نشریه فلسفه
سال پنجاهم شماره 2 (پاییز و زمستان 1401)

The ideologues of the Enlightenment Dialectical, using the term Culture Industry, have presented it as a comprehensive description of mass and common deception in the capitalist system; An all-encompassing industry with an amalgam of imprisonment, incitement and deviation of public opinion in a seemingly rational and free society. The Culture Industry integrates all these intellectual and practical anxieties and disturbances in its commercial glamor, and by refining its product - which is a reflection of the directional, deceptive and antielitist propositions of the capitalism - it captures the mentality of society and popular culture. By following the path of cure through the two channels of art and ethics, a plan is inferred that can raise hopes of curbing the waves of the cultural industry, or safety against its pervasive dominance. Analyzing this path from the perspective of the founders of the Frankfurt School, the present article first describes the ideal relationship between art and ethics with the prospect of a successful exit from the fence of the cultural industry. But, and after a critical consideration of the moral-artistic consequences in question, the path drawn in Adorno's and Horkheimer's long reflections as a way out of the cultural industry seems to have failed in practice and even in an unexpected direction. It is self-defeating or contradictory, because: a) to resort to negative ethics and conceptual art will be disconnected from public culture. B) The fruit of this seclusion is limited to agora movements. C) This safe living world, as an integral part of the cultural industry, is still indebted to capitalist relations. This result, which is far from the demands of these philosophers, is the forced result of the relations governing the modern industrial society, which can bring its enemy to the inevitable trading market. In this process, the supply of cultural products is also recognized as part of the consumable distribution network. Works whose claim is to strengthen those with negative morality and (anti) aesthetic uniqueness are also entered in this market. If the preparation of these elitist products does not require exorbitant material costs and does not fall into the box office trap and culture market with an eye on the return of investment, it is at least prone to be imitated and even promoted by the owners of capital marketing. Because the speed of reproduction is a solidifying element for the consolidation of the culture industry. In this way and as a paradoxical situation, just as the inventor or user of environmentally polluting products promotes the use of bicycles to reduce pollution, the agents of the commodification of culture also offer outstanding products of modern art as an alternative to popular art and culture; to benefit from both products.

Gilles Deleuze usually articulates his philosophical problems through the reading of other philosophers. Given this matter, he typically emphasizes a concept in a philosopher’s thought which might not seem crucial at the first glance. The concept of Expression, developed by Deleuze based on his reading of Spinoza in Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza, is one of these concepts, which is broad and multifaceted. The present paper investigates this concept considering the relationship between unity and multiplicity. So, it is the logical aspect of the concept of expression which has been discussed here. This article attempts to show how Deleuze brings the “logic of expression” into play to reject the priority of unity over multiplicity and vice versa and establish an immanent relation between them. For this purpose, first, the distinction of three elements of this logic has been described. These elements are: “what expresses itself”, “expression”, and “what is expressed”. Then it is shown how these three elements can only be considered by each other, in such a way that none of them will have priority over the other. To do so, this correlation is explained in three different ways: Firstly, every two elements of this logic can be distinguished only in respect of the third element. Secondly, since "expression" has a genetic role in the constitution of the essence of "what expresses itself", therefore "what is expressed" can only exist in "expression". Thirdly, according to the “rule of convertibility” that Deleuze takes from Spinoza, the object and the essence of the object have a reciprocal relationship, and for this reason, all three elements of the expression are correlated. The next part of the article elucidates the relationship between the concepts of unity and multiplicity by considering this correlation. Since "expression" is the multiplicity aspect of the logic of expression and "what expresses itself" is its unity and both are connected to "what is expressed", Therefore, unity and multiplicity will be mutual concepts. This interdependence of multiplicity and unity defines the concept of “immanence” according to Deleuze. Considering this logic, the last part of the article reconstructs Deleuze's interpretation of Spinoza's concepts of absolute substance and real distinction of attributes in an analytical way, to concretely reveal an example of the critical and transformative consequences of this logic. For this purpose, by assuming the logic of expression and the immanent relation of unity and multiplicity, it is shown that the understanding of the multiplicity of attributes requires the idea of ​​an absolutely infinite substance and that the idea of ​​substance requires the multiplicity of attributes that express its essence. so that in Deleuze's reading of Spinoza, neither attributes can be conceived without absolute substance, nor absolute substance can be conceived without infinite attributes.

