نشریه مطالعات اوراسیای مرکزی
پیاپی 29 (پاییز و زمستان 1400)

The ups and downs of regional integration and the factors affecting it in the field of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries, like any other region of the world, have been considered by regional and trans-regional researchers. However, in the 1990s, the CIS project failed to meet expectations and generated widespread cooperation. Despite this situation, the leaders of the CIS, inspired by the existing mechanisms of regional integration in other parts of the world, have followed their own integration trend. Accordingly, the focus of the present article is to analyze the extent to which multilateral parliamentarism is being mapped within the framework of the Inter-Parliamentary Assembly in the Eurasian regional integration process.  In this regard, by stating the background and background of the research, the place of multilateral parliamentarism in the process of regional convergence, the relationship between the political system and multilateral parliamentarism, one of the special functions of the Interparliamentary Assembly of the CIS is to formulate model laws to facilitate the regional convergence process of the CIS is described. In addition, the lack of a parliamentary mechanism in the Eurasian Economic Union is explained.

 Accordingly, the question arises that what effect does multilateral parliamentarism in the CIS have on regional integration in the region?

 In this context, using the method of comparative analysis and using library and documentary data, it is argued in the field of Eurasia that if regional integration mechanisms such as multilateral parliamentarism in addition to greater economic prosperity in the region, to ensure the political stability of the member states, is supported by the CIS to facilitate regional integration.

Therefore, the study of the functions of the inter-parliamentary organizations of the CIS as a complex issue requires the use of comparative methods and analysis using library and documentary data. Comparison is a useful way to identify the distinct functions of multilateral parliamentarism in regional integration in independent states, given the characteristics of political systems and the experiences of different regions of the world. In the context of the cognition obtained from this comparison, the expectations of multilateral parliamentarism in regional integration in different regions are adjusted or limited.

According to what was said, although the CIS utilizes all regional mechanisms -such as the Inter-Parliamentary Assembly- to consolidate its political systems, however, the process of influencing the inter-parliamentary assembly in the framework of multilateral parliamentarism on regional convergence is a positive but weak facilitator. Because the process of regional integration within the framework of the CIS and the Eurasian Economic Union has taken shape in different circumstances from regional integration in Europe as follows:-Regional integration in Europe has evolved on the pervasive idea of interdependence, while in the CIS it is limited to individuals based on the economic and political interests of its members.The democratic component of political systems, which creates and develops regional integration in Europe, is a key factor. On the other hand, prioritizing the preservation of national sovereignty in the ruling presidential and authoritarian political systems in Eurasia undermines any mechanisms arising from regional integration, such as the Inter-Parliamentary Assembly.The success of regional integration is almost entirely possible in almost equal countries. In Eurasia, evidence suggests that repulsive power has acted as a slowing factor in advancing the regional integration process compared to the gravitational pull of the powerful Russian state in its interaction with other countries in the region.In addition, part of the manifestations of regional convergence, such as economic interactions seen in the CIS, are left over from the Soviet Union.Under these conditions, the modeling of Eurasia from Europe in the framework of the formation of various institutions has remained less effective in terms of form and more in terms of content and performance.Accordingly, to pursue a policy of balance based on the facts prevailing in Eurasia on the basis of institutionalism is a logical choice not only for those who agree, but also for those who oppose skepticism in the CIS.

Of course, the facts governing the institutional mechanisms of the CIS, including the Inter-Parliamentary Assembly, do not preclude some collective benefits for its members. They maintain a certain level of symbolic unity in the post-Soviet space, which has a significant psychological impact on the elites of each country. One of the main goals of the mentioned inter-parliamentary assemblies is the integration of the member states through the creation of a single legal space. The set of interactions is assessed by the development of model laws by the Inter-Parliamentary Assembly of the CIS facilitating regional integration in the form of a common legal framework for economic activity, which ultimately contributed to the formation of the Eurasian Economic Union.

Technical and military cooperation is a unique way of securing the national interests of countries. The arms trade may change the international condition by intensifying the motivations of states and disrupting regional stability. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia has sought to return to the military arms market in West Asia and the world to compete with the United States' advanced weapons. Russia is the second-largest arms exporter in the world after the United States. The West Asian region has emerged as Moscow's second most important arms market in recent years. With the start of the Arab Spring in 2011 and especially Russia's intervention in the Syrian crisis since 2015, sales of advanced Russian weapons in the region have increased significantly. West Asia is one of the most dangerous regions in the world, with many conflicts that have affected many countries in the region. Israeli officials have expressed concern about the Iranian threat, stressing the ongoing need to maintain a large, technologically advanced army in the environment, which is facing conflict and instability in areas such as Iraq, Yemen, Syria, and Libya. Foreign powers intend to sell high-tech weapons to their local partners. West Asian countries are interested in buying advanced military equipment from major powers, including Russia, to strengthen their defense capabilities, as well as gain international prestige and increase their national strength. Although the United States has imposed an arms embargo on Russia, there is evidence that some West Asian countries are determined to buy military equipment from Russia, such as the S-300, S-400, Sukhoi-35, and Sukhoi-57 systems.

What are the security implications of Russian arms exports to West Asian countries?Research Hypothesis: According to this hypothesis, Russia's arms exports to Iran, Egypt, Syria, and Iraq in recent years have exacerbated the security crisis between Iran and Israel. According to the hypothesis, Russian arms export to Iran, Egypt, Syria, and Iraq in recent years, on one hand, lead to intensification of security dilemma between Iran and Israel and some extent lessen the security dilemma between Syria and Israel, and creating a stable security condition in Iraq. In addition, the arms deal between Egypt and Russia has not changed the balance of power between them and therefore has not created a security problem.Methodology (and theoretical framework if available): The authors have used the security dilemma theory and qualitative research method to answer the main research question according to the available reliable sources.

The findings show that geopolitical considerations, as well as relative benefits of arms sales revenue, are Russia's motivations for entering this large market and despite strong rivals such as the United States and sanctions against Moscow, the arms export market in West Asia are very complex. In this regard, Russia is seeking to increase its political influence in the countries that purchase Russian weapons. Under such circumstances, US allies in the region are increasing their arms purchases from the United States leading to a complex and multifaceted security dilemma in the region. The authors aim to study and analyze military-technical cooperation between Russia and West Asian countries. To better understand the issue, this article first tries to provide an analysis of the world arms condition and Russia's share in this market. The turbulent West Asian market and the presence of Russian weapons in the region are then examined, and finally, the obstacles to Russian military cooperation with the countries of the region are examined.

Until recently, Russia was cautious in using arms exports as political leverage. Now the situation has changed, and the growth of Russia's share of the arms market in West Asia will make the Kremlin’s arms policies even more crucial. Instability in West Asia suggests that the region will remain a major arms market for years to come, helping Russian arms suppliers challenge US dominance. Russian federal law states that strengthening military and political positions abroad is the main goal of Russian military and industrial corporations and that Moscow will undoubtedly use its arms export industry to influence the balance of power in the region. Russia plays a significant role in Syria as a game-changer and has already used its weapons industry strategically. Based on the theory of the security dilemma, the authors of this article conclude that rising defense spending in West Asia raises concerns about the possibility of a regional arms race that would increase tensions in an unstable region. This has a serious impact on the prospects for peace in the region as arms purchases can provoke more fear among countries and ultimately make it harder for them to sit at the negotiating table. Russia's goal in exporting arms to the region is to increase its military and political influence as well as to compete with the United States.

