mentioning the argument of Khwajah Nasir al-Din Tusi in the Tajrid al-Itiqad, he mentions four versions of the same in his footnotes to this book. Following this, he also presents two new arguments in which there is no reference to the impossibility of an infinite regress of causes. Then, he states the second argument in two other ways. What is more, he considers this a version of the Argument of the Veracious. Mulla Sadra, who sometimes remembers Khafri as ‘one of the Persian sages’ and at other times as an ‘Allamah’ (a very learned man), objected to the two arguments of Khafri as well as the two innovative explanations of this sage. In this paper, we hope to defend Khafri from these objections.      

An explanation of the way one looks at existence is one of the most fundamental problems of philosophy. ‘The degrees of existence’ seeks to clarify a dimension of this important problem. The Peripatetic philosophers view existence as a multiplicity in which the various beings of the universe are completely different from one another. According to this viewpoint, existence is a collection of beings that share nothing in common with one another. Therefore, the presentation of ‘the degrees of existence’ is meaningless in this philosophical school of thought. Theorists in this school of thought have said that ‘the levels of beings’ imply a series of varying categories of beings that are either strong or weak in their existence. Allamah Shams al-Din bin Ahmad al-Khafri, a great philosopher and theologian of the tenth century A. H. , believed that existence possessed two meanings, i. e. ‘being’ and ‘the source from which being is abstracted’. This paved the way for a new outlook towards existence that was distinct from that of the Peripatetic philosophers. His treatise that was entitled, ‘the Levels of Existence, ’ has elucidated this theory. Following this, in his Transcendent Wisdom, Mulla Sadra presented vital philosophical premises such as ‘gradation in existence’ that helped perfect the idea of the ‘levels and degrees of existence.                                                    

The topic of this paper is the similarity in meaning between a mental concept and the thing it depicts. The question that it wants to pursue is the following: is there a similarity between a concept and the external instance from which it is abstracted and to which it then applied? This paper utilizes the descriptive/analytical method of research. Here, we want to prove the hypothesis that every concept is similar to the instances from which it is abstracted. The discussion surrounding the relation between a concept and its source of abstraction is one of the most fundamental discussions [of epistemology]. The conclusions of such a discussion can have far-reaching effects upon the many of the subjects covered in philosophy. The most important conclusions that this research paper has achieved is the following: 1. Every concept is harmonious and similar to the thing it depicts and the thing that it is parallel to in the external world and in the mind. 2. In the Transcendent Wisdom the idea that a concept that is a quiddity matches with its instance is founded on the states of existence, the correspondence of the worlds and the fact that existential realities are one in their quiddities. 3. The secondary logical intelligible is the concept whose attribution and occurrence take place in the mind. Also, the relation between the subject and predicate in propositions in which such intelligibles occur is found in the mind. Such concepts possess mental instances that are parallel to them. 4. According to the view of Sadr al-Mutallihin, philosophical intelligibles possess something that parallels them and that they depict. This thing is similar to the concept [that depicts them] and they match with it.

One of the most fundamental discussions of philosophy is the discussion surrounding the principality of existence and the unreal nature of quiddity. A proper understanding of this discussion can facilitate the understanding of the personal unity of existence [that the mystics believe in]. In his philosophical system, Mulla Sadra passed four stages in his belief in the unreal nature of quiddity. First, like the majority of philosophers, he believed in the principality of quiddity and the unreal nature of existence. Following this, he proposed what he called the ‘tassul’ of quiddity. Then he said that quiddity is something unreal and he negated it from the external world. In the end, he also negated the reality of quiddity from the mind. In this paper, we will better acquainted with the various stages of the belief in the reality of quiddity in the philosophical system of Mulla Sadra. 

Different views have been expressed regarding the relation between casual necessity and free-will. These conflicting views can be subsumed under two general categories. Some agree with this compatibility while others do not. Allamah Tabatabaei was a philosopher of the first category. By defining a voluntary action he strives to present a factor for free-will and coincidentally show how it is possible for such a voluntary action to be compatible with the necessity that exists between cause and effect. An analysis of the writings of Allamah Tabatabaei shows that he presented a total of four factors by means of which one can determine whether an action is voluntary or not. Of course, these measures are horizontally, not vertically aligned with one another. Sometimes, he presents ‘self-specification’ as a factor. At other times, he states that an action is voluntary if ‘it is preceded by choice. ’ In another place, he says that the voluntary action can be divided into two categories: the one that stems from choice and the one that is performed through compulsion and he states that the measure of a voluntary action is its being in accord with the agent that performs it. In the end, he interprets volition as ‘possibility in relation [to something else]. ’ Thus, he says that volition is the relation of possibility that exists between an effect and its incomplete cause. In this article, we will examine the first three measure of a voluntary action. The fourth measure will be examined in a separate article.

An analysis of the philosophical teachings of Ibn Sina and Mulla Sadra show us that in these two philosophical schools of thought, the faculty of wahm was never rejected as a secondary source for the actions and conceptions of the soul. Rather, in the philosophy of Ibn Sina, this faculty was like the other faculties of knowledge of man, i. e. it was an independent faculty distinct from the others.
However, in the philosophy of Mulla Sadra, this faculty does not have an independent existence and it resembles a ‘fallen intellect’ that has descended from its original station and that has turned towards the imaginative and sensible forms.  Therefore, the faculty of wahm is like the intellect in that it is intellectual in nature and has achieved a level of intellectual immateriality. So, there is no existential distinction between them. In this philosophical system, each one of the categories of the realm of existence has its own degree of existential intensity or weakness. The pure intellect falls at the highest degree of the realm of intellection and the faculty of wahm, i. e. the lower intellect, can be found at the lowest level of this realm.  It seems that the various standards by means of which the existential multiplicity of the external beings has been applied to the problem of the existential distinctions of the faculties of knowledge that are situated in a vertical hierarchy with one another. This has led to different views regarding the nature of the existence of the faculty of wahm.  This is because Ibn Sina understands the existential difference between the faculties of understanding of man to lie in the personal accidents that lie outside of the essence and quiddity [of these faculties]. He was of the belief that human beings are classes of one reality and quiddity that are different from one another in their locus and the specific actions of understanding.  Mulla Sadra however, does not believe that their distinction lies in material accidents, since he believes in the immateriality of all of the faculties of understanding.  Rather, based upon the theories of the principality of existence, gradation in existence and the unity of knowledge, the knower and the known he was of the belief that the faculties of understanding that form a vertical hierarchy with one another become individual and distinct from one another due to their unity with the higher beings of quiddity.  

In Islamic thought, from the very onset of theological discussions, the reality of faith was given careful consideration. From amongst the various factors that are influential in the reality of faith, knowledge has been emphasized more than any other. It has not been objected to as much as the other factors that play a role in the formation of faith. In this research article, an attempt has been made to discover and analyze the reality of faith from the point of the traditions of the Infallibles (a) that are one of the original sources of Islamic knowledge. What is more, the methodology of ‘ijtihad’ that is the method suitable to the extraction of Islamic teachings from religious texts. Based upon the examination that has been conducted, it is possible to say that the knowledge that is influential in the existence of faith can be divided into two categories. One is a condition for faith and paves the way for its genesis. Naturally, such knowledge falls outside of the reality of faith. However, it is necessary for it. The other type of knowledge is found within faith and this is the knowledge of the hearth. In this paper, an attempt has been made to show how the word ‘marifat’ (knowledge) has been used in these two manners in the traditions.