Metaethical relativism is in the first place a theory about the ontological status of moral properties and the truth and justification of ethical judgments. Since truth-ascriptions of relative judgments are different from ordinary sentences, relativists should advance a semantic theory about how the content and truth of such sentences are determined. Contextualist take such sentences to be elliptic for a sentence containing a parameter that refers to a reference frame determined by the context of assertion. With the content of different assertions of a judgment varying from one context to other, contextualists are bound to consider the apparently genuine faultless disagreements, which are a main motivation for accepting moral relativism, as mere misunderstandings. Also, they are faced with other problems in pragmatics of moral assertions in cases of retraction and rejection. By refuting contextualism, “New relativists” claim that it is just the truth of moral judgments that is relative, and the content of such judgments does not vary among their different assertions. John MacFarlane makes such a move by adding an index to the circumstances of evaluation of such judgments which is determined by context of assessment, and refers to assessors' preferences. In his de se relativism about values, Andy Egan presents a different theory, which he claims it to be the best if we were inclined to adopt naturalism, internalism, and cognitivism. By accepting David Lewis' theory of de se attitudes, which considers content of sentences to be properties instead of propositions, Egan claims that the value judgments have centered world properties as contents which have no corresponding possible world propositions.  By making value judgments, people self-ascribe such properties. Using Lewis' theory of value, Egan claims that the content of value properties is “being disposed to desire to desire x”. This property does not vary among different assertions of a sentence. Combining this theory with Robert Stalnaker's theory of assertion, Egan claims that he is not faced with the problem of lost disagreement. Like MacFarlane, Egan adds an assessor index to the circumstances of evaluation of relative sentences, but unlike him he claims it to be determined by the context of use. In addition, Egan makes two criticisms against the contextualist account of value judgments, which we have called the naturalist and the internalist problems. Both problems stem from the fact that according to contextualism, an assertion of some content can be evaluative while another assertion of the same content is non-evaluative. Egan claims that his account can avoid such problems. In the present paper, we show that Egan's attempts are unsuccessful. His account is faced with the same criticisms he leveled at contextualism; and if he tries to avoid such objections, his escape routes will open the way for contextualists as well. Also, by accepting Lewis' theory of content, Egan has taken on an additional burden, which is hard to defend.

Heidegger in Being and Time, following Kant, who considered transcendental logic as a condition for the possibility of empirical science, considers historicity as a transcendental condition of historiography. He turns the epistemological and methodological question of the historical sciences into an ontological question; that is, instead of asking “under what circumstances can the objectivity of the historical knowledge be confirmed?” he asks, “what kind of existence Dasein have that allows him to care about himself and the world, and understand the meaning of his past?” “And how is there such a thing as history at all?” In order to understand the importance of historicity in the general outline of the book, we should consider its relation to the main question of the work; “What is the meaning of Being?” Hence, this article pursues two goals; First, it tries to show the place of historicity in the whole work, in such a way that is clear how Heidegger first starts from the pre-theorical understanding of Dasein as “existence”, ang then moves toward the discovery of the main structure of existentials as “concern”; Then he introduces “temporality” as a transcendental structure of concern; And finally, it comes to this that the concrete form of temporality is “historicity”. The second goal of this article is to reinterpret this debate with regard to the question of “the meaning of Being”. In this regard, I try to explain that historicity, as a concrete form of temporality, shows the openness of Dasein as the scope of the emergence of the meaning of Being and beings is a close event, which has its beginning and end, as standing on the possibilities it is thrown to them and it takes from its heritage. From this point of view, Heidegger, following Kant’s tradition, considers meaning- giving as a finite process, but unlike Kant, who considered this finitude in terms of the dependence on sensory intuition of being in the world, and thus as the ontic, he considers it as an ontological. He Knows that it arose from the special way of existence of Dasein. Being and Time finally reaches the point that the meaning-giving process which, as the verb “temporalizing” and “hisoricizing” is expressed in trads of past, present, future, or in the other words, heritage, fate, destiny. So, historical finitude reveals the concrete form of temporal finitude. The terms of heritage, fate and destiny each confirm the finitude od Dasein, and in this way, the finitude of the meaning-giving event. In its powerlessness, Dasein in undertakes its heritage in an authentic way. Dasein cannot be its own foundation, but is thrown to its possibilities.

