فصلنامه نقد و نظر
سال بیست و هفتم شماره 3 (پیاپی 107، پاییز 1401)

The subject of this article is to explain the concern of "existential Isolation" and to present its approaches by Ervin Yalom and Mulla Sadra. Yalom believes that human beings should manage existential Isolation in connection with others; Now either a connection with the same kind or with a divine being. Accordingly, in his view, the main supporter in dealing with existential Isolation is of a relational nature. In addition to his main approach (bonding with one another), he believes that liberation from existential Isolation is possible for many in a "relationship with God." Mulla Sadra also believes that all beings, including human beings, are the same as the existence of God. In this article, the authors, by adopting a descriptive-analytical method, have presented the approaches of Yalom and Mulla Sadra in getting rid of existential loneliness. In Mulla Sadra's approach, two approaches have been considered: 1. A precise approach; 2. The approach of cognition. The outcome of the present study was that Yalom's approach is self-destructive and contradictory; And the reduction of existential Isolation is possible only on the basis of Sadra's view, that is, man's evolutionary attachment to the Supreme.

Nur Ali Elahi is a contemporary leader of Ahl-e Haqq who introduced the intellectual school of “Maktab,” which is now led by Bahram Elahi. In this school of thought, spirituality is presented under “innate spirituality” as opposed to religions and with the goal of human perfection. The Elahi family justify their approach by saying that I we stick to the traditional spirituality and cult, we have negated God’s justice and mercy, because in the past, prophets and saints brought helpful kinds of spirituality for people of their time, but those are not helpful for modern man. Thus, God’s justice and mercy require the existence of saints who lead people to perfection through true spirituality. One such saint is Nur Ali Elahi who guide people to perfection through a new religion. This research describes the claim by drawing on the method of qualitative content analysis, and it criticizes the claim with the method of critical analysis based on Halliday and Hasan’s theory of coherence. The main question of the paper is what objections could be raised against the claim of “innate spirituality” in “Maktab” school of thought, according to the theory of coherence. On this theory, incoherence in the method of explanation as well as internal and content incoherence are the main problems with the claim of “Maktab.”

A systematization of religious propositions concerning Islamic punishments, particularly qişāş (retaliation in kind), and extraction of the principles governing their legislation play a significant part in understanding the philosophy behind their legislation and how to respond to objections raised against them, since it is only in this way that the ground is prepared for a systematic reply. Drawing on the descriptive-analytic method and considering the human existential dimensions and the human developmental course in Islamic psychology, this article seeks to extract theological principles, a proper deployment of which clarifies the philosophy of the legislation of qişāş and paves the path for presenting counterexamples or explanatory replies to objections raised against this ruling. Based on the findings of this article, there are five relevant theological principles: (1) the principle of human inherent dignity, (2) principle of guidance and salvation, (3) principle of justice and fulfilment of rights, (4) principle of life as well as individual and social dynamics, and (5) principle of deterrence in punishment. These are the principles governing the punishment of qişāş. This article utilizes the implications of these principles and their priorities to reply to some objections raised against qişāş, including the superiority of life prison to qişāş and its incompatibility with altruistic and human dignity considerations.

Death is a key concept in şadrā’s view. He believes that death is the soul’s transcendence over the body. In his view, death does not just occur as a metaphysical necessity; rather, one can separate their own soul and body with their efforts. The question is: How does death turn from a transcendental necessity to a human phenomenon and how it comes to have a relation with the human will. This article draws on the descriptive-analytic method to show how şadrā establishes a relation between death and philosophy, on the one hand, and death and moral will and purification, on the other hand. A reference to şadrā’s works reveals that voluntary death, moral will, and philosophy all require detachment from bodily belongings and lead to the soul’s existential perfection toward the intellectual degree. This shared fundamental characteristic paves the path for establishment of a relation among the three concepts and transition from one to the others in şadrā’s view.

The problem of accounting for the relation between soul and body was for long a focus of intellectuals. To clarify the relation, a host of analogies were used. Each of these analogies of the intellectual to the sensory were grounded in certain philosophical foundations. Based on our survey and in light of the analytic method, eight types of analogy for the soul-body relation were extracted: the relation of management and manipulation; that of a fine body running in a coarse body; that of the origin and branches; that of deployment and utilization; that of immanence; a relation based on passion and love; the relation of manifestation; the relation of meaning and word. This research aims to provide a typology of the analogies for the soul-body relation, analyze the grounds and assumptions underlying each, and highlight their implications and consequences. The espoused view is that of “word and meaning” because of its linguistic advantages.

humanism is a western attitude that puts humans in the center of their thoughts and brings originality to human growth and prosperity . in the face of religion , this attitude emerged in three forms : christian humanism , humanism of religion ( atheistic ) and humanism of escape or secular religion . ~~~ in the contemporary era , secular humanists became the dominant and dominant aspect of western civilization . Modern - era humanism is more of a ‌ ( secularism ) and is inconsistent with theistic religions .in the study, analyzing and critique of humanism, the pathology of this idea from the perspective of religion suggests that islam is essential.one of the characteristics of humanism is its unique aspect . in which it tries to explain the elements of humanism , the drawbacks , especially from the perspective of religious sources .the aim of this study is to seek the pathology of the humanistic elements of the humanism and by descriptive - analytical method , we extracted and analyzed these components by analyzing them according to their sources in order to explain the flaws of these components .

The equivocity (al-ishtirāk al-lafẓī) and univocity (al-ishtirāk al-maʿnawī) of the term “exist” was always a concern of recent Muslim philosophers (since Mīrdāmād until the present day). Some philosophers believe in the equivocity of “existence” and others adhere to its univocity. A proponent of equivocity is Mullā Rajabalī Tabrīzī. He believes that the term “exist” means two distinct things when it is used about the necessary being and possible beings. The main problem of this article is to provide an account of this thesis and the arguments of Tabrīzī for his view. We offer our critiques as well as two interpretations of his equivocity thesis. One interpretation was provided by Mullā Abd al-Raḥīm Damāwandī and the other by a student of Tabrīzī called Mīr Ismāʿīl Khātūnābādī. The method of this research is library research and descriptive-analytic. The rough conclusion of this paper is that Tabrīzī fails to articulate philosophical arguments for the equivocity of “existence,” and his evidence from religious texts is worthy of consideration only if we accept his peculiar method of exegesis. Of the two interpretations of Tabrīzī’s thesis of equivocity of “existence,” that of Mīr Ismāʿīl Khātūnābādī is more accurate and noteworthy in our view.