In 2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping launched the Belt and Road project, which had six land corridors and a sea route, and has now expanded into areas such as space, air, and digital. This initiative has been considered as a new stage in China's opening up (industrial development strategy and transition from economic development strategy) since its announcement. So that a group of it with the anarchic structure of power and geo lenses, The other group, the economic structure of power and in terms of interests. Another group is the identity structure of power and from the point of view of nation-building, and finally, another group has emphasized the class structure of power and analysed it through the lens of imperialism. The reason for this diversity in analysis, in addition to the different views on the study of phenomena, is often rooted in the principles governing foreign policy and China's declared policy of rejecting hegemony (emphasizing low policy and rejecting high policy). In addition, it is Chinese political culture that emphasizes a calm, low-cost, and peaceful emergence. Another factor is the complexity of China's international behaviour which has aligned its policies with existing international institutions and has introduced the New Silk Road as a win-win program that addresses both traditional and non-traditional security issues. Most important of all is the flexibility of the new Silk Road, which is managed with a great plan and leads to analytical confusion and often incomplete analysis among international relations researchers in the study of this phenomenon. Less analytical, however, has seen the initiative through the lens of international economic regimes. The concept of international economic regimes is defined by the absence of force, the absence of hierarchy among issues, and the existence of multiple channels of communication between societies. China's five goals ("policy coordination", "facilities connectivity", "financial integration", "unimpeded trade" and "people-to-people bond") are clearly stated in the Silk Road document. Together, these five goals evoke a kind of international regime and these principles seem to be gradually replacing existing international institutions and regimes. In this regard, China has made a series of theoretical and practical actions and efforts for each region. The real situation can be considered the turning point and the beginning of the transition period or the signs and symptoms of the ideal situation, i.e., a complete long-term Chinese regime at the international level and not at the domestic and regional levels.

why China seeks to create a global regime and how it promotes it through various regions, including West Asia, and what are the theoretical and practical measures of the Chinese regime in West Asia? Accordingly, the main issue of this research is: What are the impacts of the Belt and Road Initiative on the political economy of West Asia in the periods between 2013-2021?Research Hypotheses: The hypothesis of this research is: the belt and road initiative has strengthened and increased GDP and national economic prosperity as the main political goal, strengthening new technologies, especially in the field of transportation and information and communication technology. It has also made economic goals the focus of West Asian foreign policy.

For studying this issue, we examined “the Belt and Road Initiative” with an emphasis on West Asia in both theoretical and practical stages. First, by content analysis method, categories from the four selected texts related to the New Silk Road (New Silk Road Mother Document 2015, Sino-Arab Relations Policy Article 2016, Xi Jinping's Speech at the Boao 2021 Annual Assembly, and the Chinese Foreign Minister's Five-Article Initiative for West Asia 2021) is identified as China's theoretical action, and in the second stage, the practical action of China in West Asia is described and analyzed using the model of causal economic processes derived from the theory of international economic regimes.

The findings of this study show that China seeks to establish an inverted global regime, with an emphasis on low policies and peacefully through various regions, including West Asia.

In an era of globalization and widespread interaction in politics and economics, energy as a powerful economic tool has found a key place in countries' diplomacy. Among the various energy carriers, global demand for gas as a cheap and clean fuel is growing rapidly, and this matter has increased competition among producing countries for greater use of this type of fuel in energy diplomacy. The benefits of producing, transporting, and consuming this natural resource can be used as a tool to advance the foreign policy of countries that are part of the value chain of this energy carrier. Given that the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Russian Federation are among the largest holders of gas resources in the world and their target markets are largely common, the two countries are practically in a competitive position in the field of trade of this energy carrier. 

The main question of this research is "What are the capacities and obstacles of Iran and Russia in using natural gas in their energy diplomacy?".

The hypothesis of this research is as follows: The Islamic Republic of Iran, due to its great distance from the Russian Federation in the global gas market, has not been able to use natural gas efficiently in its energy diplomacy and turn it into a tool to advance its foreign policy goals.

Using the Comparative method, the competitiveness of these two countries has been compared and analyzed in four indicators of production capacity, surplus gas, gas trade balance, and gas transmission capacity. 

The growth of gas consumption in the 21st century and its replacement by oil and coal has led to this century being called the gas century. The Islamic Republic of Iran, as one of the largest holders of gas resources in the world, should define its relations with the Russian Federation as one of the main competitors in the market of this energy carrier, it must also increase its competitiveness with this country in the European market as the gas territory of Russia and the Asian markets (China and India).Although the two countries are not far apart in terms of natural gas reserves, Russia is far ahead of Iran in terms of production capacity and export capacity. While Russia is the world's largest exporter of natural gas, Iran's gas trade balance is minimal. More than half of the country's energy basket is supplied by natural gas. Very high domestic consumption is one of the factors limiting exports in Iran. Non-optimal consumption in the domestic and industrial sectors causes a large annual waste of gas production. Lack of domestic financial resources and failure to attract foreign investment is another important factor limiting Iran's gas production and exports. Sanctions by the Security Council, the United States, and Europe are other factors that have affected Iran's gas industry for several years. All of this has led Iran to have just about one percent of the total world gas trade for several years. Some statistics even show that in the long run, the balance of Iran's gas trade has been negative.On the other hand, Iran has not been successful in producing LNG and has no production, while some analysts believe that the natural gas market will find a new definition in the coming years based on LNG shipments and can play a role in the global arena as a credible market such as the global crude oil market. According to BP, LNG exports are likely to exceed pipeline gas supplies by 2025.

The findings of this study indicate that due to Iran's infrastructural limitations in many gas-related industries, extremely high domestic consumption, and lack of sufficient financial resources to finance gas industry projects, there is a significant difference in Iran's export potential compared to the Russian Federation in the global gas market, which limits the possibility of competition, at least in the short term. The Islamic Republic of Iran also lacks a comprehensive doctrine of energy diplomacy, while Russia has outlined its energy diplomacy policies and goals in 2035 in its upstream documents. To partially bridge this gap, the Islamic Republic of Iran can establish a link between production, domestic consumption, and exports by designing a long-term doctrine, so that increasing production and improving the pattern of domestic consumption can be directed towards export development. Focusing on the development of indigenous knowledge and technology as well as trying to raise capital to finance existing gas industry projects are other important measures. It must also be able to clearly define its energy diplomacy to allow for multifaceted planning between production, domestic consumption, and foreign marketing.

In recent years, Russia's strategic influence in the Central-Eastern European region has led to a shift in British foreign policy priorities (transition from isolationism to extraversion). Britain believes that "the increase in Russian military movements in Eastern Europe", "the annexation of South Ossetia and Abkhazia", ​​"the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula to Russia, etc. are contrary to the rules and values ​​of the existing order in international politics. Therefore, the barrier of influence against Russia in the region is strategic. Poland is one of the countries in this area that, geopolitically (close to Russia), can play an utterly deterrent role to the Russian influence. Therefore, the primary purpose of the present study is to analyze British measures against Russia in Eastern and Central Europe, especially in Poland.

Consequently, the question arises as to how Britain seeks to prevent Russian influence in Poland?

The paper's hypothesis is based on the premise that Britain's main strategy in Eastern Europe, especially in Poland, is the securitization of Russia's influence in the country. Due to Eastern European countries' military and defense weaknesses, Britain distorts Russia's foreign policy d. In other words, Britain, with its tools such as diplomacy, the media, and research institutes, is demonstrating Russia's strategy as an existential threat to the security system in Eastern Europe.
The method of the present research is analytical and argumentative.The Methodology and Theoretical Framework: The present research method is qualitative. Data analysis will also be based on securitization theory.

Britain attributes the German invasion of Poland and the evolution of communism to the fact that their enemy (Britain and Poland) has been the same throughout contemporary history (ie, Germany and the Soviet Union). Consequently, Poland considers Russia its most important enemy in recent years. This common assumption between Poland and Britain has led Poland to see Russia as a threat to its values and independence and to equate the United States and Britain with its strategic allies. That is why the memorandum of understanding between the two countries mentions the two countries' cooperation in World War II and Britain's efforts to transition to democratization in Poland. These cases are referred to as common historical points between the two countries.On the other hand, Britain has blurred the line between "Polish" and "British" by accepting more than one million Polish workers in its own country. Today, Poles see the UK as a friendly country with better economic incomes than other European countries. So if the Polish government is given the power to choose between Russia and Britain to align its foreign policy orientations, it will undoubtedly be Britain; because Poland's foreign policy will be built in interaction with the country's economic interests with Britain. Britain is trying to make Russia a common enemy in its relations with Poland, so labels such as aggressor, enemy, hostile, etc. are given to Russia. Britain does this through three channels: First, Britain insinuates to Poland that Russia is NATO's number one enemy and that NATO is Poland's main guarantor of security. Second, Britain brings Poland and the United States into international alliances against Russia (a country that violates international order and security).

