فصلنامه پژوهش های تاریخی
سال دوازدهم شماره 2 (پیاپی 46، تابستان 1399)

Although some aspects of the political relationship between the Safavid state and local governments in the history of Iran have been examined, nevertheless, the relations between the Safavid state and the local governments in Iran's western borders, especially Atabakan-e Lor-e Kouchak, have been largely ignored. Accordingly, the present paper, with a historical approach and by describing and analyzing historical sources, have studied the relations between the Safavid state and Atabakan-e Lor-e Kouchak dynasty in the light of various internal and external factors. The findings of this research indicated that the territorial position of Lor-e Kouchak, their ability to influence the central and western regions of Iran, the border and the strategic position of this family in the west of the country, and their occasional overt and covert relations with the Ottomans brought about fear for the Safavid state and raised tension between them. In the shadow of these threats, finally, after nearly a century of the appeasement policy of the Safavid government, Shah Abbas I by adopting special political and military measures about Lorestan, not only eliminated the local dynasty of Atabakan-e Lor-e kouchak but also divided the region under their control into two parts and appointed puppet rulers in both regions. In practice, he neutralized the widespread threats of the Atabkan-e Lor-e Kouchak government.  

Atabakan-e Lor-e Kouchak, known as Abbasi or Al-e-Khorshid, was established in the middle of the 6th AH/ the 12th century AC, when the centrality and authority of the Seljuk government had been lost by the war and conflict between the military rulers and the Turkish tribes. Despite the silence of historical sources and the lack of a family historiography tradition about the historical events of this local dynasty, the Atabakans for centuries were able to have the area between the Zagros Mountains and the areas reaching the Diyala Plain and the city of Baghdad under their control and authority. By taking advantage of the region's mountains, effective war strategies, local influence and legitimacy, and political strategies such as declaring obedience to central government and political marriages, the local dynasty was able to maintain and continue its rule. Shah Ismail I, after his coronation in 1501 AC, on the way to consolidating and dominating Iran, eliminated many local powerful rulers or forced them to accept obedience to the Safavid government. The small Atabakan-e Lor family was one of the local dynasties who declared obedience and subordination to the Shah of Iran. As they were not considered a political and religious rival for the central government anymore, the Safavid government agreed with their obedience and thus their rule continued over Lorestan. From then until the killing of the last khan belonging to the Atabakan-e Lor-e Kouchak dynasty by Shah Abbas, their relations underwent many ups and downs. In addition to factors such as changes in the political strategies of the Safavid state, such as centralism, the tendency of the Lor rulers to internal independence and not being in absolute obedience to the Safavid state (that was well-precedented among Lor rulers in relation to previous governments), long-lasting wars and conflicts of the Safavids with the Ottomans, and the Ottomans deployment in the west of Lor-e Kouchak’s territory (after dominating over Baghdad) added to the complexity of the relations between Atabakan-e Lor-e Kouchak and the Safavid government. Lorestan had become part of the front line of the Ottoman-Safavid conflict and played an important role for both sides in providing security and control over the western and southwestern regions of Iran and Iraq. The Ottoman government would gain access to the heart of the territories of Iran and the capitals of the Safavid state, namely Isfahan and Qazvin, by passing through this region (in the shadow of a secret or overt agreement with the local government). The Safavid government also made it possible, through control of Lorestan, to monitor Mesopotamia and the important city of Baghdad or threaten them when necessary. The present paper attempted to examine the political relations between the Safavid government and the Atabakan-e Lor-e Kouchak in light of all these internal and external factors. Various works have been written about the history of the Atabakan and their political relations. However, these studies do not have a comprehensive generality about the political ties of this family with the Safavid government. Therefore, in these studies, the significant characteristics and points of these relationships and the contexts in which these relationships took place are not highlighted. The writings of researchers such as Izadpanah, Khodgoo, and Saki (while being valuable in the public context of Lorestan studies), on the political relations of Atabakan-e-Lor, are mainly rewriting the words of historians such as Mostofi, Badlisi, and Iskanderbeig and lack a new analytical approach. There are three essential articles on the political relations between Atabakan and the Safavid state: first, Shahram Yousefi Far’s research with the title of Atabakan-e Lorestan on the political history of Atabakan-e Lor, which contains more analysis and details. Salehi and Akbari's paper entitled Shahverdi Khan's governorship of Lorestan and the centralism of the Safavid government which deals with the political relations between Shahverdi Khan and Shah Abbas; however, it focuses more on the issue of centralism and its role in their relations. Third, the paper by Rohhollah Bahrami entitled Atabakan-e-Khorshidi and Safavid Government deals with events analysis and reports by historians on relations between these two dynasties. In general, all three articles lack a detailed analysis of the political, economic, and military significance of Lorestan for the Safavid government and the new strategic position of that land in the political-defense plans of this government; therefore, they generally ignore the background and context of the formation of the ups and downs of these relations. Therefore, the present article tried to provide a more objective and understandable analysis of the developments by highlighting crucial internal and external factors of the ups and downs of the relations between the Safavid government and Atabakan-e Lor-e Kouchak.  