One of Mūllā Ṣadrā’s logical innovations based on the theory of the primacy of existence is that “the definition of an object is unique to its recent differentia”. Mūllā Ṣadrā believes that in order to achieve true unity in composite quiddity, it is necessary to gather all the previous genuses and differentias in existence or in the same recent Form and differentia; in other words, in the recent Form and differentia, they are merged and depreciated. One of the consequences of such an attitude towards the recent Form and differentia - as the provider of the true unity of the composite quiddity - is that the previous materials and genuses are integrated in a simple way in the recent chapter, but each one, in a detailed way (that is, with actualities multiple) are not the constituents of the compound object and are considered outside of its truth. The inevitable result of the above point is that the inclusion of previous genuses and differentias in the definition of quiddity is not as an intrinsic component of that, but as equipment or branches of quiddity. Ṭabāṭabāʼī, as one of the most important commentators on Mūllā Ṣadrā’s view, did not accept this view and proposed three objections to it: 1) it is not appropriate to be content with the differentia alone; while the “definition” must be detailed 2) the exclusion of previous genuses and differentias from the truth of the object requires a revolution in essence 3) The exclusion of the genuses and differentias from the truth of the object is in conflict with “dress after dress” in the substantial motion. This article, after a brief reference to Mūllā Ṣadrā’s view on the uniqueness of the definition of an object through its recent differentia, presents Ṭabāṭabāʼī’s threefold criticisms with a critical attitude. Examination of these three criticisms led to the conclusion that none of Ṭabāṭabāʼī’s criticisms is correct and that Mūllā Ṣadrā’s intention is to exclude the genuses and differentias present in the detailed order, not the genuses and differentias mentioned in the brief and simple order of the recent differentia. Also, during the study and response to Ṭabāṭabāʼī’s criticisms, some of the hidden dimensions of Mūllā Ṣadrā’s view, such as the affirmative actuality of the genuses and the previous differentias.

The basis of the originality of existence created fundamental changes in philosophy that the essentials of such a theory were not followed even by Mulla Sadra. One of the essentials of authenticity of existence is the changes that take place in the principle of division of rationalities into primary and secondary rationalities. The division of rationalities into the first rationality is derived from the basis of originality and sensibility, which by proposing the theory of originality of existence and adherence to its accessories, all sensory, imaginary and intellectual perceptions have truth to the extent of benefiting from existence, and based on the theory of abstraction of general concepts from the external facts general concepts have a counterpart in the world of wisdom, and none of the rationalities can be considered to have only an abstract origin without having a counterpart.The division of intellects into the first and the second rational is one of the famous philosophical divisions that has been accepted in The philosophy of masha and sadra with different interpretations. This research, with the method of library, collection and analysis of information and comparison of opinions, seeks to prove the incorrect division of rationalities and enumerates the ontological results of such forms. On this basis, first the division of intellects on the basis of the principle of essence and the principle of existence is examined, then the incorrect causes of the division of intellects are explained, and finally the ontological results of the forms are divided into the division of the first and second intellects. Among the results of this research is that in the light of existence of having general concepts in the world and abstractions and the basis of the principle of existence, it is not possible to divide the rationals into the first and second rationals; Essential unity has a weak place in carrying, and existential concepts are carried over each other based on the connection that is established between them; The division of affairs into reality and credit is incorrect, and all things are real to the extent that they benefit from existence; The division of affairs into intrinsic and transverse is incorrect because it is based on the originality of nature, while on the basis of the originality of existence and the validity of nature, there is no place for it.

