فصلنامه معرفت فلسفی
سال هجدهم شماره 1 (پیاپی 69، پاییز 1399)

How the philosophical meanings are realized in transcendental philosophy is subsidiary to the principality of existence and conventionality of meaning. By posing the ideas of principality of existence and conventionality of meaning, Mulla Sadra proved that external identities are of the type of truth of existence and that the meaning is impossible to be found in external world. Therefore, he maintains that the existence of meanings, including the philosophical meanings, in the external world is their verifying external quiddities. Considering the fact that Mulla Sadra does not know the external quiddities to be of the meaning type, he thus believes that the contrast of concepts and meanings would not necessarily lead to multiplicity of instances and it is possible that multiple concepts and meanings refer to one single quiddity. It is necessary to mention that although Mulla Sadra regards it possible for multiple concepts and meanings to refer to one single quiddity, by putting forward the idea that accident is separable from what it belongs to, he could prove that the accidents are externally supper added to what they belong to.

In the present article, we have sought to investigate the concept of ‘essence’ in Farabi’s thought and show the distinctive point between Farabi’s image of essence with that of Aristotle. To dos so, we firstly mention and explain Farabi’s definition of essence and the criteria he has provided for it in his al-Horuf. Then, we make that definition and those criteria a basis to pursue various orders of essence in his other philosophical works. Continuing our discussion on the distinction between Farabi’s view and that of Aristotle on ‘essence’, we would mention the nature of ‘essence’ in the book entitled metaphysics and, finally, investigate the difference between those views. Those differences arise from Aristotle’s essence-centered look and Farabi’s existence-centered look. In his pursuit of the truth of existence or the reason for existence of beings, Aristotle arrives at the ‘particular individual essence’, since he regards the ‘essence’ the same as ‘existence’. But for Farabi, the thing’s individuation arises from its existence and not its essence. Thus, the thing is realized with existence, and this is different from its essence or entity.

Differentia’ is the only concept among the ‘Five Universals’ that is not essentially quidditative. It is neither ‘essence’ nor ‘accident’. Rather, it is, as Avicenna puts it, the most general concept. Generality of the concept ‘differentia’ and its being out of the circle of categories can show its being existential, which Avicenna does not assert anyway. For Sohrawardi, the concept ‘differentia’ has basically no place in his philosophy due to its simple light quiddity. And in logic, he rejects the limit elements, i.e. genus and differentia, by criticizing Peripatetic definition. Considering Sohrawardi’s critics of elements of quiddity and inspired by Avicenna, Mulla Sadra asserts, based on principality of existence, that the concept of ‘differentia’ is existential. For Mulla Sadra, the form of mode of existence of a thing is in outside, whose negatively conditioned consideration, i.e. the very ‘differentia’, is a philosophical concept, not a quidditative one. In this article, we show how the ‘differentia’ returns from its logical position to its originally philosophical position, and turns into one of the essential accidents of existence as it is.

The discussion on unity or duality of the soul and body has been, and is, the focus of attention by scholars. Although Mulla Sadra believes in two domains for the soul, he emphasizes on the unity of the soul and the body. It does not mean, however, that two independent essences are unified; rather, human soul is a being with orders; its lower order is the body and its higher order is the soul. Accordingly, Mulla Sadra’s theory can be called bi-domain unity. This is while the content of the verses and traditions cannot be considered consistent with his view as he wishes. This is because although the Quranic verses denoting the creation of the man from a material origin and in a gradual way are initially consistent with his theory, it is difficult to prove it as an evidence for this. On the contrary, there are many verses and traditions asserting the duality of the soul and the body.

The argument of ‘public consensus’ is a popular argument founded on the basis of all humans’ belief in God’s existence. Although it seems that the argument lacks the strength of other arguments, it is somewhat justified and acceptable. Evidences show that the majority of human beings believe in the existence of a meta-physical being; thus, many philosophers and theologians have regarded humans’ common agreement and public consensus as the support for some theories and beliefs. The most common facts proven through this method are ‘God’s existence’ and ‘eternality of human’s spirit’. This study seeks to answer the following questions: “How do the expositions of this argument emphasize on the innate divinity and theism in addition to public consensus in believing in God?” and “What doubts have been cast on the argument and its expositions?” The findings of the study show that this argument has two certain expositions with numerous narrations, each of which stresses on universality of belief in God and human’s innate theism. Although some objects such as denying universality, rejecting the innateness of the argument, stressing on analogy and suspicion of polytheism have been put forward for this argument, each has been answered and investigated here.

According to the explicit texts in the Holy Quran, there are corporeal features in the hereafter. However, there have been disputes among the Muslim thinkers and philosophers and a wide variety of views have been presented by them. These range from the views that regard the hereafter as just spiritual to those that consider it as merely corporeal. Among those who consider the hereafter as both spiritual and corporeal, some maintain that the “ideal body” is the body in the other world, and some others have spoken of the elemental material body, and still some others have considered the body in the hereafter to be an immaterial corporeal body. Accordingly, they have spoken of the differences between the worldly and otherworldly bodies. Those who hold this view have even adduced the Quranic verses. In this article, we have tried, after reporting those various views and reviewing them, to specify the right view.

In value sciences, ‘freedom’ refers to something which is, in itself, a human action and can be evaluated. Freedom is among the important concepts and generally among the much disputed values in value sciences, a value whose analysis would have a great impact on value arguments. The concept of freedom is among the secondary philosophical intelligibles and abstract concepts, a concept obtained through comparison. In understanding freedom, it is necessary to consider six parameters: (1) the action of the agent, (2) lack of external obstacle or reluctance, (3) preparing the necessary conditions in society or lack of emergency condition, (4) no interference in internal factors or deception, (5) preparing the necessary internal factors through education and training, and (6) accepting and considering the human destination and good fortunes in moral reasoning.

In the present article, the discussion is on how one can offer a single definition for beauty that can be applied to possible beings as well as exalted necessary being. The writer has attempted to get idea from Sheikh Ishraq’s method of “conceptual analysis” and adduce Mulla Sadra’s ontological views to offer a general definition of beauty in a way that covers both the necessary being and the possible beings. The beauty based on specific gradation of existence is “realization of mode of perfection existence in form”, and on the basis of personal unity of existence is “the mode of manifestation or appearance of perfections of absolute existence in form”. By adding stipulations to the abovementioned definition, one can present specialized definitions of beauty as well. To obtain those general and specific definitions, the writer, while arguably denying the quidditative mode for beauty, has regarded the existential mode for it, continuing his discussion by analyzing and extracting philosophical concepts which reflect the relationship between existence and beauty.