Therefore, in the present article, with a historical approach, description, and analysis of historical sources, an attempt has been made to address the new strategic position of Lorestan and the role of the external factors in the approaches and strategies of historical actors in light of the ups and downs of the relations between the Safavid government and Atabakan-e Lor-e Kouchak. Thus, factors such as the proximity of Lorestan province to the Ottoman government and the intermediary and strategic role of this region between Mesopotamia and the western, southwestern, and central territories of the Safavid state have been highlighted.  

The relationship between local governments and central governments in the history of Iran was organized based on a set of mutual obligations and expectations. On the one hand, local dynasties fulfilled a set of political, financial, and military obligations in relation to the central states. On the other hand, it was expected that the central governments, while declaring the legitimacy of the local government, would not interfere in the internal affairs of the states and provinces. Nevertheless, the nature of the power structure and policies of the central governments, as well as the type of political tendencies of the local dynasties, caused these relations to fluctuate. There are few historical reports of a conflict between Atabakan-e Lor-e Kouchak and the pre-Safavid rulers and their tendency towards some form of independence. After the rise of the Safavid state, until the middle of the tenth century AH, the relations between Atabakan-e Lor-e Kouchak and the Safavid state revolved around the old circle of the above-mentioned mutual obligations and expectations. The effects of the above-mentioned factors in the relations between the two continued until the second half of the tenth century AH. Reports indicate the presence of the Khan of Lor in the campaigns of the Safavid government and the presentation of gifts to the Safavid Shah. However, in this historical period, the Ottoman government's domination over Baghdad and the alignment of Lor-e Kouchak's political geography with the political borders of the Ottoman government changed the type of mutual relations between the Atbakan-e Lor-e Kouchak family and the Safavid state. These new demarcations gave the Lorestan region a strategic position, enabling the Lorestan rulers, given the previous relative independence, economic self-sufficiency, and mountainous and impassability of the region, to maintain greater internal power and independence and gain maximum political and economic benefits. The Safavid government, considering the strategic position of Lorestan and the threat that could be perceived from this area, tried to use tools and tactics such as intimidation or granting political concessions to this local family to keep them away from the Ottomans. As a result, each of the historical actors involved in this period (Safavids, Ottoman, and Lorestan rulers) sought to make the most of it and avoid dangers to the extent possible. It seems that this external factor has played a major role in the central government’s distrust in the Lor rulers and in pursuing the policy of overthrowing this old and rooted family of Atabakan-e Lor-e Kouchak by the Safavid government. Therefore, the previously-mentioned situation, inadvertently caused the overthrow of the old and rooted family of Atabakn-e Lor-e Kouchak and provided the grounds for the fundamental changes in the political geography of Lor-e-Kouchak and divide it into two regions of Pishkouh and Poshtkouh.

