فصلنامه قبسات
پیاپی 103 (بهار 1401)

One of the discussable topics is the existence of a general religious systems, regardless of the countless rules, in the micro and atomic aspect in the pure Shari'a of Islam.Proponents of the existence of system are divided into two groups in a large scale: a group that considers the atomic inference of religious rules enough to infer what is necessary in the arena of inference, assuming that the performer of inference reaches to canonical systems at this stage of inference. The other group believes in at least two inferences: the performer of inference deduces the rules in a phasic and non-systemic way (jurisprudence of rules) in the first stage, and inferences the systems (jurisprudence of theories) in the second stage.One can propose the hypothesis of the necessity of three stages of inference (atomic inference, subsystem inference, macro system inference, or a single macro system).I insist on accepting systems (micro and macro); however, I do not urge on the multiplicity of inferences and turning it into stages, I rather considers the one-stage inference correct, but at the same stage of inference, all the elements must be rightly involved.

The purpose of this article is to examine the nature of the philosophy of Islamic religion, and discover the feasibility of its realization. For this purpose, I have made an attempt to determine the differences and distinctions between the philosophy of Islamic religion and the present philosophy of religion, in terms of subject, method, purpose, and source of inspiration, using a descriptive-analytical method and relying on library resources; and have defined four conceivable and achievable meanings for the philosophy of Islamic religion. According to its first definition - which is based on the distinction of the subject - the philosophy of Islamic religion is a religious philosophy in which the subject of philosophical thought is the religion of Islam. The second definition is based on the distinction of method, according to which the philosophy of Islamic religion is a religious philosophy that deals with philosophical thinking in the field of religion, based on the method of Islamic philosophy and its foundations; similar to the philosophy of analytic religion and the philosophy of continental religion which are the same. The third meaning, mentioned above, is based on the output of philosophical activity, according to which the philosophy of Islamic religion is a religious philosophy such that the results of philosophical thinking on religion are in accordance with Islamic teachings; even if that philosophical activity is not based on the principles and methods of the present Islamic philosophy. The fourth meaning of the philosophy of Islamic religion is a religious philosophy that, inspired by the Qur'an and Islamic hadiths, reconstructs Islamic teachings about religion according to philosophical methods, and deals with philosophical thinking in the field of religion. This article also tries to critique the reasons for the opposition to add the qualification of ‘Islamic’ to the philosophy of religion.

Discussing the basis of new-formed issues in any science leads to a logical and systematic progress and development in that science. One of the new issues to be discussed in the ‘principles of jurisprudence’ (or Fegh methodology) and its philosophy is the basis of Martin Heidegger and his student, Hans-Georg Gadamer, in understanding and reading a text, which is called "philosophical hermeneutics". Two of its important teachings, i.e. "not achieving the author's intention" and "considering personal istizhar - along with partial and not typical preconceptions - correct", has a great impact on the two sciences. Therefore, the main question of this article is to analyze the possibility of proposing the above two hermeneutic principles as propositions in the science of ‘principles of jurisprudence’ and its philosophy. Based on the findings of this research, the important principles of ‘philosophical hermeneutics’ should be evaluated in both the ‘principles of jurisprudence’ and its philosophy and must be considered as their issues. Therefore the doctrine of "the possibility of achieving the speaker’s intention and being speaker-based" should be included in the knowledge of ‘the philosophy of principles’ as one of the affirmative principles of ‘the principles of jurisprudence’; and the reliability of the doctrine of “considering personal – and not typical – Istizhar correct” - which is applied in various chapters [of ‘the principles of jurisprudence’] including commands, prohibitions, general and particular, absolute and non-absolute, certainty and suspicion - should be considered and studied by Figh methodologists as a part of the problems of ‘the principles of jurisprudence’.

The most basic intellectual basis of Salafieh is the reliability (hojjiyat) of the predecessor’s (salaf) understanding. They believe that the predecessor’s understanding [of sunnah] is more correct, wise and valid in comparison with the descendent’s (the khalaf) understanding , due to factors such as better understanding of the texts, being closer to the Prophet, and being close to the time of the Qur’an’s revelation. The Salafieh have argued in favor of their view by various verses of Qur’an. One of their most important arguments for this claim is verse 100 of surah Al-Tawbah. Relying on the general sense of this verse and connecting obedience and understanding, they have sought to prove the authority of the predecessor’s understanding. Although a predecessor who obeys the Prophet’s teachings in his/her thought and practice is more virtuous, but there is no reason to claim their absolute obedience. Proving this claim by verse 100 of surah Al-Tawbah has many drawbacks including: confusing the meaning of practice with understanding, lack of generality of the verse, lack of connection between consent and authority of understanding, lack of the absolute meaning of obedience and narrations indicating the superiority of successors over predecessors. In addition to explaining the Salafieh’s claim, I have tried to examine and critique their arguments in this article.