Sacrifice of Isaac by the command of God and by the hand of Abraham is a common narrative between Judaism, Christianity and some sects of Islam. In addition to Muslim and Christian sages and theologians such as Ibn ʿArabī', Kierkegaard, Augustine and Aquinas, this narrative has also attracted the attention of philosophers such as Thomas Hobbes, Kant, Hegel, Emmanuel Levinas and Derrida. Verses 1 to 19 of Chapter 22 of the Torah Genesis are the narration of Jehovah's command to Abraham to sacrifice Isaac. A command that Abraham, together with Isaac and his two slaves, traveled a three-day journey to Mount Moriah to fulfill, and just when Abraham took out the knife to slaughter his son, Jehovah's angel called him from the sky and forbade him to perform the sacrifice. Some church fathers, such as Clement and Tertullian, considered this story to be a prototype of Jesus' ascension to the cross. The explicit mention of the covenants and especially Paul's emphasis on the eternal power of God on the one hand and Abraham's faith in this absolute power that can bring even a slaughtered and dead child back to the arms of the father, and also Abraham's faith and suffering in this test are at the center Kierkegaard's attention and reflection are placed in various works such as Repetition, Either/Or, and especially Fear and Trembling. In the Holy Quran, the clearest reference to this narration is in verses 101 to 113 of Surah "As-Saaffat". This essay focuses on the religious-mystical thoughts of Ibn ʿArabī', a famous Muslim mystic, and Søren Kierkegaard, a Danish philosopher and theologian, who is mentioned as the founder of existentialism, compares Abraham's divine experiment to son sacrifice in Christian and Islamic narratives as the focus of his research. Ibn ʿArabī' in Isaac section of Fusus al-hikam (The bezels of wisdom) and Kierkegaard in the book of Fear and Trembling have attempted to interpret the divine experiment of Abraham. The main question of the research is the foundations and principles influencing the thought of Ibn ʿArabī' and Kierkegaard in the interpretation of the mentioned narrative. The results of the research show that the difference between the views of Ibn ʿArabī' and Kierkegaard is the type of view that each of them have on man and his place in the order of creation. The difference of opinion based on which is Abraham, the knight of faith and a believer in the “strength of absurd” in Kierkegaard's view and rejected in the interpretation of Isaac's face as a sheep according to Ibn ʿArabī'. Using the comparative method and relying on the data collected through library sources, this paper first compares the position of man in the thought system of Ibn ʿArabī' and Kierkegaard and then studies the opinions of both of them about the narrative of Isaac's sacrifice.

After the translation of logical and philosophical works of Greeks  in To Arabic, in the Islamic society, a serious conflict occurred between logic and Arabic grammar. The grammarians considered logic to be useless and irrelevant to their culture, and the logicians considered language just as a tool to convey the statements in the field of thought, and by the criteria of logic. This controversy is mainly represented within the famous debate between Abū Bishr Mattā ibn Yūnus and Abu Sa`īd Al-Sīrāfī, in which  one (Mattā) emphasizes the instrumentality of Arabic syntax, and denies its functionality in guidance and correctness of thought; while the other (al-Sirāfī) emphasizes the obsoleteness of logic and sufficiency of Arabic syntax to ensure the accuracy of thought. In this conflict, Farabi (as a logician) took a third position, despite logicians such as Ahmad ibn al-Tayyib al-Sarakhsī, Yaḥyá ibn ʿAdī and Abū Sulaymān Muhammad Sijistānī. In the usual linguistic discussions of the Islamic society, he adopted a new perspective by taking philosophical-linguistic issues relating to pre-Islamic period into account. Afterward he would find different answers to the problems that had arisen. He believed in a kind of “science of language" ("Elm al-Lesān") common among all languages of all societies, which due to this commonality, would be considered equivalent to logic, and perhaps a part of that. Therefore, logic and grammar were considered to have the same component, which is common among all languages. According to Farabi, ideally all special grammars in setting their partial rules, should follow the rules of this component, because in all societies the words of the language should be able to imitate  the meanings and the beings, and these logical rules can guarantee the imitation of relationships between meanings and categories that are derived from their beings in the Universe. Farabi's emphasis on the commonality of this kind of linguistic rules could be an evidence of his agreement on some sort of a universal grammar in which, the rules of utterances construction - specially the rules of construction of derivative words- plays the main role. Here is the evidence of Farabi's attention toward ancient traditions of linguistics, especially the ones influenced by Dionysius Thrax, Markus Terentius Varro and Priscianus Caesariensis. Dionysius Thrax wrote the first concise grammar of the Greek language influenced by Aristotelian thought. Varro  Brings to light two significant distinctions within the rules of language, which had never been considered before: one is the distinction between morphology (rules of word construction) and syntax (rules of phrase construction); and the other is the distinction between morphological changes and derivational changes in the words, as well as the distinction