Britain is well aware that the Polish elite is strongly dependent on the United States for security and defense. Therefore, from the British point of view, the precondition for US defense and security assistance to Poland is its opposition to Russia's strategy in the region. Third, Britain has given itself and its allies the Role to play in countering Russia as a common enemy in the region and changing Russia's values and norms in the direction of the value foundations of allied countries. In this sense, Poland is one of these countries and the confrontation with Russia is considered legitimate for it. Since the annexation of Crimea by Russia, Western European countries, especially Britain, along with the United States, have sought to increase their security and defense cooperation with Central Europe (mainly Poland) and Eastern Europe. In some ways, this has strategic implications for NATO's influential countries; First, Britain and the United States have made the fight against Russia more acceptable by intensifying their military presence in those countries. Indeed, Russia's actions in the Ukraine conflict have provided an opportunity for Britain and the United States to secure Russian action in the region. This has given NATO leaders the power to impose heavy sanctions on Russia in 2014. This situation helps to stabilize the region in two ways. First, Russia sees the Ukraine conflict as a strategic victory and balances its position in Eastern Europe to avoid less possible damage from NATO. As long as Moscow has repeatedly stated that it is deeply concerned about the permanent presence of NATO on its borders, it considers it a hostile act. On the other hand, economic sanctions imposed on Russia by NATO member states could deter and stabilize Eastern and Central Europe.  Another consequence of the presence of British troops and the intensification of US military programs in Eastern Europe could lead to instability, contrary to the above assumption. Russia has proved that it is acting only in the face of developments in Eastern Europe, disrupting all NATO calculations. Aside from the Crimean Peninsula, South Ossetia is an example of this hypothesis. Although Russia and a limited number of countries in the world have recognized the independence of this region, the majority of states do not recognize the independence of South Ossetia from Georgia. Russia's intervention in Georgia was only on the pretext of defending Russian citizens in the region.

The term global governance is a concept that refers to e management of international affairs and how to deal with conflicts and crises. Understanding dynamics of Western-Russian relations as the United States takes the lead of the former, given the changes it has undergone since 2014, requires global governance as a measure of research. This scale of analysis can provide an understanding of the circumstances at hand. Under Putin's presence in world government, Russia faces common structural and normative challenges. It has intended to adjust, revise or remove some of the precedence governing dynamics of international politics and relations at the global level. From the kremlin's perspective, the global governance is but the dominance of the West and a Neo-liberal order with the Americans at the helm. Having mentioned that, Russians insist on a productive role of the United Nations in resolving conflicts, recognizing authority at the regional scale, classic interpretation of international relations in defining its norms, and finally, recognizing sovereignty through a Westphalian lens. The Russians have also announced that they will update both the rules governing financial and monetary regimes and the UN Security Council, which legitimizes the use of force in times of need.

 The main question of this research is to find an answer to the views, ideas, and principles of Russia in the Putin era towards world government and how can it be explained?

Russia's view of world governance is parallel to a hegemonic goal and in essence, equates with the Neo-Liberal-American order. Ideas including an excessive role of the United Nations in resolving conflicts, reinforcing the classic international law, deescalating global governance to a regional level, setting the official and unofficial regulations in financial and monetary affairs worldwide, conceptualizing sovereignty according to that of Westphalia, the role of regional organizations as security providers, the UN Security Council's exclusive right to use force could be one of the most important issues for Russia, which is worth theorizing. These issues can be explained in terms of value, normative, institutional, economic, and security.

This research is based on a case study. This approach can be included in the historical analysis of a phenomenon, conducting quantitative and qualitative research on it, procedures, conducting research on sample characteristics, and studying the phenomenon/sample. Moreover, this approach follows the causal dynamics of events/examples/phenomena at its core. To gain a deeper understanding of normative issues in world affairs and to compare them with the Russian perspective, the described method was used, which also enables us to identify reasons, motives, and procedures why Russia in some cases acts following the norms of the world sovereignty and attacks against others.

Academic discussions on world affairs began with the ideas of American political scientist James Rosenau. In his work, he argues that in the post-international world, actors are confronted with multiple spheres of power in which the dynamics imposed by international politics and its changes can be interpreted by global governance as a framework. Rosenau explicitly states that the distribution of power and the structures of the international organization are what govern the world over time. In most of the definitions regarding global governance, it is described as a mechanism for resolving conflicts. Weiss and Wilkinson define it as a combination of ideas, values, norms, precedence, and organizations, official and unofficial, which assist all actors, whether state actors, international organizations, or even civil society, to resolve issues that transcend borders. Global governance economics also covers environmental security, human rights, and civil society.

The study shows that Russian officials in recent years have denounced US law enforcement methods and criticized its unilateralism around the world and in Eurasia. It has also been argued that regional sovereignty and world governance have long been a recognized norm of Westphalian international law and are now within United Nations principles. Theoretical concepts, especially governance in areas including security, institutions, norms, economy, and environment, are what has been produced in the Russian political lexicon:1- Russia's perception of the structure of world government is based on realism, so it is based on the state. Putin himself believes that the United States cannot form a world government, so he tries to maintain a conservative, nationalist and authoritarian order. In addition to governments, international organizations also play a very important role in world governance with Putin focusing on the United Nations as the main regulator of international relations.2- Russian officials believe that global governance has been facing challenges at a global scale. Thus, introducing governance responsibilities at the regional level helps address these challenges.3- Russia's position on international law is Westphalian. Russia and China prefer (hard) rule or totalitarian rule to good government and protection of human rights.4- Putin criticizes liberal democracy as the driving force behind the norms of international law, but his goal is to democratize international relations, thus pursuing a change in the process of world governance.5- Regarding the role of the economy in global governance, Putin is adjusting and reconstructing. This position suggests revisionism of the monetary and financial systems. He pursues to change the architecture of international monetary and economic organizations.6- In this perspective for global governance, the regional player plays a key role as a provider of security. In this regard, Russia uses the role of the UN Security Council in the use of force.7- Russia's view of world government has few elements in common with the West. Differences are visible in certain places. This is because they are derived separately from two separate systems. Thus, Russia can be considered a norm-breaker and invalidator of the principles and rules governing Western international relations.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the South Caucasus became a battleground between regional powers and superpowers due to its rich energy resources, transit geopolitics, proximity to the Caspian Sea, and economic opportunities.  This strategic importance for Iran was greater than the fact that the region affects Iran's regional security and provides many economic opportunities for the country that can help lift economic sanctions. Foreign relations between Iran and the Republic of Azerbaijan are more critical between these countries. Research on the relationship between countries suffers from methodological gaps and shortcomings. Thus, this study attempts to cover these weaknesses and develop and validate a model of relationships between the countries.

 To achieve the objectives of the research, the following research questions have been developed: What are the main factors and variables of the structure of foreign relations between Iran and the Republic of Azerbaijan? What is the interaction and behavior of these variables in the system of bilateral relations and what is their nature?

According to the research questions and objectives, the following hypotheses are proposed:The developed model of Iran-Azerbaijan relations is a valid model that corresponds to environmental realities.The validated model shows an acceptable fit index in SPSS. The extracted variables can predict the future of foreign relations between the countries.

This study uses a multi-method, multi-step design that combines structural equation modeling (content analysis, exploratory factor analysis, and confirmatory factor analysis) in SPSS and interaction analysis in Mic Mac. In the first phase, a content analysis was carried out in which literature review, documentary research and semi-structured interviews with experts resulted in the extraction of 33 variables. Then confirmatory factor analysis was conducted and based on Eigen Value and Factor loading, 20 variables under five different factors were extracted and confirmed. In the second phase, a crossed impact analysis was done with experts in MicMac software according to which the behavior and nature of variables were identified and reported.    The theoretical framework: The theoretical framework that guided the entire study from data collection to data analysis was the regional integrated security theory proposed and modified by Buzan and Waver (2003) Which is in stark contrast to traditional approaches in security studies and foreign relations because it has shifted attention from the global focus to the regional level. It has four main dimensions and covers the issues of border, polarity, anarchist structure, and social construction.