The present article intends to present a new and unprecedented argument to prove monotheism by reflecting on the existential relationship between two correlative (motazayef) matters and how they are originated and evolved in the outside world. For this purpose, I first quote and critique two exclusive theories in this regard, namely the theory of Fakhr-e Razi and the theory of Khajeh Nasir, and then, in the light of the rationality of the Infallibles’ narrations, I present a third theory that includes a new and innovative argument  in proving monotheism. Thus I first argue that the external existence of two correlative matters always requires a circular reasoning, but the realization of a circular reasoning entails impossibility only if it is the result of a subjectivity of the type "making something from something", but if it is the result of a subjectivity of the type "making something not from a thing", it will not entail any impossibility. Thus I will conclude that the mere external existence of correlative matters implies a subjective existence; an agent who is the creator not from a thing. Then I will show, using four implication eliminations, that whoever is a creator not from a thing, will be the one who has no second.

This article is a research on the possibility of theoretical design and objective implementation of Iranian-Islamic modernism and finding the correct approach to the design of Iranian-Islamic modernity. Hence, after a semantic analysis of the epistemological and technological dimensions of modernism, I have described the philosophical foundations of modernism according to historical events and the evolution of modernity in order to reveal the identity dimensions of modernism and use it as a basis to analyze the above question. In addition, using a historical-social research method, I have studied the historical process of formation of intellectual currents confronting modernism in Iran, especially after the Islamic Revolution, to present – through a model - the general atmosphere of the theoretical and practical tendencies that have shaped the ideology of contemporary thought. Then, based on analyzing the accumulation of ideas and criticisms, it evaluates the existing tendencies and finally concludes that the Iranian-Islamic modernism is a self-contradictory proposal. And in order to achieve elevating progress and development and to preserve the Iranian-Islamic independence and identity, it is necessary to criticize the various currents of modernism and its critics and establish an approach that is based on the basis, principles and methods of Islamic knowledge and is according to the historical, cultural and social heritage of Islamic Iran.

This article is on one of the long-standing issues with a theological and Quranic background, i.e. "the relationship between miracle and the truth of the claimant of a miracle" and how, for example, dropping a cane and turning it into a snake proves the rightfulness of the words of the asserter and his mission from God. In other words, what is the relationship between a genetical act and prophecy, which is a spiritual position.I try to justify the above claim, and present some reasons to prove it; such as: the famous saying "Qobh-i iqra’ bi jahl” (the enormity of keeping in ignorance) and the statement of Allameh Tabataba’i with the philosophical rule "hokm-ol amthal fi ma yajuz” (the ordinance of instances of what is permissible).The implication of miracle on the truth of its claimant is not a verbal implication, consequently we do not discuss the signification, hyponymy or implication indications; rather, it has a rational indication and has a priori argument. The reason is that considering the attributes of God, such as being wise and that His existence is free from enormity, and since these issues have a causal aspect, we finally realize its implication. In other words, the presenter of these miracles is truthful in his claim and God’s attributes of beauty and glory requires that he be truthful in his claim; God never gives such extraordinary power to a liar, and even if a person possesses such power, God should prevent the servants from going astray.In a second word, the occurrence of a miracle is presented as a supernatural event, and the claim of connection with the higher world is a second supernatural claim, and both are similar to each other. If we accept the first, the second should be necessarily accepted as well, due to the rule of “hokm-ol amthal fi ma yajuz va ma la-yajuz vahed” (the ordinance of instances of what is permissible and what is not permissible is the same). In contrary to those who believe a miracle is to persuade the masses and consider it a deceptive act, proving the first theory, we have elevated the rank and status of miracle to its highest level, which is the level of logic and reason. If we do not consider the indication of a miracle as an argument, in fact we have no argument for one of our most important and fundamental convictional issues!

Don Cupitt offers a new explanation of Christianity for the New Christian world, being influenced by postmodern ideas and taking an unrealistic approach. Proposing the theory of ‘unrealistic fideism’, he seeks to reconcile religion and modernity in the new world. Don Cupitt's view is based on critical rationalism and pragmatic approach, and introduces religion as a kind of spirituality devoid of theoretical and metaphysical structures. Accordingly, giving priority to the nature of faith over the subject of faith, he argues that the ancient mythical notion, which suggests there is a pre-existing rational and eternal order in the world, must be discarded. Denying the theoretical and metaphysical basis of religion, including the origin of the world and resurrection - as the most important elements of Divine religions - he still defines himself and his followers in a Christian space, and claims to show the right path of faith by emphasizing the nature of faith.Don Cupitt’s approach is an inverted and incorrect reading of religion that has no mental affinity with the Divine religions and, instead of inspiring faith, afflicts its followers with the suffering of self-deception and negligence of the subject of faith. In terms of intellectual foundations, it is based on positivism and will lead to absolute relativism.