between their features and rules. Also Priscianus is one of the first linguists whom in order to adapt the Latin grammar to the Greek grammar, considered the Aristotelian logic and categorization to be the criteria of the rules of the language structures. The act of taking the rules of the Greek language, as a pattern for the Latin language rules reveals that he considered common general aspects among different  grammars. Farabi's statement on the newfound problem of the relation - or better to say, the opposition - of grammar and logic, which due to the cultural and religious condition specified to the Islamic world, was proposed for the first time in the history of linguistics; he introduces rules equivalent to logic rules, for construction of the words in all languages grammar. These rules are common among all languages, and they guarantee the words imitation of implied meanings. Farabi's understanding of the characteristics of these signified meanings, which themselves were derived from the beings of the external world, was based on a philosophical perspective toward the world and the beings; and he believed that among all different language rules, the rules of derivation have the greatest capacity ​​to signify the beings, in the same way that they are understood in philosophy. Al-Farabi in different parts of his works especially in the book of letters makes extensive use of the rules of three types of word structure, i.e. the words "possessive primitive words", "non-possessive primitive words" and "derivative words": For naming different levels of knowledge (including knowledge consisting of/ knowledge of referable and perceptible like white (abyadh); and an abstract and imperceptible independent knowledge like whiteness (bayādh) in all languages, the structure of words signifying to categories (including both substantial species and genuses, accidental species and genuses) in all languages; and also the characteristics of the word signifying to the most important philosophical concept in All languages ​​(of course, except Arabic language), which exactly imitates the characteristics of this concept in philosophy. Considering these linguistic opinions of Farabi, furthermore the history of linguistics after this era, we could truly consider Farabi beliefs on the unity of modes of being, modes of undrestanding and modes of signification, as well as a belief in an universal grammar prior to the  Modists (the believers in speculative grammar); a Linguistic approach in the late Middle Ages, mostly influenced by Priscianus in the history of thoughts, which continued to the contemporary period.

It is widely known contrary to the Hikmat-Mota'aliyya, which believes in composition through unification of matter and form, the peripatetic believes in composition through annexation of the two. The attribution of this opinion to the Peripatetics is so strong that no one doubts that they believe in annexation composition, despite research on the subject demonstrating that it is not so simple and that such an attribution cannot be attributed to the Peripatetic with such conviction and certainty. The goal of this article is to refute the assertation that attributed to the peripatetic.Those who believe in union or annexation composition have provided arguments to prove their position. Seyyed Sadr al-Din Dashtaki, also known as Seyyed Sanad, was the first to consider the combination of matter and form to be a union, and Mulla Sadra agreed with him. They document their opinion on previous philosophers in the same way that those who believe in annexation composition do. Seyyed Sanad, the innovator of the unified composition, also considers his theory to be based on the opinions of Ibn Sina and Bahmanyar and cites evidence from them to prove that matter and form exist outside as a one entity, he used Ibn Sina's statement that matter and form are one according to the entity and multiple according to the meaning. Furthermore, the combination of soul and body, which represent matter and form, is annexed, according to Bahmanyar's statement.While rejecting Sadr al-Din Dashtaki, Fayyaz Lahiji, who some consider to be an Ibn Sina follower, believes that matter and form exist as two distinct entities, and most philosophers believe in annexation combination. The majority of philosophers who mentioned meant peripatetics, because the majority of those at the time were peripatetic. Contemporaries of Fayyaz Lahiji, Mirdamad and his student Seyyed Ahmad Alavi, also consider the combination of matter and form to be annexed, rather than the  union combination in the mind, such as genus and differentia. Hakim Sabzevari, a admirer of Hikmat-Mota'aliayya and an interpreter of Mulla Sadr's works, disagrees with him on this point accepting annexation composition as the opinion of great philosophers, including Ibn Sina. As a result, The issue of composition by way of unification and composition by way of annexation is one of Sadr al-Din Dashtaki's innovations in the ninth century AH and has not been discussed previously. As a result, it was not discussed in the books of Ibn Sina, Farabi, Bahmanyar, and other Peripatetics prior to Dashtaki, and they did not discuss this issue, but during and after Sadr al-Din Dashtaki, many philosophers, mostly Peripatetics like Mirdamad and Fayyaz Lahiji, argued against Dashtaki on this point. If we present this issue to the Peripatetics before Dashtaki, we can find evidence in favor of both unification and annexation, so one of these two cannot be attributed to them, and only through tolerance can the Peripatetics be convinced of the annexation combination.