Imagology in comparative literature deals with the study of representations and the image of the others in a travelogue or a literary work. Alterity is one of the conceptions of this branch of history/ literature and in reality; it is an attempt to know the opinion of others about yourself with all the prejudices or derivations made by the writer. In this study, we will see through the writing of an English traveler, James Morier, and Pierre Loti, a French writer, the described image of the customs of the Iranians of the Qajar era. First of all, a general image, positive or negative, which gives in the foreground a vision of self-identification and admiration of the Western "self" focused on the culture of the Eastern (Iranian) "Other" and in a second plan, a negative look according to the current example in the orientalist context in the opposition between the self and the other or the East and the West, Stereotyping and generalization, amplification of conflicts and contradictions, humiliating and insulting.

The story of " Abu Moslem Nameh " has been the scene of confrontation of religious-cultural and intellectual stands and views following political power since its inception, i.e. the Seljuq period until the end of the Safavid era. At the beginning of the Safavids' rise to power, this story, while entertaining the Qizilbash supporters of the Supreme Murshid (Murshid –i kãmil), played a significant role as a creed of belief in their cohesion and encouragement to overcome internal and external opponents. The story of Abu Moslem Nameh, which best contained the elements and tools of discourse needed by the fledgling Safavid government, persuaded its listeners and narrators and acted as a charter in unifying the forces of the scattered Qizilbash tribes.
With the suppression and destruction of internal and external opponents and the consolidation of Safavid power, those interested in their Abu Moslem Nameh became a threat to the power of the Safavid kings. The Qizilbash's disregard for the Murshid - i kãmil due to the change of some beliefs and their disregard for the rules of Shari'a and religious rites due to their nomadic temperament and superficial acquaintance with the rules of Shari'a, paved the way for king Safavid by inviting Arabic Shari'a scholars from Syria and Iraq to Iran to promote and revive religious principles and teachings based on the Shiite school. Following the formation of a sharp contrast between the new and old discourses, Qizilbash beliefs and their propaganda tools were disregarded and the character of Abu Muslim was attacked by the Abbasids because of not trying to restore the rights of the Alawites and the story of Abu Moslem Nameh due to the inclusion of some improper Shiite teachings; consequently the followers, narrators and lovers of this view, were attacked, threatened and killed.

This article tries to emphasize the fatwas of the prominent scholars of the Safavid period (Mohaghegh Karak 1533 AD) and the Shiite scholars of the first and last centuries; meanwhile it represents the historical context of the Safavid rule, the reasons for the convergence of the proponents and the divergence of the opponents of Abu Moslem Nameh, by analyzing the discourse of Shari'a and Tariqat, according to the "Van Dijk" model; furthermore,  by using rhetorical-expressive arrangements, the article describes, interprets and explains how activists used the tactics of destruction, denial, intimidation and murder, to the extent that they succeeded in marginalizing the opponent in exchange for highlighting their positive characteristics.

 Material and Methods

 The purpose of this article is to use the story of Abu Moslem Nameh purposefully according to Van Dijk's ideological method and activist methods of discourses to advance religious goals and ideas in the two discourses of Shari'a and Tariqah in order to overcome the opponent. This article is based on descriptive-analytical method and uses library resources.