The data showed that the valid model of foreign relations between countries has five major dimensions that include economy, survival and stability, hegemony, legal and political, and socio-cultural dimensions with twenty different variables at least. Cross-impact analysis where the identified variables are divided into impact variables (critical and environmental variables), two-dimensional variables (risk and target variables), dependent variables, and independent variables (exceptional and secondary-leverage variables).    

It was concluded that structural equation modeling could provide a robust and validated model of foreign relationships between Iran and Azerbaijan and explain these relations' direction and intensity in different dimensions.  It was also concluded that the constructed model shows indicators of a good fit with the geopolitical realities of the South Caucasus. These findings obtained in the interaction analysis can be used as a valid input for scenario development and forecasting of foreign relations between countries.

Identity Issue was a crucial issue in Post-Soviet Russia between the scholars. Some scholars see Russia as an existing entity tasked with testing different socio-political contexts because identity-building is complex to face serious and new challenges. Contrary to view as mentioned above and other scholars who believe that identity has changed in the post-Soviet era, we say that identity as a dynamic concept is the basis of socio-political actions. While the identity is based on the indicators of "authoritarianism and great power" in Russia in the three historical periods of the Tsars, the Soviet Union, the post-Soviet unions (modern Russia), it has continued and will continue in the future.Research question: How has the collapse of the USSR affected the Russian leaders and nation's perception of National Identity? Research hypothesis: This hypothesis suggests the collapse of the Soviet Union, and although it has changed borders and geopolitics, the perceptions of Russian leaders and nations based on authoritarianism and the concepts of great power have continued.The

Data collection method in this study is based on the library documentary. Analysis of the data will be performed in the format of the interpretative approach of the historic-comparative method, which Theda Skocpol emphasizes. As in this method, historical comparisons are made on the validity of keywords, throughout the article, keywords such as "authoritarianism", "nationalism", "great power", and "national identity" are analyzed in three historical periods. The hypothesis test is applied based on the concept of identity in constructive theory. The theory is based on an interpretive approach and finally the hypothesis is confirmed based on the method and theory.

Russian identity on the basis of authoritarianism factor on the national level rooted in the religious thinking in the Tsar era, which developed under the Byzantine. This thought made to parallel the "God & TSARS" idea. Although dissatisfaction was the main factor among people in the Soviet era, making the industrial economy & overcoming Nazi Germany-made to become Stalin popular more and more even today. Putin created public satisfaction in modern Russia by overcoming internal challenges such as corruption, making rules sovereignty, making security. In addition, Putin called himself a "patriot" increased his popularity among Russians till 2021. Great Power on the international level has been described based on Tsar's dominance over north to south and their expansionism idea as a whole. In Soviet era, the characteristics of power policy changed basically and the leaders introduced themselves as Communist revolution leading and leader of Communism World. Putin understood the “Great Power” concept as a historical & holy pillar of Russian identity. He believed that other powers, especially the West, had to accept Russia and respect him (as a great power) regardless of its economic and technological conditions Studying these facts about Russia on the national and international level from Tsar to the modern era showed that Russian Identity based on "authoritarianism" and "Great Power" has continuously affected the minds of Russian foreign policymakers and nations. So, we can get the result that the collapse of the Soviet Union did not follow independent national Identity.

Studying Russian Identity based on "authoritarianism" and "Great Power" has continuously affected the minds of Russian foreign policymakers and nations. So, the collapse of the Soviet Union did not make following independent national identity. Although borders have changed in the post-Soviet era and new republics have been created, Putin exercised authoritarianism within the (self) state and was accepted by the people within the (other) nation. Russia's position as a great power is a part of Russian Identity, which mainly lies in the Russian identity understanding in the Tsar and Soviet-Union eras and plays a crucial role in the post-Soviet period. In Tsarist Russia, the perception of great power belonged to the leader of the Orthodox world and sometimes its expansion to other regions. The role of Moscow in the Soviet Union is emphasized in the leader of the communist world and finally, Putin understood the "great power" concept as a historic pillar of Russian identity which other powers especially the west has to accept and respect regardless of his economic and technological position. Finally, we must return to the basic hypothesis of constructivists such as Alexander Went, who states: "Identity is a mental personality rooted in the actor's understanding of himself and others. It can be added that border and geopolitical changes have not affected this perception.

Foreign policy is affected by various political components of transition from decision making to implementation of decisions. This process should be proportional to the countries’ sources of foreign policy, as well as obtaining feedback. According to this conceptualization, Iran’s relations with Tajikistan have moved from activeness to a period of stagnation and passivity since 2010. In the first period, the Islamic Republic of Iran has undergone an active process of strategic instrument-making (as a political component). However, this process has not been stable. The incidents of September 2015, banning the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan (IRPT) and at the same time accusing Iran of supporting a coup in Tajikistan stopped the process of convergence in the two Persian-speaking countries. In the second period, conversely, slowing down the political advantages and instrument-making process and neutralizing Iran’s foreign policy instruments in Tajikistan has taken place. This period started in 2015 and peaked in 2018, while Saudi relations with Tajikistan were the warmest it had been since independence. However, Iran and Tajikistan have started a new era of reviving relations through a convergence process. Stabilizing the process is now a common question for both states.

 This paper aims to answer the question: Despite the revival of relations beginning in 2019, how will the transition of relations between the two countries from divergence to a stable process of convergence take place from the perspective of political components such as foreign policy tools?

In response, the hypothesis that this article puts forward is that the process of reviving foreign policy components and instruments could be achieved through discourse, legal, and political context of the Tajik Peace Accord; starting from economics, culture, politics, and ultimately a security-political framework to resolve the issue of the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan.

The paper uses a qualitative method to analyze the transition of Iran-Tajikistan relations from divergence to stability in convergence. The theoretical-conceptual framework has been based on concepts such as foreign policy instruments and instrument-making and instrumentalization in foreign policy. The data are collected based on library resources and published archives and analyzed based on the theoretical and conceptual framework presented.

Iran and Tajikistan have started a thaw in relations since 2019, while the key issues remain. Despite Iran not hosting the IRPT leaders and members anymore since 2016, the party situation in Europe was still a significant obstacle in the Tajik-Iranian relations. However, the two governments, considering the increasing costs of sour relations and in favor of new plans in their foreign and domestic politics such as the power shift in Tajikistan and Iran’s pivot to the East, as well as the escalation of the crisis in Afghanistan, more determined to ignore the remaining issues temporarily. However, the process of reviving the relations since 2019 has not been stable. In the short period of 2019 to 2021, the relations have had many ups and downs; from bilateral meetings of high-ranking officials to summoning the ambassadors and conveying harsh criticism. In this regard, first, the Islamic Republic of Iran should start reviving the old instruments or creating new ones based on mutual interests while considering the sensitivities. Starting to recover from trade and economic relations is a serious and sensible step for Tehran. However, along with this process, a political guarantee mechanism must be devised to reduce the risk of trade and investment to influence and improve trade. At the same time, restoring Iran's cultural perspective in Tajikistan is also a vital area of this process. It could be pursued through the axis of Persian-speaking countries focusing on cooperation in the Afghan peace process, reopening Iranian cultural centers and establishing new institutions, developing cultural interactions of Iranian-Tajik elites, and in brief, applying a promoted cultural diplomacy. This could upgrade and recover the image of Iran in Tajikistan's public opinion, complementing economic and trade ties. However, this trend also requires the development of political relations at the macro level.  At a higher level,  the revival of political relations through the activation of bilateral and multilateral political mechanisms is another requirement for overcoming the recession. In this regard, increasing political interactions and meetings between high-ranking officials of the two countries, especially at the level of presidents, should be on the agenda. Furthermore, joint alignments on regional and international issues can provide the Islamic Republic of Iran with a level of political convergence as a foreign policy instrument. Among these issues are the political and bilateral consultations between Tehran and Dushanbe on the future of security and stability in Afghanistan. Finally, at the highest level, Tehran should present a comprehensive and precise multilateral political and security platform to resolve the issue of the IRPT permanently. Russia is a significant player in this proposed multilateral framework, and the legal, political, and discourse context can be reconciled with the 1997 Peace Accord.