The third and the last stage of the revival of western natural law thinking in postmodern period started from the last third decade of the 20th century by philosophers' and lawyers' attention to human rights. The last western natural law theories have been explained and assessed during two chapters in this article. The first chapter has analyzed non-Thomist thought of natural law in that period. In this direction, Fuller offered the theory of "internal morality of law". There are at least three deficiencies of his theory. The first is that his definition of natural law is eighter a circular one, or couses positive law to be the criterion of identifying natural law, whereas natural lawyers put natural law as the criterion of positive one. The second deficiency is that the theory is just an innovation of words. The third and the last deficiency of Fuler's natural law theory is that the theory does not insist on positive rules to be moral. Dworkin called his theory of law "Constructive Interpretation". According to the theory, law is the best interpretation, which can be understood from interrelated legal data, like the acts of legislator, court jugments, legal basic texts and… . "Integrity" is an important keyword in his theory. He emphasized that legal claimes are interpretational jugments. They interpret a present legal act as a plain political affair. That is why Dworkin believed that history has an important role in his theory, unlike positive approaches to law. Infact, he was a proponent of interpretive theories of law and he always criticized semantic theories. In addition to the implication of his speech, which is the acceptance of relativism in the world of law and ethics, since Dworkin identified (moral) positive law as a perfect criterion of integral actions,  his theory about those human affairs, which have no enacted law, was wrong. The second chapter has assessed Finnis's theory as the newest neo-Thomist conception of natural law. Natural law in his view, is the intellectual judgment to do good actions. According to Finnis, a wise decision is one that is accomplished for the sake of a basic good. In his final view, basic goods are seven: bodily life, knowledge, skilful performance in work and play, friendship, marriage, practical reasonableness and harmony with the widest reaches and ultimate source of reality including meaning and value. He attributed to basic goods five characteristics as follows: self-evidence, being intrinsic, having no relation with each other, being equal with each other and having no inference from the fact. Finnis's theory has variant deficiencies, including that none of these features is an attribute of basic goods. Research method in this article is a synthetic one, which is traditional – intellectual – critical.

The Philosophical investigations in to the Essence of Human freedom (1809), known as the Treatise on Freedom, is Schelling's attempt to establish a system of freedom. Schelling's main concern in this treatise is to resolve the confrontation between freedom and necessity, which, in his view, is the focus of philosophy. Schelling's main concern in this treatise is to resolve the confrontation between freedom and necessity, which, in his view, is the focus of philosophy. The principle pursued in the fundamental search for the formation of the system and the solution for the conformity of the system and freedom is " identity", which in the true sense means that in pantheism it becomes possible as the only possible system of reason. By proposing and rejecting possible and deterministic interpretations of pantheism, especially in the system of Spinoza and Leibniz, he not only corrects them, but shows that the leading system of pantheism to determinism is the result of a misunderstood ontological understanding. This study shows how, according to Schelling, misinterpretation of this principle allows the incompatibility of system and freedom in different definitions of pantheism. And how Schelling's interpretation of the need to pay attention to "is" leads to an ontological question of the meaning and truth of being in the thought of German idealism. A critical reading of Schelling's attempt to eliminate possible misinterpretations of identity means prioritizing ontological issues over theological issues such as pantheism and explaining a single basic principle for establishing a system as the jointure of the order of being.In order to answer the relationship between pantheism and freedom, we turn to reflection on different interpretations of Schelling's pantheism, this is done by criticizing and examining the errors in Spinoza's and Leibniz's misinterpretations of pantheism. Then, by discussing "is" and showing Schelling's transition from the usual understanding of the principle of identity, we question the true meaning of identity. Finally, we come to the position of answering this question, how does Schelling, with the correct interpretation of the true meaning of "is" in these statements, look for a foundation for the formation of the system and a solution for the compatibility of the system and freedom? Based on Schelling's new understanding of the principle of identity, the leading of a pantheistic system to determinism does not arise from its pantheistic and theological elements, but is the result of ontological misunderstanding and resulting misunderstandings. The wrong context that has become the root of such misunderstandings is the misunderstanding of the meaning of "is" and the role of the conjunction in the sentence. Therefore, the question of pantheism, as a question of the system, leads to the question of "is" and this means changing and transforming the theological question into an ontological question and planning the ontological foundations of the freedom system. Heidegger uses this material to show that the determining element in the question of pantheism is the ontological element, and according to this meaning of the principle of identity, the question of the possibility of a system of freedom is related to the adequate understanding of existence and its fundamental determination, and the question about pantheism is considered He attributes the question about the system to the question of "is" and the way of connecting the jointure of beings.