The purpose of this article is to represent the confrontation between the Shari'a discourse and the Tariqah in the first and last centuries of the Safavid dynasty, and how at first Morshid -i kãmil was able to reduce the power of the Qizilbash discourse by inviting a rival religious trend. Initially, this confrontation was formed by emphasizing the fatwa of the prominent scholar of the Safavid period Mohaghegh Karaki and Shiite scholars and limited the power of the Qizilbash. But in the last century, due to the acquisition of court positions and other interests by the discourse of the Shari'a and the desire of the Safavid kings for Sufi masters, not only did the power of Sufism not diminish, but some scholars were persecuted and some scholars were accused of Sufism. This article tries to examine the causes of convergence and divergence around this classic work while representing the historical context and explains how the new discourse of Shari'a was first formed by creating the ideological atmosphere of “We and Other” and how it was able to use rhetorical-expressive arrangements and techniques of destruction, denial, threats and assassinations, in contrast to highlighting their positive qualities, Fmarginalizing the opponents from the scene of power; although in the next stage it was not very successful. Analysis of the discourse surrounding the story of Abu Muslim on the issue of Shari'a and Tariqah leads to the conclusion that the sharp reaction of Shari'a scholars to the story of Abu moslem nameh, contrary to the views of some scholars who have reduced it to a pan Arab and non-Arab issue, shows the influence of Ahlul Tarighat, as the early Safavids supporters, who played important social roles in cultural and ideological structures and intellectual institutions. For this reason, the followers of Shari'a have tried to dominate the discourse of Shari'a by articulating and creating a new discourse, destroying the discourse of their favorite opponent and hero, and accusing the lovers of the story of Abu Moslem Nameh as followers of atheistic and non-Shiite ideas. To this end, they tried to make their conception of the Shari'a the truth by changing the historical character of Abu Muslim and de-texturing the mystical ideas and teachings that spread among the public in the form of epic and miraculous stories. Relying on the Qur'an and hadiths, they tried to marginalize Abu Muslim and the narrators and friends and even the listeners of Abu Moslem Nameh by using the techniques of negative attribution and uncertifying, nomination and classification, reference and decoupling.

Legitimacy is one of the basic foundations of governments in their relations with the people. Governments, depending on their spatiotemporal requirements and intra-governmental characteristics, use various components to gain legitimacy through which they can implement the desired policies in connection with their political domination. The Alavid rule of Tabarestan (ruled: 232-234 AH/ 865-929) was formed in the region of Tabarestan, far from the center of the caliphate, symmetrically with the second Abbasid era (847-946). Hassan bin Zayd Alavi, the first claimant of the Zaydi ruler, made the religious legitimacy of his government in divergence with the Abbasid caliphate the headline of his policies in the face of the majority of the governments of this period, which based their legitimacy on the Abbasid caliphate due to the strength of the foundations. Thus, in this period we witness long and wearing conflicts between Hassan bin Zayd Alavi and agents of the Abbasid Caliph. This study tried to answer the question: what components did Hassan bin Zayd Alavi use to gain legitimacy for his government? The findings of the study indicate that Hassan bin Zayd Alavi was able to gather the people of Tabarestan around him in the form of ‘Imam Zaydi’, due to its inherent characteristics, and then strengthen the legitimacy of his government by pursuing an anti-caliphate policy. At the same time, he pursued efficiency and attention to the public interests of society to satisfy the public.

The Alavids, who were in power until the martyrdom of Imam Hussein (AS), considered themselves entitled to the government after that, and did not spare any effort achieving it. Numerous Alavid uprisings during the Umayyad period, and later, during the Abbasid caliphate, such as the uprisings of Mukhtar Saghafi, Zayd ibn Ali (AS), Abdullah ibn Mu'awiyah, Muhammad Nafs Zakia, etc., were only some of their efforts towards the realization of their right. With the passage of time and the consolidation of the power of the caliphate, the caliphs, who were at the height of their power, ousted all the forces claiming power, including the Alavids. The second Abbasid era (847-946) was symmetrical with the formation of the Alavid government of Tabarestan (865-929). In this period, the Abbasid caliphs did not have the authority of the first era, and power was not concentrated in their hands, so we witness the rise of the opposing forces in different parts of the Islamic world. The second Abbasid era can be called the beginning of the independence movements to disintegrate the caliphate. Due to its vast territory, the Abbasid Caliphate was susceptible to independence movements in the east and west of the Islamic world. During the reign of Abbasid caliph, Hadi (784-785), the Alavid movement under the leadership of Hussein ibn Ali, known as Sahib Fakh was crushed (Mas'udi, 1987, 3/328-327) Idris ibn Abdullah and Yahya ibn Abdullah were two Alavid elders who survived this incident. Idris went to Africa and formed the basis of the Idrisian rule in that region. Yahya also chose Tabarestan and collected some followers for himself there. (Baladhuri, 1997, 3/355) The Alavids gained power in Tabarestan due to the presence of Yahya ibn Abdullah and the distance of the region from the center of the caliphate, and the ground was prepared for the formation of their government. Accordingly, the present study, while expressing the legitimacy of the government in Zaydi thought, which has played a key role in legitimizing the government of the great dā'ei, addressed other aspects of the legitimacy of his government such as divergence from the Abbasid caliphate and efficiency and attention to the public interest. 