 For stabilizing the convergence process in the bilateral relations between Iran and Tajikistan, Iran should pay special attention to the revival of its foreign policy instruments. In this regard, finding a permanent solution or at least a stable situation for the issue of IRPT with Tajikistan is a crucial point. However, this process cannot be a short-term goal, but a result process based on less sensitive and indirect processes such as economic and cultural convergence. On a higher level, the cooperation and coordination on the issue of Afghanistan is another influential factor that can affect the process. Ultimately, when a certain level of trust is achieved on mentioned subjects, creating a multilateral framework (especially with Russia) for the permanent solution or a stable situation of IRPT issue could be achieved. The instrument making and instrumentalization in foreign policy should be under attention through all these processes. The final results can also affect Iran’s active role in Central Asia.

The Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Azerbaijan have been at loggerheads over the Nagorno-Karabakh region since its inception and there have been bloody wars between the two sides. The Nagorno-Karabakh crisis began when the Karabakh parliament voted on June 12, 1988, for the complete secession of Nagorno-Karabakh from the Republic of Azerbaijan and its accession to Armenia. This region is legally within the borders of Azerbaijan, but the majority of its inhabitants are Armenians. In the last years of Soviet life, clashes broke out between the two sides and hundreds of thousands were displaced. In 1992, a full-scale war broke out between the two countries. The clashes lasted for more or less until 1994 when a ceasefire was mediated by Russia. After that, the Nagorno-Karabakh region and the surrounding areas came under the control of Armenia. Karabakh region is of strategic, geopolitical, and geo-economic importance for Iran. For this reason, this crisis has had a great impact on Iran's security and Iran has repeatedly tried to end this conflict by adopting an active policy of neutrality. The Islamic Republic of Iran has taken mediation measures to prevent bloodshed and killings in the region. Azerbaijani officials expected Iran, like Turkey, to support them and cut ties with Armenia, not to mediate. In any case, Iran sided with Armenia in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict due to the pursuit of pan-Azarist policies and the idea of unification of Azerbaijan and anti-Iranian positions by the government of the Republic of Azerbaijan in the first decade of independence. Iran's policy is more inclined towards Armenia and despite the cultural and historical commonalities with the Shiite Republic of Azerbaijan, it is more inclined towards Christian Armenia. The latest ceasefire violation dates back to September 2020, when the two countries began a new war again, despite the outbreak of the Corona Virus. In the recent crisis, we are witnessing a turnaround in Iran's policy. In this crisis, Iran supports the government of Azerbaijan and explicitly emphasizes the right of Azerbaijan to the ownership of the region. During his speech on the conflict, the Supreme Leader of the Revolution stated that all the occupied territories of Azerbaijan should be evacuated and handed over to Azerbaijan and that Yerevan should know that any occupation is condemned.

 The main question of the article is how to analyze Iran's foreign policy in the Nagorno-Karabakh crisis based on a constructive approach? This study seeks to analyze the factors influencing the turnaround in Iran's foreign policy in the face of the Nagorno-Karabakh crisis from the tendency towards Armenia to a resolute defense of Azerbaijani policy. Research Hypothesis The Hypothesis posed by the above-mentioned question is that factors such as Islamic-Shia ideology, modification of ethnic and Pan-Azarist policies of Azarbyjan and subsequently its orientation toward realism and pragmatism, reciprocally westernizing foreign policy of Armenia and intensifying the internal oppositions against the early foreign policy of Iran in supporting the Cristian Armani state caused the change in Iran foreign policy toward the crisis.

Using the qualitative method of analysis, this research wants to analyze the factors of change in Iran's policy toward the Karabakh crisis. In other words, the authors explain the factors of convergence and divergence in relations between Iran and Azerbaijan. The nature of this writing or the method of analyzing is qualitative. The data collection has been through the library method, the use of internet resources, articles, and documents.

Analyzing from a constructivist point of view, the behavior of the actors of international relations is formed during social interactions, this, in turn, determines their identity and consequently, their interests. The cultural, social, and political structures governing the structure of the political system and foreign policy of Iran and Azerbaijan and the formation of identity and interests of the two countries based on it, in the early years of Azerbaijan's independence, led to divergence in relations between the two countries. Iran turned to Armenia in the Nagorno-Karabakh crisis. Gradually, however, with the fading of ideological orientation and the tendency of the two countries towards pragmatism and realism, as well as the redefinition of the mentioned structures, more convergent relations were experienced between the two countries. In general, according to what has been said, the perspective of the relations between the two countries can be described in such a way that despite the opportunities that exist in some areas, relations between the two countries will also face challenges. The shift of Iran's policy towards the interests of Azerbaijan, especially during the recent Nagorno-Karabakh crisis and meeting the expectations of this country, as well as the adoption of realistic policies by the Azerbaijani government and reducing reliance on relations with the West and diversification in foreign relations have a more positive outlook.

The challenges in the relations between the two countries regarding the legal regime of the Caspian Sea, the development of relations with Armenia, and the proximity of Azerbaijan to the United States and Israel should not be overlooked. In this regard, especially the issue of establishing a US military base in Azerbaijan can have a decisive impact on relations between the two countries. However, the Azerbaijani government has realized more than ever the importance of relations with Iran. In recent years, mobility in relations between the two countries has increased. There are many economic opportunities around Iran, one of which is the transfer of Iranian gas through the Caspian Sea to Georgia. Development of investment in the Caspian Sea, which is demanded by Azerbaijan, is not possible without the presence and cooperation of Iran. In general, compared to the early years of Azerbaijan's independence, a more favorable environment has been provided for the improvement and development of relations between the two countries.

The Eurasian Economic Union is one of the most sophisticated and ambitious international organizations of the post-Soviet space in terms of institutional design and goals. The initiative to achieve regional integration in part of the Central Eurasia is the result of more than two decades of Russian efforts in forming regional institutions and organizations. This time, Russia, gave up the intention of bring all the former Soviet republics under the umbrella of a single regional organization and preferred to choose those with the least political divergence from Russia and the most economic interdependence with it. So the Eurasian Economic Union might be a useful instrument for deep regional integration unlike its predecessors.Although economic goals and concerns for growth and development have been important throughout all Putin's years, they cannot be considered the only or the most important reason for the emergence of the Eurasian Economic Union. Such an organization, economic functions or at least current economic benefits of which to its most powerful founding member have not yet reached the desired level, is categorically based on a strong intellectual foundation and a long-term vision.

 This article seeks to answer the question of how the perception of Russia's political elites of their country's worthy position in the international system is reflected in the functions of the Eurasian Economic Union as a regional initiative.

Eurasian Economic Union is one of the most sophisticated projects which has been designed to represent Russian self-concept as a great power.

Given the nature of the subject under discussion, the present study is a qualitative research that has been written using unresponsive methods of data collection and analysis and relying on the existing quantitative and qualitative data.An analysis of the intellectual roots which have put an impact on the formation of the Eurasian Economic Union has led the author to examine the perception of Russian political elites of their country's appropriate position in the international system and the schools of thought influencing this perception. The formation of regional organizations and integration projects cannot be explained only by examining material and ideational factors and therefore requires using a combination of theoretical approaches.The concept of "great power" is still widely used to analyze the behavior and foreign policy of certain countries and has not lost its relevance. "Great power" is an identity that, for historical reasons, cannot easily be wiped off from the minds of the political elites of some states even despite their severe loss of material resources of power. Most of the great powers of the contemporary world cannot achieve the status of global hegemon. But most of them claim special rights, privileges and responsibilities in certain geographical areas. Mutual recognition of these spheres of influence by other great powers can put a stabilizing effect on the international system. Declining great powers can institutionalize hierarchical orders in their respective region through initiating regional organizations to maintain their sphere of influence. To realize that goal, they can provide more incentives to encourage smaller countries to stay in that regional order. They also may strengthen regional identity and increase economic interdependence among regional countries to bolster their hegemony in that neighborhood.