This article proposes of analyzing and investigating Husserl's approach to other’s constitutions, as alter ego. What emerges from Husserl's statement in the fifth meditation of Cartesian meditations is the other’s constitution as a commencement for the foundation of a world in which objectivity is available to all. Husserl calls this world intersubjective. Husserl's account of this constitution includes two basic steps: In the first step, the second reduction implements, by which all intentions, motivations, meanings, etc., aimed at others other than me, are neglected. Then, by expressing the character of the other’s perception as an indirect presence, the meaning of the other is transferred from my body to the other’s body, through an assimilative apperception and by a meaning transfer in the pairing process. At least three serious criticisms can make of this description: (1) The second epoché removes all the meanings directed at the other from the ego. Therefore, any reference to the other that is supposed to acquire its meaning from the ego excludes. In the transcendental sphere, the second epoché takes place by abstracting from everything gives to me as something other than myself; therefore, what remains after the execution of this epoché is only "I." In the second epoché, everything that concerns explicitly I leaves me in what Husserl calls "the special sphere of ownness." This reduction includes the decision only to consider what belongs to me; therefore, to find how "I" gives meaning to the subjects who are bodies as perceptual objects belonging to this reduced sphere of "ownness" and also to discover those capacities that transcended as subjects, this reduction implements. (2) Husserl's description of the body leaves out many aspects of it, And even at the starting point, it does not consider the perceptual difference between the perception of my body and the body of others. He emphasizes the claim that a person's own body is uniquely separated from other animal and human bodies. A person may be supposed to experience this body as an organism when he attributes to its feelings, perceptions, and meaningful actions. Husserl's description of a person's experience of his own body seems to be a particularly limited experience, because Husserl fails to explain the vast part of physical experiences that are known as experiences beyond one's control. Such descriptions of the body seem to be more suitable for mechanical beings that rely on the governance and control of the body.(3) Husserl's statement to distinguish between organism and pseudo-organism is unclear, obscure, and unsatisfactory. Expressing ambiguous terms such as variable but harmonious behavior, as well as not providing a criterion to recognize the harmonious behavior of an organism, are among the things that make Husserl's description difficult. First, in this type of reasoning, it is usually not clear how much improvisation - that is, how many observers apart from the revealed other - is needed to ensure a sufficient number of cases of harmonious behavior. Second, it is also unclear what one should do when faced with another person without having the opportunity to observe their behavior several times. That is, it is unclear to what extent single behaviors or limited behaviors can demonstrate the criterion of behavior harmony.As a conclusion, regarding (1), (2) and (3), despite Husserl's remarkable insights, suggest that the constitution of alter ego appears to have problems that are far from being resolved.