The present article aimed to analyze the legitimization efforts of Hassan bin Zayd Alavi in ​​the Alavids rule of Tabarestan, with a descriptive-analytical approach and based on library studies. 

Among these early Islamic governments, the Alavids of Tabarestan continued their opposition to the Abbasid Caliphate from the beginning to the end of their rule and sought their legitimacy outside the legitimacy of the Abbasid Caliphate. For this reason, the Alavid government of Tabarestan, among its contemporary governments, was considered one of the divergent governments of the Abbasid caliphate, which lacked the official banner of governance from the caliph. Hassan ibn Zayd Alavi, as the founder of the Alavid government of Tabarestan, from the very beginning set the goal of his government against the rule of the Abbasid rulers in Iran, such as Taherian and repelling the oppressive ruler, and established the nature of his government in opposition to the caliphate. Dependence on the family of the Prophet (PBUH) and the spiritual influence that existed among the Alavids was reliable support that made Hassan ibn Zayd without the need to gain legitimacy from the Abbasid caliphs. The arrival of Hassan bin Zayd in the region caused his government to enjoy the support of the people in the region, which helped a lot in gaining legitimacy, and this support continued until the end of the government. Hassan ibn Zayd was considered one of the most popular rulers in the eyes of the people, and from this point of view, he was able to carry out his policies with the support of the people. Hassan bin Zayd's government was in fewer direct conflicts with the Abbasid caliphate due to its distance from the Abbasid capital, distance, territorial limitation, and coincidence with internal conflicts. As we do not see the conflict and the direct presence of the caliph in the region of Tabarestan. For this reason, the Abbasid Caliph tried to use the subrogation forces or his supporters to confront the Alavids of Tabarestan. The sending of Musa ibn Bagha and Mufleh by Mu'taz and Motamed and Amal Taheri to suppress Tabarestan are examples of this. In the meantime, the rulers of Taheri, Samani, and Saffari took full advantage of the conflict between the Alavid rule of Tabarestan and the Abbasid caliphate. They used the repressive position of the Alavids to be close to and serve the caliph and to strengthen the foundations of their government, and the Abbasid caliphs also welcomed this situation. Hassan bin Zayd was also successful in terms of efficiency and securing the public interest. He was known for his forgiveness and charity and was very strict about establishing security. Hassan bin Zayd also paid attention to the people's opinions about the election of the rulers of the regions and made the appointment of well-known people the top priority of his choices. He also took valuable measures in the field of public satisfaction and efficiency due to the limited territory. The endowment of settlements, the construction of gardens, baths, shops, schools, mosques, and bridges were among his important actions in gaining the legitimacy of the government. In terms of efficiency, Hassan bin Zayd, while emphasizing charity and the construction of public buildings to attract the attention of the people, has paid attention to establishing security and selecting qualified people for government positions. These actions led to people's sympathy and sympathy with his government and led to his legitimacy and the continuation of his political rule. In general, his approach to gaining legitimacy, while emphasizing the principle of Imam Zaidi's Imamate, based on divergence from the Abbasid caliphate and efficiency, was considered and followed by his successors as a model of government.