Russia is the most powerful post-Soviet country in terms of size, military power and economic capabilities. It enjoys a special or strategic relationship with most of the so-called near abroad countries. Russia plays the role of a strategic hub in the post-Soviet region. Active engagement in all regional equations of this part of the globe has been an integral feature of Russian foreign policy for nearly all post-Soviet years. After several consecutive years of dealing with the reluctance of the Euro-Atlantic bloc to acknowledge its identity as a great power and the mere regional power in the post-Soviet space, Russia has begun to further consolidate and institutionalize this role in Central Eurasia. The establishment of the Eurasian Economic Union can be analyzed in this context. The ideological underpinning of the Eurasian Union is the Russian-backed vision that seeks to establish a new center of power in a multipolar world. It can be said that this union, despite its problems, is the most effective regional economic projects led by Russia.As has been emphasized in most theories which explain the role of the great powers in the post-bipolar world, almost none of the great powers can have the chance of achieving global hegemony. But most of them want to remain at the top of the hierarchical order in their traditional sphere of influence, and by maintaining this sphere of influence, they can also play a role in the system of great powers' management at the global level. The power exercised in these spheres of influence today is considerably different from the imperial order and normally does not require reliance on hard power or coercion. The great powers are increasingly encouraging the weaker ones to remain in their sphere of influence by creating and strengthening a regional identity based on shared values and common culture and providing public goods for the small powers in that region. Some great powers have convince other great powers to recognize their position and their rights and responsibilities. Russia has been in such a path in recent years.

Russian elites' and public discourse considers this nation a "great power" whose dominance and leadership in a multipolar world is both an inalienable right and an important means of maintaining and consolidating this position. Thus, the institutionalization of this sphere of influence - especially after the numerous transatlantic encroachments on the traditional backyard or near Russia, as well as the West's efforts to force Russia to renounce any claim to membership in the Club of Great Powers - is more highlighted on the agenda. The establishment of Eurasian Economic Union is a serious step made by Moscow to institutionalize the Russian-led regional integration among a group of Central Eurasian countries which on the one hand, are not economically, politically and culturally divergent from Russia, and on the other hand have been reluctant to join those international institutions formed to balance or contain Russia's regional influence. As we move away from the first years of Putin's presidency, we more and more find a Russia which despite siding with the West on many global issues, is unwilling to compromise its regional hegemony.

Ever Since Putin rose to power in Russia, Belarus has pursued more independent foreign policy toward Russia's regionalism. Based on the two countries that had signed the Union Treaty in 1999, Russia called for Belarus to be more cooperative and integrative in economic, political, security, and institutional dimensions. But Belarus not only has not implemented many of the provisions of the Union State and refused Russia's multifaceted demands on more convergent policies within Eurasian institutions and has strived to expand relations with members of the European Union and other trans-regional powers. This issue has caused tensions between Russia and Belarus. Belarus has always been considered Russia's closest ally. Russia has had serious tensions with all of its neighbors since the collapse of the Soviet Union, but Belarus has been an exception and recognized as a pro-Russian state. Russia has long been the main and exclusive guarantor of Belarus' security and economy. In terms of trade, Russia has by far been Belarus' largest trading partner and on the cultural aspects, linguistic closeness and common religion, ethnicity, and history have been the reasons for Belarus' alignment with Russia. Tensions between the two countries have risen severely, especially since Putin. In terms of energy, Putin has put Belarus in a tight spot and has repeatedly cut off gas supplies to Belarus, which is dependent exclusively on Russian energy. On the other hand, Lukashenko has repeatedly condemned Russia and Putin with unprecedented and blunt statements. In addition, the government has begun significant cooperation with the European Union.

 what is the cause of the tensions between Russia and Belarus, especially during the Putin era?

Three factors of (a) rising tensions between Russia and world powers, (b) Belarus' independent approach to Russia, and (c) Belarus's tendency to cooperate with "outside powers" such as the European Union, has led Russia to push pressure on Belarus for more integration and this pressure has increased tensions between the two countries.

The theoretical framework of this research is based on Olaf Knudsen's analytical model, which is used to evaluate the relationships of small powers with opposing poles of global power. In this paper the research methodology for studying the hypothesis is explanatory. Data collection tools are libraries and internet resources.

The factors that increase tensions between the two countries are the EU's Eastern Partnership strategy, the Ukraine crisis, Russia's forced regionalism, energy disputes, and the expansion of Belarus' relations US. The first concerns the Eastern Partnership strategy. The EU Eastern Partnership Strategy was adopted in 2009 for six Eastern European countries, including Belarus. Russia saw the strategy as a geopolitical conspiracy by the West and the European Union to weaken RussiaIn this regard, Belarus has taken several measures, including the release of political prisoners, electoral law reform, lowering restrictions on NGOs, making laws to increase media freedom, increasing freedoms in the 2008 parliamentary elections, dialogue with political opponents, and allowing the sale of some from their newspapers, propaganda in favor of the European Union and inviting senior members of the EU. Lukashenko traveled to Western countries such as Italy in 2009 after 13 years, and then Berlusconi became the first high-ranking leader to visit Belarus in 14 years. The second is the Ukraine crisis, which has two important effects. First, Belarus resembles itself and Ukraine, thinking that Belarus might be Russia's next target. Second, since the Ukraine crisis and the annexation of Crimea to Russia, tensions between Russia and the European Union escalated unprecedentedly. As tensions between Russia and the West increased, Russia's pressure on Belarus to develop integration has increased. So the third is Russian regionalism. Russia's efforts to create a cohesive and integrated region have failed. Because of their collective memory, Russia's neighbors in Eurasia fear that Russia will violate their national sovereignty. Belarus is also one country that is very skeptical about Russia's regional goals. Russia has officially stated that Belarus' integration into Russia is possible and desirable and that six Belarussian provinces could be added to 89 Russian regions.The fourth is energy. Russia has repeatedly used energy tools to pursue political interests in Belarus. The first case was in 2002 and the last case was in January 2020. Belarus is heavily dependent on Russian oil and gas to meet its domestic needs and to generate revenue from the processing and sale of energy. In the most recent case, the cessation of energy exports to Belarus in 2020, Russia explicitly stated that sustainable re-export of energy to Belarus was conditional on Belarus complying with the provisions of the Union State Treaty. Belarus met with US officials such as Bolton and Pompeo in 2019 and 2020, and the United States delivered its first oil shipment to Belarus in May 2020, promising to supply energy to Belarus. Russia considers the presence of NATO and the United States in Eastern Europe to be the most important security problem, and strongly opposes the development of relations between Belarus and the United States

All of these factors have led to unprecedented tensions between Russia and Belarus. Despite the protests of the Belarusian people against Lukashenko in 2020 and 2021 and the escalation of tensions between Belarus and the European Union and the rapprochement of Belarus and Russia, tensions between the two countries have temporarily eased However, it should be noted that the reason for the conflict between the two countries is fundamental and will continue with or without Lukashenko. Belarus seeks partnership and alliance but Russia seeks integration and unification. The threats of the European Union are limited to criticizing issues such as human rights. But Russia's threats go far beyond the disintegration of Belarus and the annexation of part of its territory to Russia, as in the case of Georgia and Ukraine, rather, Russia, as its politicians have repeatedly stated publicly and officially, claims to dominate the whole of the independent nation-state of Belarus, based on its specific interpretation of the Union State. So the realization of scenarios such as the Ukraine crisis over Belarus is not far-fetched.

The beginning of the 20th century coincided with the emergence of deep-rooted crises in social, political, and economic life in Russia. The scope of these crises was so wide that it led to the overthrow of the Tsarist government in 1917 after fundamental changes. The Provisional Government also lacked the necessary efficiency, and finally, after the overthrow of the Provisional Government in October 1917, the government fell to the Bolsheviks and a new history page was turned. In the early years of the revolution, Lenin in his speeches paid close attention to the cinema and after Lenin's death, Stalin also paid close attention to this branch of art. Stalin's cultural management had components and features that required a special kind of media management.