Aesthetic concepts explaining with scientific functions, can be an inspiring idea to lead to a new and special form of aesthetics. A form of aesthetics that as its most important work, produces relations between the aesthetic dimension as the material form of the artwork, and material functions in natural science. Establishing such relationships, may first and foremost seem like an idealistic simulation; An effort that is supposed to reduce the latter to an allegory of the first system by finding similarities between two incongruous scientific and aesthetic systems. However, it should be noted that such discussions are not aimed at producing allegorical relationships between scientific and aesthetic systems, and they have no relation with the subsequent reductionism, but by maintaining the independence between these two systems from each other, they try to move in the boundaries, regions and intersection blocks between them, and rooting the modern aesthetic concepts in the scientific systems, or by discovering and even "inventing" these intersection blocks and establishing material relations, try to explain aesthetic concepts by scientific systems. Therefore, the aesthetic concepts located in the intersection block will no longer be an allegory of scientific functions, but they are nothing except a slice of these functions but with a different formulation. Because of their adherence to scientific procedures in producing material relations between the material form of the artwork and the material functions of natural science, such discussions can be considered as a form of materialist aesthetics. As a methodological proposal, materialistic aesthetics can start its work by discovering the trace of a scientific system in an aesthetic system, or in other words, by reconstructing that intersection block that is achieved by intersecting two sets. In this regard, the discovery and reconstruction of the relationship between the Frankfurt School’s critical aesthetics and Leibniz's mathematics can be an outstanding and inspiring example.This research has tried to root Benjamin's concept of Aura in Leibniz's differential theory and Deleuze's special understanding of singularity, and explain Aura based on it. Due to his influence on Leibniz, Deleuze offers a special understanding of mathematical singularity, which can be considered exactly equivalent to extreme point in the general calculus of curves. By intersecting the concept of Aura with differential theory, then discovering conceptual equivalences, identifying nodes, and producing a junction block, it was shown that Aura can be considered as a singularity on the aesthetic space-time curves. Then, based on this experimental method, an attempt was made to formulate the initial and proposed design of a materialist aesthetic as a secondary achievement of the research. Based on this plan, the main idea of the proposed materialistic aesthetics is to intersect the aesthetic system with the scientific systems to produce intersection blocks and areas; in such a way that the aesthetic concepts established in these intersecting blocks can be reconstructed as scientific-material functions. To understand this issue, help was taken from the theory of sets in mathematics.

“According to “Confessions,” what is the root of the pessimistic view of St. Augustine and other first Christian philosophers on desire and pleasure, and why does this philosopher think that pleasures are evil?” This article is going to provide some insights about this question.Augustine believes that “the delight of loving God” is the one and only real pleasure, and all other earthly pleasures are considered as evil. But why are earthly pleasures evil? Augustine explains this from three different aspects: At first glance, it seems that Augustine blames some ignorance or perceptual (or cognitive) limitation for the deviation of pleasure and desire. Although this theory is consistent with some parts of “Confessions,” it is not consistent with the other parts. Augustine believes that even the pleasures and desires of children are evil. This clearly shows that in his philosophy, the evil of physical pleasure is not related to perceptual errors or ignorance. It seems that even the instincts are evil, and Augustine thinks these basic desires (instincts) are not perceptual. According to Confession’s text, Augustine believes in “original sin” and considers it as the cause of the deviation of the desires and pleasures of human beings. This Christian doctrine says that everyone is born sinful. Original sin is the guilt of disobedience to God passed on from Adam and Eve to all subsequent generations. Because of this disobedience, human pleasures and desires also became sinful. Although this theory justifies the issue in many cases, it cannot cover all the problems. If Augustine attributes the evil of human pleasure and desire only to the “original sin,” then he must always regard human desires and “needs” as evil. But he emphasizes in book 10th of “Confessions” that some prophets, such as “Noah” and “John the Baptist,” would eat any meat they wanted to satisfy their needs and never deviated, but “Esau” deviated once he consumed lentils. “greed” can be cited as the cause of the diversion of desires and pleasures. According to the holy Bible, the snake first seduced Eve, and then Eve seduced Adam to eat the forbidden fruit. What the snake did with Eve was nothing except arousing his greed. In fact, Adam and Eve became sinful due to their greed. It is clear that what caused them to be exiled from Eden was the desire (greed) they had before the descent and original sin. It should be noted that the above three answers are all the causes of deviation, but each one is itself the cause of another. In other words, human greed is the cause of the original sin, and the original sin is the cause of ignorance, error, and deviation of pleasure and desire. And these three causes (on three different levels) explain the deviation in our pleasures, inclinations, and desires.