Iran’s eastern borders have historically been one of the country’s most important economic routes, and developments in the region and within the country have had a direct impact on the prosperity and decline of the routes. Mirjavah is one of the cities in Sistan and Baluchestan province in eastern Iran. It is located near the border with Pakistan. The inhabitants of Mirjavah are Baloch. Mirjavah became important in contemporary history first due to Russian-British rivalries and it then became important because of the railway that connected the city to Quetta. It was considered one of the most important customs in the east of the country. The main reason for the development of this city was foreign trade and the existence of railways. The border town fell into economic prosperity after Pakistan seceded from India. As a result, people’s lifestyles changed. Researchers were sent there by the central government in the 1970s to identify Mirjaveh's economic situation. This research was based on some of these reports. The question of the research is: what was the economic situation of Mirjavah in the Pahlavi era? The results showed that smuggling has flourished due to the lack of prosperity in agriculture and formal trade, and the actions have been ineffective.   

The present study aimed at investigating the economic and commercial situation of Mirjavahduring the reign of Mohammad Reza Shah and consisted of three parts: agriculture and animal husbandry in Mirjaveh, trade and customs, and smuggling in Mirjavah. In the first part, geographical location and climate show did not allow extensive agriculture and animal husbandry. Considering the second part, people’s lives and problems have reportedly been investigated after Pakistan seceded from India. Regarding the third part (smuggling of goods) studies have shown that trafficking has flourished for various reasons.

About the sources used and research methods, two very important sources were written about this city. A View of Mirjavah is a manuscript written by Assadollah Alavi and Faramarz Asadzadeh in 1975. This manuscript is in the library of the Zahedan Program and Budget Organization Also, Mirjaveh Economic Report by Mahmoud Zand Moghadam is in the library of the Tehran Program and Budget Organization which was prepared in 1976. Both works have examined the city from an economic, social, and especially commercial point of view. Sources include tables and pictures and additional descriptions. This research has been written based on these reports, documents of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and interviews with several people from Mirjavah.

This article was written in all three cases about Mirjaveh's economic issues (agriculture, animal husbandry, and trade). Mirjaveh air is warm and its natural environment is dry and the rain in Mirjaveh is in the form of showers. Floods occur due to low and high ground. Documents showed that there was no possibility of extensive agriculture and animal husbandry in this city. Also, this article has covered problems such as the size of the area, lack of border control, and lack of sufficient and trained forces at the borders. It was one of the problems that fueled the issue of trafficking.    Lack of coordination between Pakistani and Iranian staff was another problem that affected the city's economy and lack of traffic control at the borders has been another economic and social problem of this city. The present study also discussed the type of commercial goods smuggled. In the early years of the second Pahlavi regime, most of the gold was smuggled across the border which the government at the time had made great efforts to control. Wheat was another commodity that was always smuggled into this city. Gradually, this trend has changed and with the strengthening of the central government, the goods became more diverse and simpler. It has changed from gold and coins to wooden beds, tea, spices, and old foreign clothes. Also, smuggled vehicles had changed from camels to cars. But the city faced economic hardship during this period of border poverty and most of the people's livelihood was through smuggling  Thus, the research findings showed due to the lack of prosperity in agricultural occupations and official trade and the proximity of this border city to Zahedan, trafficking from Mirjaveh route has flourished. The Pahlavi government in the 1960s and 1970s paid special attention to the eastern borders and sought to establish better trade relations between Iran, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. Therefore, the government had several plans for Sistan and Baluchistan province. The plans were ineffective in the case of the city of Mirjavah and the city continued to suffer from smuggling and economic poverty in the 1970s.