In this study, we seek to answer the question of how was Stalin's cultural management in Soviet political cinema. Then, using the descriptive-analytical approach and library method, we will answer this question. In this article, it is assumed that Stalin's management of Soviet cinema showed that even under conditions of control and censorship, directors were able to create different and glorious works. The various cultural policies and decisions adopted by the Communist Party influenced cinema. It can be said that approaches such as national Bolshevism and socialist realism had noticeable effects in cinema. The reason for the influence of cinema was, firstly, as a very powerful and important cultural tool, and secondly, its increasing acceptance by the people and citizens of the Soviet Union. These factors made cinema the center of attention and cultural policies had a direct and undeniable impact on it. In this study, we are trying to answer this question: How Stalin's cultural management was in Soviet political cinema? By using a descriptive-analytical approach and the library method, we will answer this question.

 The general conclusion of the article is that control and censorship necessarily do not reduce the quality of art in cinema, and the artist can turn custom work into a magnificent work in cinema in a process of artistic exaltation.

Research on Soviet cinema in Iran and the world cannot be considered new and innovative, because it has been discussed for years by cultural scholars, filmmakers, media managers, and even researchers in the field of history and politics. But when this is accompanied by time constraints and issues such as Stalin's management, new parties can be expected. Various researches on Soviet cinema have been done in Iran and the world, but looking at these researches, none of them covers the subject of the present study, because most of these researches are in the level of journalistic articles. The small number of scientific articles and treatises have not addressed the issue of political cinema in the period 1924-1945 despite its importance.

Cinema were more influenced by Stalinist views and ideas because Lenin had a short time to implement his ideas, but Stalin's leadership was long. Under Stalin, cultural approaches and policies were adopted that influenced cinema. These approaches include socialist realism, national Bolshevism, and the cult of personality of Stalin. Zhdanov, an influential figure in Soviet culture, also applied his doctrine to art as Stalin's agent. Apart from negative moral features, Stalin had a significant impact on the development of cinema. He paid special attention to this field. For this purpose, he formulated instructions and policies, and the directors had no choice but to follow them. In this study, Stalin's management model is not defended and the ultimate goal is not to confirm Stalin's management style, but this article confirms that even in conditions of censorship, directors can create excellent works. The Soviet look at the cinema was more than just a hobby. In general, cinema enters as entertainment coverage and then exerts its ideological and educational influences. Joseph Stalin, the first secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, like Lenin, saw cinema as an important propaganda tool. In general, art has had great importance to the Soviet Communist Party from its earliest years, and this aroused Stalin's interest in cinema. During his leadership, Stalin adopted and implemented policies that had a profound effect on the body of Soviet cinema. These effects were both positive and negative, but in any case, the important managerial role of Stalin in the Soviet cinema cannot be ignored. In the Soviet Union, under the leadership of Lenin and Stalin, art became the greatest factor in socialist culture. Art was a powerful tool for educating the mass. Lenin and Stalin paid great attention to the art of cinema. "Of all the arts, cinema is the most important to us," says Lenin. "Cinema is the greatest tool of mass propaganda," Stalin said. Elsewhere: "Cinema in the hands of the Soviet government is a very large and valuable power." These sentences determined the way for the development of Soviet cinema.In Stalin's management model in cinema, the ideological interests of the party prevailed over the rights of the creator and the audience, and the power determined the path of the artists. This management style with all its negative aspects has points. Directorscan create excellent works with supervision and control following the culture of the society and supervision and control do not necessarily reduce the quality of cinematic works, and it can be considered in this article. This article can be an introduction to future research on the autopsy of Eisenstein's political-revolutionary works. With the method of discourse analysis, it is possible to examine cinematic works such as Potemkin, October, and the Strike, and from that, the exact model of Stalin's management of Eisenstein's works can be extracted.

To strengthen the legitimacy of the communist system, Stalin formulated detailed policies and programs for artists. These policies involved many branches of art, one of which was cinema. Using Russian national heroes in the politics of national Bolshevism was also one of these strategies, which gave the necessary tool for the legitimacy of the communist system.As we mentioned above, the general conclusion of the article is that control and censorship do not necessarily reduce the quality of works of art in cinema, and the artist can turn custom work into a magnificent work in cinema in a process of artistic excellence.

During his tenure, the Afghan President, Mohammad Ashraf Ghani, followed a different foreign policy path than his predecessor. The shift from neutrality, as the traditional way of conducting foreign affairs in Afghanistan, to a non-neutral path characterized the foreign policy of Afghanistan during his term of office. This can be seen as a major shift that may be addressed from various points of view. This article shows how President Ghani’s perception of reality and his beliefs about an ideal foreign policy for Afghanistan led to this foreign policy shift. Cognitive mapping as a theoretical approach has been used to show how his perceptions and beliefs are related to each other to form policies. Qualitative content analysis has been used to represent his cognition. The main finding of the article is that Ghani’s pragmatic economically-driven attitude besides his understanding of peace and security for Afghanistan as a major goal being achievable through economic growth, foreign direct investments, and interdependence at regional and extra-regional levels led to his diversion from neutrality.During his tenure, the former Afghan President, Mohammad Ashraf Ghani, followed a different foreign policy path than his predecessors. Traditionally, neutrality has been the main orientation in Afghanistan’s foreign policy. Since its independence in 1919 (except for a few years after its occupation by the Soviet forces in 1979), Afghan leaders have, more or less, almost always followed the same path. This has been true even in the post-Taleban era. Ex-President Hamed Karzai, for example, despite all external pressures, continued the same foreign policy orientation through a balanced policy towards great powers and regional powers.However, the shift from neutrality to a non-neutral path characterized the foreign policy of Afghanistan during Ghani’s presidency. Instances of President Ghani’s new orientation can be seen in deepening and expanding relations with western powers, weakening relations with Iran and India, expanding relations with China, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, and even supporting the Saudi-led alliance in Yemen. These changes can be regarded as unexpected foreign policy decisions as they reflect a violation of neutrality and a balance-based foreign policy dominant for decades. They can even be considered unrealistic when regional conditions are taken into account. Furthermore, they can be regarded as violating Ghani’s economic preferences as they deprived Afghanistan of some primary economic advantages.

 The question that can be raised is about the cause of such a shift. In other words: why did Afghanistan change its traditional foreign policy orientation in the form of neutrality towards a non-neutral path during Ghani’s presidency?

The question above may be addressed from various points of view and lead to different answers. One may refer to, for example, the significance of foreign pressures, Ghani’s sense of gratitude towards his supporters during the presidential campaign, or the requirements of development. These, however, prove to be inconsistent as some aspects of the shift might be seen as contradictory.In this paper, the significance of President Ghani’s perceptions in this regard is underlined. The hypothesis is: President Ghani’s perceptions of reality and his beliefs about an ideal foreign policy for Afghanistan led to this foreign policy shift from neutrality to non-neutrality.

In a country such as Afghanistan, even if structural forces impose limits on foreign policy choices, the special position of the leaders gives them important leverages. It is the president who can determine the foreign policy of the country. What leads him to his decision is his definition of the situation which is rooted in his understanding of the situation. This article aims to show how cognitive mapping as a theoretical approach can be used to explain how Ghani’s perceptions and beliefs are related to each other and how they have led to his policy choices. According to this theory, everyone has a causal explanation for every situation. In other words, decision-makers have causal claims about the reality in their minds and cognitive mapping seeks to represent the structure of their causal claims. “Cognitive mapping” reflects the arguments of the decision-maker in a graph. Although the approach is usually used to show how the decision-maker sees the relationships in what has happened in the past, we have used it to show how some causal claims have been made and act as presuppositions for reaching a policy option.In the cognitive approach in general and in cognitive mapping theory in particular, it is believed that one’s thoughts and perceptions are reflected in one’s statements. Thus, if we gather the relevant statements and analyze them, we may get to one’s perceptions in the form of a directed graph that shows the network of concepts in their causal relationships. Content analysis, both quantitative and qualitative, is taken to be the appropriate method for cognitive approaches.As for the research method, we have employed qualitative content analysis in order to represent President Ghani’s cognition. Accordingly, the speeches and texts produced by Ghani in various contexts are analyzed to find his way of reasoning and arguments. The result is a graph in which causal relations between concepts are demonstrated.