All the mythological themes and worldviews of the primitive tribes and religious concepts of different nations, which represent the general examples of human behavior, should be called archetypes. These mythological themes are repeated and common in different societies. In the myth of Jamshid, which is quoted in the Shahnameh and some other works of Muslim writers, like the myths around the world, one can see the role of the archetypes, and based on these archetypes, one can analyze the desired myth. The present study has been conducted with the archetypal criticism approach and the descriptive-analytical method based on the library data. The purpose of this study is to investigate some of the most important archetypes in the Jamshid myth quoted in the Shahnameh and to compare them with the most important historical works of Muslim writers who have quoted the Jamshid myth. The study results indicate that the role of archetypes such as the archetype of good and evil battle (the archetype of heroic and anti-heroic battle), the archetype of utopia, the archetype of flight, the archetype of the New Year celebration, the archetype of longevity, the archetype of sin as a result of being deceived by demonic forces, the archetype of shadow, the archetype of the mask, the archetype of punishment, and so on, are observed in the Shahnameh and other mentioned works. Thus, the myth of Jamshid can be analyzed based on these archetypes.  

Today, myths have been studied from different perspectives, including historical, philosophical, mystical, functional, psychological, anthropological, sociological, artistically, etc., and each of them has different analyses and interpretations. One of the major methodologies is to analyze myths using archetypes, which is also called archetypal criticism. Archetypal criticism explores the nature of the characteristics of myths, archetypes, and their role. Critics of this method look for exemplary forms and archetypes in mythological works and talk about their relationship to the depths of human nature. The collective subconscious encompasses contents and behaviors that are more or less the same everywhere among all human beings. In other words, it is common to all human beings and, therefore, creates a common psychological realm that is superhuman and exists in all of us. The contents of the collective unconscious are called archetypes. If we want to deal with the concept of the collective unconscious, we must know that we are dealing with ancient patterns, or rather eternal, that is, universal images that have existed since time immemorial. Accordingly, the contents of the collective unconscious are formed by archetypes. These archetypes are deposited in the collective subconscious of human beings based on ancient experiences and manifest themselves in the form of dreams, myths, and works of art. In the definition of an archetype, it can be said that it includes a pattern, a model, a person, a letter, an example that looks, patterns, models people, professions, and other examples of perfect imitations, or at least very similar to them. The analysis and adaptation of the archetypes that make up the structure of myths will enable researchers to solve the mysteries of prehistoric man and analyze their beliefs. This study examines the myth of Jamshid, one of the most famous Iranian myths narrated in the Shahnameh and some other historical works of Muslim writers and analyzes some of the most important archetypes in this myth.  

Since the present research is a library study in which the library data constitute the main materials for investigation. The research method is descriptive-analytical with an archetypal criticism approach.  

The results of this study indicate that the narration of the Shahnameh and the narrations of the other Muslim writers concerning the myth of Jamshid are very close to each other and there are slight differences in these narrations. In the myth of Jamshid, like many other Iranian myths, the archetype of the battle between good and evil is symbolized in the form of the battle between a hero and an anti-hero. In this myth, Jamshid can be mentioned as a hero who is captured by carnality in the end or by being deceived by demons who are a symbol of the negative part of the archetype of the shadow, he deviates from the right path and commits the sin of heresy. This sin of Jamshid carries a heavy punishment, and that is the loss of all possessions, wandering, and tragic death. Archetypes of sin and punishment are among the most important archetypes found in this myth. In this myth, the archetype of utopia can also be seen. In various sources, the period of Jamshid’s reign is mentioned as a golden period, which is the manifestation of the archetype of the utopia in Persian myths. The flight archetype is another important archetype that has been quoted in the myth of Jamshid and various sources. The narration of this archetype is the manifestation of ancient human desires to fly in the skies. Another important archetype in this myth is the archetype of the New Year celebration. The archetype of the New Year celebration is one of the most important archetypes that has continued to live in the cultural geography of Iran until today in the form of the Nowruz celebration. Another important archetype quoted in this myth is the archetype of the longevity of some mythical kings. This archetype is also reproducible and can be seen in many myths. In general, by examining the archetypes in the myth of Jamshid and applying them in different narrations, an acceptable analysis of this myth can be achieved.