Ghani believes that an active foreign policy leads to Afghanistan’s interest and security and that is why we can see a proactive foreign policy in this era. To him, a developmentalist approach to foreign policy, i.e, giving priority to economic needs but also leads to security. Western powers are seen as the best partners’ security terms and hence cooperation with the members of NATO plays a vital role in providing stability and security which are seen as a precondition for attracting foreign investment. Ghani argues that an active developmentalist foreign policy leads to more opportunities in international and regional processes that are regarded to be beneficial to Afghanistan. Although western powers are given a special place in providing security, it is believed that expanding relations with China (compared to India) leads to more economic gains and security. Furthermore, he perceives that expanding relations with Saudi Arabia and Persian Gulf Arab states leads to more security as well as more financial aid.

Thus, the main finding of the article is that Ghani’s pragmatic economically-driven attitude besides his understanding of peace and security for Afghanistan as a major goal being achievable through economic growth, foreign direct investments, and interdependence at regional and extra-regional levels led to his diversion from the traditional orientation of neutrality.

The 9/11 attacks US media propaganda to combat terrorism led many countries worldwide to ally with the US. In the meantime, even America's traditional rivals, Russia and China, came to terms with this. This approach, which extremist ideologies have influenced in areas such as the Chechen Autonomous Region in Russia and Xinjiang in China, has changed over time as the goals of American politicians behind their counter-terrorism policy became apparent. This behavior change was strongly influenced by the provocative and at times controversial actions of the US towards China and Russia, to the extent that even in the last days of 2014, and due to the tense activities of the US in regards to the expansion of NATO to Eastern European countries and toward the borders of Russia, led the country to define NATO as a military threat and even its number one enemy, in its new security doctrine. On the other hand, the adoption of provocative US policies toward China, especially in the last two decades, such as keeping tensions between South Korea, Japan and North Korea high in order to pressure China, has also become centerpiece of the US foreign policy During the presidencies of George Bush, Barack Obama, and Donald Trump, increasing pressure on China to limit its power has become more pronounced.

 The Main Question is: what impact has the military-industrial complex had on the US foreign policy toward Russia and China.

The  Hypothesis  posed  the question as mentioned earlier   is  that  the flow of the military-industrial complex, using the available capacities, as well as its effective pillars, headed by military contractors, by influencing the decisions of US officials, has led to the adoption of military arms sales policies under the pretext of limiting great powers such as China and Russia. Along with the increasing trend of military contractors' incomes, it has provided the cause of discord and tension in the regions of East Asia and Eastern Europe.

 Due to the fact that most researchers in the field of regional studies use the combined method in their research, this method will also be used in this research. In this method, both quantitative and qualitative methods are used. In the research process, the library method is used to collect data. In this method, two types of first-hand and second-hand sources are used; From first-hand sources, we can mention interviews, documents and news, and from second-hand sources, we can mention books, articles and strategic reports. In addition, due to the volume of research and related articles, Internet resources, including the sites of think tanks and research centers, have been used.

One of the main reasons for the US policies cited above during the last two decades is the fulfilment of the interests of the US military-industrial complex. A trend has led the country's officials to create discord and tension in many parts of the world, including East Asia and Eastern Europe. Meanwhile, the role of military contractors as one of the critical pillars of this process, which is known as to the link between other pillars of the military-industrial complex, is vital in adopting this policy. The arms industry, in the last two decades and due to the circumstances after September 11, has increased its influence, concluded heavy arms contracts and has made huge profits. At the same time, it has created military dependence in some countries in the East Asian and Eastern European regions, as well as increased tensions in these areas.

The Military contractors have constantly tried to persuade countries in the region to increase their “security” by threatening Russia and China. At the same time the escalation of tensions has benefited them and they have used widespread lobbying and even bribery to achieve the continuance of weapons purchases. Military arms companies such as Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman, which use their close ties to US officials and influential politicians to stabilize profitability and even increase it, often sacrifice US national security. For example, the above policy shave encouraged Russia and China, to develop advanced military weapons in order to counter American power. This has sometimes been achieved by stealing the intellectual property of advanced American weaponry and has provoked protests from US officials to the extent that it is mentioned in the 2017 US National Security Strategy as a threat to the country.

The Main purpose of this article is to examine the nature of Russian and Chinese revisionism and Iran's approach to this issue. In the context of transition to a new international order, their revisionism has become more prominent than before and this has had tangible consequences for the world politics and Iran. This paper analyzes the issue with a systematic approach and considering the interrelationship of agencies and thematic categories in the international arena and in the context of bridging revisionism. Until a decade ago, Moscow and Beijing were “integrated revisionists” because of their limited access to resources “outside the existing order”, arranging them for change within the existing order. In recent years, with strengthening these resources, their revisionism has shifted to “bridging one”, according to which the desire and possibility of change increases and the cost of change decreases.

The question of this article is what are characteristics of Russia and China’s revisionism and what is Iran’s approach in this regard. Iran, due to the special conditions of its foreign policy and its regional and international situation, is affected by the relations of the great powers, especially between Russia, China and the United States. This effect has been exacerbated in the context of Biden's emphasis on “smart pressure” and the continuation of “maximum pressure”, especially as Tehran insists on active deterrence, including through the development of relations with Russia and China.In this regard, Iran, especially following the military cooperation in Syria, has deepened its relations with Moscow and is seeking a long-term strategic agreement with it. On the other hand, the 25-year strategic agreement with China is a clear indication of Tehran's determination to expand relations with China. The acceptance of Iran as a permanent member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization is also a sign of efforts for multifaceted interaction with Moscow and Beijing. These developments increase the complexity of Iran's relations with the great powers and also increase Tehran's sensitivity to the state of Russia-China relations with the international and US order.

 This paper analyzes Russian and Chinese revisionism with a systematic approach and within the framework of "bridging revisionism" concept, referring to Stacie E. Goddard’s notion on four types of revisionists; integrated, bridging, isolated and rogue.

According to research findings, given that most of Russia and China’s resources are still provided “from within the order”, their revisionism is not directed to the basis of existing order, but on gradual and non-radical modification of some elements and trends. Their focus is on the relative negation of the dominant force in the existing order, the US, of some processes and structures. This revisionism is also non-radical and pragmatic, as the United States retains most of its institutional power for the foreseeable future, and as a result, interdependencies intensify.So the reason is that, firstly, Russia and China are in a state of complex interdependence and mutual vulnerability with the existing order and the powers that dominate it, so fundamental changes in the order will damage Moscow and Beijing (in particular), and secondly, they acknowledge that despite some weaknesses, the United States has retained much of its network and institutional strength, so a radical confrontation with it would be detrimental. Accordingly, Russia has a strategic agreement with Washington on strategic stability and security, and China on international economic stability, which keeps them away from a radical confrontation.On the other hand, due to the interconnectedness of the order and its dominant powers with China and Russia, it is not possible to radically limit them and apply unaccounted systemic pressures on them. Applying these pressures can be costly by creating a strategic challenge for the order and dominant powers. The fact that the policies of China and to a lesser extent, Russia are not illegitimate and unacceptable and have the potential to unite and use “out of order” resources, makes it difficult to put radical pressure on them.Accordingly, the existing order and the dominant forces, especially the United States, are involved in inciting the revisionism of Russia and China and its depth and scope. For example, by imposing and forcing the two to obey laws that are of interest to the West, they lead them to revisionism. Therefore, if, on the one hand, this approach and, on the other, the efforts of Russia and China for greater participation in world politics continue, their revisionism will become more aggressive and complex.

As noted, Russian and Chinese revisionism and their confrontation with the US is not radical. Therefore, the assumption that Iranian revisionism is similar to Russia and China, and that this similarity is a precondition for long-term relations and continued support for Moscow and Beijing, is incorrect. Consequently, propositions such as “Iran-Russia-China alliance” or “Iran-Russia strategic cooperation” are also inaccurate. Contrary to these assumptions, Moscow and Beijing's revisionism are not focused against existing order or to remove the United States from international politics. They do not have the ability to achieve this goal, if any. They take advantage of current trends in the existing order, so the stability of the order is important to them. For this reason, they are cautious in dealing with anti-order/anti-US forces, including Iran, and do not want their relations with Tehran to disrupt their “intra-system” interactions.