Heritage and modernity are among the most challenging and perhaps the most sensitive issues of the last two hundred years of the Islamic world, around which different and sometimes contradictory, extremist, and deviant readings and approaches have been formed. Undoubtedly, this issue is one of the common and frequent topics in the intellectual discourse of the Arab world and has attracted the attention of many thinkers. Hassan Hanafi (1935) is a thinker, theorist, and one of the most prominent contemporary religious modernists. His project of heritage reconstruction is one of the great projects in the Arab Islamic world. Hanafi launched a project to rethink and rebuild the legacy of the past to resolve the crises and challenges of the Islamic-Arab world. This present descriptive-analytical study aims to review and critique Hassan Hanafi’s heritage reconstruction project. The study addresses the following questions: What is the definition of heritage from Hanafi’s point of view? What are the components of the Hanafi’s heritage reconstruction project? What are Hanafi’s intellectual foundations in this project? What is the Hanafi approach to this project? What are heritage readings? This study uses two articles of Nasrullah Aghajani as benchmarks. The results show that according to Hanafi, heritage reconstruction is made in special ways, some of which involve language and words, some refer to meanings and concepts, and some to the very nature of objects and subjects.

Modernity in the Arab world began from the moment the Arab thinker realized that the Westerners were ahead of him and that he was still lagging behind. The beginning of this moment is mentioned in the attack of Napoleon Bonaparte in the late 18th century. That is, modernity did not originate from the context of an internal cultural revolution. Some see it as a moment of cultural invasion and the spread of Western colonialism in the Arab world. Modernity allowed the Arab intellect to discover itself, its shortcomings, and its space. The clash between the Islamic and Western systems took place during Napoleon’s invasion of Egypt in 1798, which led to their confrontation and affected the people. The issue of heritage and modernity is one of the most important challenging issues in contemporary Arab thought in the 1970s, especially if we look at the vast amount of writings, researches, and seminars that have dealt with this subject. Hassan Hanafi (born 1935, Cairo) was a thinker, theorist, and one of the most prominent contemporary Egyptian religious modernists. He was an Islamic theorist, a graduate of the French Sorbonne University, and taught and researched in many universities in Arab countries. He had the middle ground between fundamentalism and secular currents. Hanafi became famous for his Islamic leftist views and the intellectual project called ‘heritage reconstruction’. Hanafi works in the three areas of reconstruction of Islamic heritage, western studies, and the recognition of issues related to the contemporary reality of Muslims.

The present study critiques Hanafi’s heritage reconstruction project using a descriptive-analytical approach. Articles have already been written on Hanafi’s intellectual foundations, methodology, and Western studies project. We can even refer to numerous and noteworthy articles (e.g. Nasrullah Aghajani and his book entitled Islam and Modernity in Egypt).  The two studies of Aghajani have been considered in this study as benchmarks of criticizing Hanafi’s heritage reconstruction: ‘Islamic heritage in the grip of modernity: a critique of Hassan Hanafi's approach in the reconstruction of Islamic heritage’ and ‘the methodology of Hassan Hanafi's intellectual system’.

In Aghajani’s first study, the issue of modernization and ways of modernizing heritage, which is considered in the present study, is mentioned. But the project of heritage reconstruction and its components and readings, the difference between modernity and innovation, and other issues raised in the present, have not been considered by Aghajani. In the second study, Hanafi’s methodology including the epistemological and non-epistemological fields affecting his intellectual system is stated and only influential people and schools are mentioned and Hanafi’s reconstruction project is not discussed.
Hanafi presented a project called ‘heritage reconstruction’ to solve the contemporary crises of the Islamic-Arab world, which is one of his most important intellectual projects based on conceptualization. He refers to the legacy of spiritual data left over from the history of Islam in the fields of traditional epistemology. He believes the tradition itself must be achieved by suspending existing interpretations. Hanafi has a utilitarian view of the Islamic tradition that should be reconstructed in that part of the Islamic tradition. This view is in line with the conditions of the Islamic world. Hanafi describes the Islamic heritage phenomenologically according to Husserl's phenomenology.